

## Abstract

B.V. Sokolov The Truth about the Great Patriotic War (collection of articles)  
"The Truth about the Great Patriotic War" is one of the first serious attempts in Russian historical science to tell about those facts that really took place, but were either carefully concealed or received the opposite interpretation. The figures of military losses of the USSR, the contribution of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (especially the United States) to the victory over Germany, the truth about the Soviet economy (more precisely, the truth about colossal postscripts during the war years) all this is also our history. ...

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## **Sokolov B**

# **V The truth about the Great Patriotic War (collection of articles)**

B.V. Sokolov

The Truth about the Great Patriotic War

(collection of

articles) "The Truth about the Great Patriotic War" is one of the first serious attempts in Russian historical science to tell about those facts that really took place, but were either carefully concealed or received the opposite interpretation. The figures of military losses of the USSR, the contribution of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (especially the United States) to the victory over Germany, the truth about the Soviet economy (more precisely, the truth about colossal postscripts during the war years) all this is also our history.

The well-known Moscow researcher, Doctor of Philology Boris Vadimovich Sokolov, on the basis of archival documents, in the language of numbers, almost always tells the bitter, but always the truth.

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## Preface The

Second World War was the greatest catastrophe that mankind has ever experienced. An integral part of the Second World War was the Soviet-German war, which in our country is called the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union of all participating countries suffered the greatest losses in people and, accordingly. The Red Army inflicted the greatest casualties on the Wehrmacht, so it is customary to talk about the decisive contribution of the USSR to the victory over Germany. We emphasize that such a statement is actually true only in terms of human losses. One on one, without the support of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the USSR with Germany, Stalin would not have been able to cope with Hitler. England and the USA not only supplied our country with critical types of raw materials, materials and equipment, without which the level of Soviet production necessary for the needs of the war could not be maintained, but they also diverted almost the entire German fleet and the overwhelming majority of aviation, and in the last war year, when the forces of the Red Army were already largely depleted - up to 40% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht. These questions were carefully retouched and obscured in Soviet historiography. This was either not talked about at all, or they repeated the traditional statement about the low share of Anglo-American deliveries in relation to the total volume of Soviet production. As for the losses, they preferred to remember only their total value of 20 million, without specifying what part of them were the losses of the Red Army and how they correlated with the losses of the Wehrmacht. In the last months of the existence of the communist regime, the official figure of losses was raised to 27 million, and then, already in the years of the triumph of democracy, reduced to 26.6 million, and the authorities try to calculate the losses of the armed forces by only a third of this number and almost equate to the losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Eastern Front.<sup>{1}</sup> The question that the Soviet Union in the Second World War was not a victim of aggression, but a real aggressor, was definitely not formulated either in the former Soviet or in the current Russian historiography. Although the fact of the Soviet attack on Finland is now generally recognized, it was justified in the need to ensure the security of the USSR on the eve of a future clash with Germany, as well as in

the intransigence of the Finnish side, on which they are trying to lay part of the responsibility for the military conflict. Meanwhile, the Soviet aggression against Finland did not fundamentally differ from the German one against Poland, and the peaceful annexation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Bukovina - from the equally peaceful German annexation of Austria and the Czech Republic. Stalin and Hitler were dictators who led totalitarian states and sought hegemony in Europe. On the way to this hegemony, a military clash between the USSR and Germany was inevitable, and it depended only on the will of chance, who would start first. After the publication of Viktor Suvorov's books and the stormy controversy around them, it became obvious to any unbiased observer that the Soviet attack on Germany was being prepared almost simultaneously with Operation Barbarossa and absolutely independently of it. If the Wehrmacht's Balkan campaign had dragged on for some reason, Stalin would have had time to strike first, which, however, would not fundamentally affect either the course or the outcome of World War II.

Answering all of the above questions is necessary, first of all, in order to understand the role and place of our country in the world before and now. The Western allies had no sympathy for either Hitler or Stalin, but due to objective reasons they were forced to support the latter. These reasons by no means boil down to the fact that Germany, infringed by the Treaty of Versailles, in search of revenge, first had to face the victorious parties in the First World War. There was also a global, deeper aspect. Both communism and National Socialism alike aspired to world domination. However, economically and militarily, Germany was much stronger than the USSR. This superiority was determined not so much by the number of tanks or aircraft, iron and steel smelting, coal and oil mining, but by the level of training of workers and military personnel, the general cultural and educational level of the population, which was much higher in Germany. The victory of the stronger Hitler in the war carried, accordingly, a much greater threat both to the interests of the United States and England, and to all of humanity as a whole. And this victory was by no means an incredible event even in the conditions of a real anti-Hitler coalition (for example, if the German atomic project

managed to implement before the American and even before the entry of the allied forces into the territory of the Reich). In this case, the interests of Russia and humanity coincided. If Germany had won, the USSR would have ceased to exist, the bulk of Russian territory would have been occupied, and Russia could not have been reborn as a truly independent state. The losses of the civilian population, even if the war were lightning fast and did not last long, would hardly have been less than they were in the Great Patriotic War. Then the majority of military personnel would have died in the camps, and an even greater part of the inhabitants of the occupied (and non-occupied) territories would have become victims of starvation. In addition, at least 2 million Jews and Gypsies would have been additionally exterminated, as well as a considerable number of people of other nationalities who, for one reason or another, were objectionable to the Nazis. For all mankind, in the event of the triumph of Hitler, the prospect of a series of new wars with an unclear outcome and with a high probability of the use of weapons of mass destruction would open up.

The Soviet Union, even having won a military victory, still economically remained weaker than both former allies and defeated opponents. It took only 45 years for its collapse as a result of the Cold War. Communism, like National Socialism, could only prolong its existence by achieving world domination. With the advent of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, this goal has become absolutely unattainable. But in doing so, the purpose for the existence of the Soviet Union was also lost. The hopes for expanding the territorial limits of their dominance through the "world revolution", which nourished the nomenklatura in the times of Lenin and Stalin, already came to naught under Khrushchev. As the development of thermonuclear weapons reduced the possibilities of military blackmail against the rest of the world, and as the confrontation with the West in various regions required more and more funds, the inefficient economy of the USSR approached collapse. The nomenklatura's striving to snatch the largest possible piece of the national pie ultimately led to perestroika and the collapse of totalitarianism and empire.

Today, half a century after the end of World War II, we are trying to objectively assess what this war was for our people.

and other peoples of the USSR, how exactly and why the victory was achieved, which in Soviet mythology and the Russian one that inherited it is traditionally called "great". Yes, it was great, but only in the sacrifices made, not in the results achieved. From the point of view of eternity, several territories that the USSR took possession of for four and a half decades, and a dozen satellites that remained in the Soviet orbit, and even less, are insignificant achievements. Such a conclusion, of course, is extremely painful for national vanity. Therefore, the problems of military losses, genuine Soviet plans in 1939-1941. and the role of Western aid is still hotly debated, which was confirmed both by the discussion around the Suvorov books, and the stubborn desire of researchers closely connected with the Ministry of Defense, without stopping at direct falsifications, in every possible way to underestimate the losses of the Soviet armed forces and overestimate the losses of the Wehrmacht - in order to confirm the words poet "Yes, we know how to fight." The reverse was proved by the failure of the Chechen adventure and by an impartial scientific study of the results of the Great Patriotic War.

Note that the tendency to underestimate one's own losses and overestimate the losses of the enemy is not at all new and is not peculiar to the Soviet-Russian tradition alone. To one degree or another, the military of all countries and at all times suffer from it and have suffered. However, in democratic states, civil power is able to effectively limit the imagination of people in uniform, since society is interested in the most complete account of its own victims and in the most accurate assessment of the losses of the opposing side, in order to really take into account the danger that may come from the enemy in the future, and have a real idea on the effectiveness of their own armed forces. In Russia, which practically did not know real democracy, the most favorable conditions have long existed for falsifying military losses. Here you can start with the great A.V. Suvorov, whose last name was used as a pseudonym by the author of "Icebreaker". According to legend, when, after the capture of Ishmael, one of his subordinates asked Alexander Vasilyevich how to show the loss of the Turks in the report, the future generalissimo, without hesitation, answered: "Write more, why should you feel sorry for them, adversaries." Adversaries were not spared, at least on paper, and in later

wars. Especially astronomical and very far from the true values reached the loss of the enemy in the Great Patriotic War, however, even later the adversaries had a hard time, if not in battles, then in victorious reports. Thus, in Russian reports, the number of killed Chechen "militants" exceeded the adult male population of the republic. Enemy losses have always been calculated according to the principle of one anecdote about Chapaev, which we will give in a slightly softened form: "Hey, Petka, where is your saber? - Oh, Vasily Ivanovich, I was driving to you, I came across ten Cossacks. I chopped them all, oh I broke the last saber. - And if you tell the truth? - Well, Vasily Ivanovich, there were not ten Cossacks, but three. I cut them down, but broke the saber. - But if you tell the truth? - Well, not three, there was one Cossack, but a saber - And if you still tell the truth? - I see, Vasily Ivanovich, you can't hide anything from you. Listen, how it was. I was driving, suddenly I saw: my naked ass was sticking out from behind the bushes. "Oh, Petka, what I love you for is because you always tell the truth. Here, hold the saber." For this reason, it is impossible to take as a basis for calculations

the data of one side on the losses of the other (with the exception of the number of prisoners). However, the data on one's own losses is also not ideal and, as a rule, suffers from incompleteness: in a combat situation, it is difficult to trace the fate of each soldier and take into account all the victims. The absolute size of losses also plays a role here - the larger it is, the relatively higher the proportion of unaccounted for losses. In addition, much depends on the nature of society. In England and the USA, the relatives of almost all military personnel made efforts to find out their fate, and the military departments were forced to send notices to almost all the dead and missing, in particular, and due to legal necessity: issues of inheritance, etc. The same laws also operated in Germany, where totalitarianism had not yet had time to exterminate these traditions of civil society. In the USSR, the attitude towards a person as a simple cog in the state machine has already taken root. The Soviet people had practically no property, and in practice, the relatives of the dead and missing did not always need legally strictly formalized documents on the fate of their loved ones. In addition, many fighters and commanders

all relatives died during the war, and millions of others were displaced as a result of evacuation to the East or sent to work in the West, in Germany. Therefore, it was impossible to calculate more or less accurately the losses of both the Red Army and the civilian population in the first post-war years. Since there was no pressure from the public, a more or less detailed and accurate calculation of the victims of the Second World War in the USSR was never made. Because of this circumstance, we are forced to base our calculations on an estimate of the total population of the USSR at the beginning and end of the war, as well as on some indirect data that correlates with the level of irretrievable losses of troops. On the whole, however, we have to abandon the opinion, widespread among the general public, that sooner or later our losses in the war will be established almost by name, or at least with an accuracy of tens of thousands of people. This will never happen, and the accuracy of calculating the military losses of the population of the USSR will always fluctuate within a few million. Purely theoretically, one can try to more accurately establish the losses of the Red Army by comparing the data on the number of all its units on various dates throughout the war. Commanders often overestimated this number in order to obtain more food, ammunition and other supplies, as well as to minimize losses. However, most of this distortion would have been removed by the subtraction process, since it can be assumed that most of the data were overestimated. However, such a project is hardly feasible, as it requires too much time and money.

The fact that the human losses suffered by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War many times exceeded the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front is recognized by most researchers. This ratio was determined by the fundamental flaws of the Soviet system, which leveled the personality, depriving people of the desire to show initiative and, in general, to show independence. The consequence of this was the low individual fighting qualities of the fighters and commanders, the inability of the commanders and their headquarters to adequately lead large masses of troops and their desire to succeed at any cost, regardless of the victims. It cannot be said that Stalin and other Soviet leaders did not know



about these shortcomings of the Red Army, but, obviously, they, at least subconsciously, felt their irremovability under the existing system of government, which, of course, they were not going to change. Hitler's totalitarianism was much younger - before the start of the war, he dominated Germany for only 6 years. In addition, the Fuhrer, on principle, did not allow drastic changes in the army and industry, trying to keep them as effective weapons for a future war. In the USSR the situation was different. The Red Army and the Soviet military-industrial complex were created after the October Revolution, which completely destroyed both the former army and the former industrial agricultural Russia, the structure that eliminated the elements of free enterprise that were preserved in Nazi Germany. Therefore, the strength of Soviet totalitarianism was only in the ability to mobilize all the resources of the country for the needs of the war, create a large army And equipped with military equipment, and ~~population~~ fully control over the fully in the face of the most severe defeats at the front. However, Stalin could not effectively use powerful armed forces or create a military economy truly independent of supplies from outside, following the example of the German one, in particular, due to the significant industrial backwardness of Russia in 1917 compared to Germany, and the preservation of this backwardness until 1941

It so happened that the only article in this collection, which tells about a specific battle of the Great Patriotic War, is devoted to the Battle of Kursk. There is an element of chance here: in 1993, the Military Historical Research Institute of the German Ministry of Defense invited the author to a conference in Ingoldstadt, which considered this particular battle. However, in randomness, you can see a pattern. It was the Battle of Kursk that became the largest battle not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. By that time, two whole years had already passed since the German attack on the USSR, and all the advantages that the Wehrmacht received due to the surprise of the invasion had long lost their significance. The Soviet Union had fully deployed its military potential, was able to use significant Lend-Lease supplies and had an army manned and equipped with

two years of experience in fighting, in terms of numbers and weapons, it seriously outnumbered the enemy. Nevertheless, as was shown in our report, from the point of view of military art, the Red Army lost the Battle of Kursk, because, with the enormous superiority that it possessed, the relatively modest results achieved do not justify the monstrous losses in people and equipment reported by it. By the way, in terms of the degree of inconsistency with the real course of events, the Soviet mythology of this battle will give odds to the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad. The reports of the German participants in the mentioned conference leave no stone unturned on this myth. I would especially like to highlight the work of Karl-Heinz Frieser, dedicated, in particular, to the analysis of the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka.<sup>{2}</sup> The German historian was inspired to write it by watching the Soviet film "Arc of Fire" from the film epic "Liberation". He found the film's picture of the greatest tank battle to be wholly false. On the material of the German archives, Frieser proved that the Soviet claims that the Germans lost 300 or 400 tanks near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943, are nothing more than a poetic exaggeration contained in the reports of Soviet tank commanders. In fact, the 2nd German SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army near Prokhorovka, irretrievably lost only 5 tanks, and another 43 tanks and 12 assault guns were damaged, while the irretrievable losses of only 3 corps of the 5th 1st Guards Tank Army, according to Soviet reports, coinciding in this case with the German ones, at least 334 tanks and self-propelled guns. And this despite the fact that the Soviet side had an almost fourfold superiority - together with two corps called up in the army of P. Rotmistrov, tank and mechanized - up to 1000 armored vehicles against no more than 273 from the Germans. There is an oral tradition from the words of eyewitnesses that after the Battle of Prokhorov in Moscow, Stalin called Rotmistrov "on the carpet" and said something like this: "What are you, an asshole, ruined the entire army in one day, but did nothing?" However, the Supreme Commander refused to bring the unlucky commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army to trial: after all, the Soviet troops won the Battle of Kursk. As a result, born

the legend of the Soviet success near Prokhorovka. For this purpose, the number of German tanks was overestimated by two and a half times - up to 700, and their losses - by 5-7 times, up to 300-400 vehicles, in order to make them comparable with the Soviet ones. I had a chance to talk with one of the participants in the Prokhorov battle, L.V. Chechkov. Then he was a foreman, commander of the T-34 tank. Although the tank was burned down, Leonid Vasilyevich was lucky enough to survive. But out of 50 of his friends in the tank corps formed in Transbaikalia, only five left the battlefield alive near Prokhorovka. Most of the Soviet tankers did not have the necessary combat experience and received a baptism of fire on the Kursk Bulge. This undoubtedly affected the results of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The true reasons for the termination of the offensive of the Army Group "South", contrary to the widespread opinion in Soviet historiography, that the Germans' refusal to continue the "Citadel" operation was caused by the failure near Prokhorovka (which in reality did not happen), lie in the fact that the Soviet attack against Orlovsky had already begun bridgehead, and therefore there was no chance of encircling the Red Army grouping near Kursk. The continuation of the attack on Kursk from the south was an unjustified risk and in the future could lead to the encirclement and death of German tank formations. The victory at Prokhorovka still could not change the overall strategic situation, unfavorable for the German side. In general, the Soviet command clearly

underestimated the ability of the Wehrmacht to restore and even increase its forces after the disaster at Stalingrad and did not pay due attention to the combat training of troops and staffs. Meanwhile, there were generals in the Red Army who assessed the situation more realistically and fully paid for their realism. Thus, the head of the Smolensk Artillery School, Major General of Artillery E.S. Petrov, had the imprudence to express the opinion at one meeting that after Stalingrad the Germans "will make up for their losses, after which they will still be strong, and we must reckon with them." He was immediately arrested and sentenced to 25 years in the camps.{2a}

The reasons for the heavy losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, as well as in subsequent battles of the final period of the war, I think, are also explained by the following reason. Due to the high level

casualties in the first years of the war, officers with military experience survived mainly at the level of the regiment and above. In the platoon-company link and even the battalion of commanders who started the war, as well as sergeants and foremen, very few survived. Therefore, it was very difficult to transfer experience to new recruits. Hundreds of thousands and millions of poorly trained fighters continued to die before they could cause serious damage to the enemy. Data on the successes of the

Soviet military economy, as well as the very fact of victory in the Great Patriotic War, served for decades as a powerful propaganda argument in favor of the viability and progressiveness of socialism in comparison with capitalism. In a number of articles in our collection, considerations are expressed that information about the Soviet production of weapons and military equipment during the war years was deliberately inflated by enterprises and people's commissariats due to postscripts {3} and that without Lend-Lease supplies, the Soviet economy could not have ensured victory for the Red Army. It should be noted that indirect evidence of the overestimation of data on the Soviet production of weapons and military equipment is the fact that the number of tanks, guns and combat aircraft that were in the army during all the war years was only from 22 to 60% of their total number, and this the indicator steadily fell towards the end of the war. {3a) Most likely, most of the unproduced weapons and equipment were constantly listed in reserve, repair or in the process of transportation, in fact, existing only on paper. A loophole for postscripts was also opened by the delivery of military equipment to the front "in bulk", without crews, when it was quite difficult to control exactly how much was received

tanks or planes and when.

A special article included in the appendix reveals the true scale of Soviet military spending at the decline of the empire, in the mid-1980s, about half of the gross national product. It also proves that in terms of GNP, the USSR lagged behind the United States by 6-7 times and that official statements that the level of Soviet production was about two-thirds of the American one are nothing more than a propaganda fantasy, designed to sweeten the existence of the vast majority of the population who knew about the West only from Soviet newspapers. At the end of the 80s, when

this article was written, even many economists thought such a degree of militarization of our economy incredible. Now, when we are all witnessing the collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex, such an assessment no longer raises sharp objections. It turned out that many millions of workers worked in military factories, that there are entire cities focused exclusively on military needs and with the collapse of the empire and a sharp reduction in military orders, doomed to death. The tragedy of our situation is aggravated by the fact that such cities, for reasons of secrecy and because of the need to provide their inhabitants with a higher standard of living, were built at a distance from other industrial centers, and with the stoppage of military factories, the problem of unemployment in them becomes practically insoluble. The opportunity for quick and effective conversion, associated with the refusal to maintain the capacity for the production of weapons in the event of mobilization, was lost at the majority of military enterprises in the early 1990s. In the USA and other Western countries, the military-industrial complex is not so narrowly specialized, since it was created not under administrative-command, but under market conditions and is not so isolated geographically and economically from the rest of the industry. Therefore, the conversion there is much easier to carry out. In general, the concept of "imaginary", "imaginary value" introduced in this article in relation to the Soviet economy has a much broader application for characterizing the socialist heritage as a whole. In many ways, the victory in the Great Patriotic War turned out to be imaginary, although for those who won this victory with their own blood, it forever remained true and holy. But the picture of the war that Soviet historiography has been painting for decades, with good reason, must be recognized as imaginary. The true history of the Soviet-German war has yet to be written. The articles of our collection, of course, cannot replace such a fundamental work. They are intended only to indicate the most important and painful problems in the study of the past war and indicate possible options for their solution. The author is well aware of the need for further research. Thus, in particular, the assumption of falsification of the data of Soviet military production requires confirmation both on the material of the primary statistics of individual enterprises, and by comparing technology.

production of armaments and equipment in the USSR and Germany, taking into account the exact amount of aluminum, armored steel and other types of raw materials and materials consumed per tank and aircraft of various designs in the two countries during the war. An article devoted to

Soviet collaborators is also published as an appendix. According to the terms of the newspaper publication, it was divided into two parts, but was originally conceived as a single whole. At the time of the publication of this work, the very topic of collaborationism had just ceased to be taboo in our country. From the point of view of a Western reader, our article did not contain anything fundamentally new, but for a Soviet and post-Soviet reader (the first part of the publication appeared in the last months of the existence of the USSR, the second - after its collapse) here much could sound like a discovery. For example, for some reason, no one wondered whether the inhabitants of the Baltic states or Ukraine and Belarus, who collaborated with the Germans, could be considered traitors, whose lands were occupied by Soviet troops in 1939-1940. Who did they betray? Those who, against the will of the peoples, annexed their countries? Incidentally, for the indigenous population of the Baltic states, life under German occupation was even better than after their second "liberation" by the Red Army. And the Belarusians under German domination had such opportunities for the development of the national language and culture, which they did not have under Soviet rule until the end of the 80s and early 90s. At the same time, in these same countries, very significant groups of the population, primarily Jews and Gypsies, were almost completely doomed to death as part of the genocide carried out by the Nazis. The tragedy of the collaborators was that they were forced to fight against one criminal regime in alliance with another, no less criminal, and inevitably found themselves, to one degree or another, involved in the crimes of the Nazis, including the extermination of the Jews. Although it must be remembered that not all soldiers of the Baltic and Slavic SS divisions or soldiers of local security battalions in practice participated in the implementation

genocide.

Disputes about Russian collaborators are ongoing both in Russia and among the Russian emigration to this day. Attention is drawn to the figure of General A. A. Vlasov, who is often considered an ideological

a fighter against Bolshevism and almost the founder of the Russian liberation movement. Meanwhile, all the available facts indicate that the future head of the ROA in life was only concerned with the problem of his military career, for the sake of which he showed both ingenuity and heroism. If Vlasov really was going to fight against Stalin with the help of Hitler, what prevented him from surrendering at least in the autumn of 1941 in the Kiev pocket? However, for several weeks he went out to his own forests, as he later tried, together with the remnants of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army, to cross the front line and only by chance ended up in German captivity. Then, in the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht was at the pinnacle of success, the victory of Germany seemed, if not inevitable, then very likely. Vlasov, on the other hand, was well aware that in the Red Army his career was essentially over. In the event of release from captivity after the war, the lieutenant general, with the most favorable outcome, could only count on resignation or appointment to an insignificant position. Such was, in fact, the fate of those Soviet generals released from captivity who were lucky enough to escape the death penalty or the camps. Among the Germans, Vlasov became, in fact, a potential head of the Russian government and army - in case of a German victory. Back in December 1940, at a meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, he, perhaps the only one, spoke directly about the superiority of the Wehrmacht in the level of discipline and combat training: "We live on the border (the 99th division, then commanded by Vlasov, was stationed in the area Przemyśl, at the very border with German-occupied Poland. - B. S.), every day we see the Germans. Wherever the German platoon goes, they go exceptionally clearly, they are all uniformly dressed. I pointed out to my fighters: "Here is the capitalist army, and we must achieve 10 times more results. "And the fighters paid attention. After all, for 100 meters we see each other well and, observing the German platoons, our platoons began to pull up tightly. Thus, drill training is exclusively disciplinary, and we turn to it great attention. There were cases when a German officer greeted us clearly, but ours did not greet us. Then we said that the friendly side should be welcomed and now they began to greet us quite well. "{4} Perhaps the memory of the army of the "friendly side" was one of incentives

cooperation between Vlasov and the Germans, but a necessary condition for such cooperation was the capture of the general. In the collaborationism of Vlasov and many others, it was precisely selfish interests, the desire to survive at any cost, that were strong. Vlasov, as a general, had a lot of chances to survive in captivity and without betrayal. Millions of ordinary Soviet prisoners of war had much less of them. Here the choice was often very tough - either cooperation in one form or another with the enemy, or starvation. Many residents of the occupied territories had the same choice, who had to work in factories, transport or in schools opened by the occupiers in order to receive rations and feed themselves and their families. Subsequently, many of them were convicted as "accomplices". Former Vlasovite L. A. Samutin, who was safely extradited by the British to the Soviets in 1946, and before that in 1941 had known the charms of the German camp for Soviet prisoners, wrote in his memoirs: This noble indignation is all the more easy to kindle in oneself when never in one's life, not only oneself, did one experience real hunger, nor even see people reduced by hunger and deprivation to the loss of human face. .

Eh, gentlemen, gentlemen, one can only say: "Do not judge, so that you will not be judged!" The British in German captivity were deprived of only one thing - freedom, but they did not experience hunger, cold, humiliation with everyday life, or loss of contact with their homeland and families. And the Germans treated them differently from us, and the Red Cross did its duty towards them. So, gentlemen, are you to judge the people who survived by chance and fate in conditions that doomed us all to a total

and painful death?"{5} critics neither then, during the war years, nor later, were faced with the need to make a choice between almost certain death and betrayal. And it is likely that many or even most of them would have acted like the one million or so former Soviet prisoners of war who served the Germans. , not at all



you will be judged!" these words sound most sensible half a century after the end of the war. Although the condemnation of collaborators was an inevitable action of any power, totalitarian or democratic, for breaking an oath and renouncing allegiance to their former state institutions does not forgive their subjects or citizens, no power in the world. The fact that Vlasov was not an

ideological, but a forced traitor, is also proved by his behavior during the investigation and trial, in the outcome of which he could not have any doubts. In the last word, the former head of the ROA stated: "... I not only completely repented, True, it was late, but during the trial and investigation he tried to bring out the whole gang as clearly as possible. I expect the most severe punishment. "{6} Also, none of Vlasov's associates tried to defend the ideals of the Russian liberation movement from communist tyranny, but only repented and asked for indulgence. Collaborators from among the former white generals behaved quite differently - P. N. Krasnov, A. G. Shkuro and others, treacherously extradited by the same British for reprisal. At the trial, in the face of imminent execution, they did not express a shadow of repentance and denounced the Soviet government. The extradition of emigrant generals was illegal and was not even provided for by the Yalta agreements. As one of the the leaders of Soviet intelligence, the prominent terrorist General P. A. Sudoplatov - Krasnov, Shkuro and others, were actually exchanged under a secret agreement with the Soviet side for the former commander-in-chief of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder and a group of high-ranking German officers who found themselves in the Soviet zone of occupation. Not this exchange, Raeder could well have avoided the Nuremberg Tribunal, since the USSR expected to use for their own purposes the extensive connections of the former admiral and the information that Raeder possessed. .

The allies had to "not notice" many Soviet art. They turned a blind eye to Katyn, and to the secret Soviet-German protocols, and to the aggression against Finland, although even then they had little doubt that Stalin and his entourage were responsible for all this. About the same that the orders in the Soviet Gulag are few

differ from those that were revealed to the whole world after the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps and "death camps", then few in the West guessed, and even then very vaguely. To condemn in all fairness the creators of the genocide and the aggressors, it was necessary to turn a blind eye to exactly the same actions, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale, by one of the winners. True, what the Soviet Union did should rather be called not genocide, but stratacide - the destruction of the wealthiest and most educated classes of the population. The execution of Polish officers in Katyn and other places is precisely the manifestation of such a policy. In Russia, stratacide was carried out during the civil war with the help of the Red Terror, in East Germany and other countries of "people's democracy" - after the Second World War (in particular, hundreds of thousands died in internment camps). True, here the terror was no longer the same as in Russia, since it was carried out in the conditions of the beginning confrontation with the West in the form of the Cold War, when the states of Eastern Europe were viewed as allies in this confrontation.

It is often said that Stalin and Hitler made an abyss of mistakes, that if not for this, there could have been neither terror, nor genocide, nor the Second World War, and the Soviet and German peoples would have lived peacefully and happily, that Hitler did not have to start a world war, to exterminate Jews, to suppress democracy, to attack the USSR, that Stalin did not have to exterminate kulaks and carry out forced collectivization, to destroy party and military personnel in 1937-1938, to attack Finland, to shoot Polish officers, that he had to repent after wars before the people for their mistakes, which led to the defeats of 1941-1942, and for the mass repressions that weakened the army. In a word, they are trying to approach the two dictators with the standards applied to democratic rulers. There is nothing here but naivety or the desire for a bright propaganda image. From the point of view of their own logic and the logic of the development of the totalitarian state systems they created or improved, both Stalin and Hitler and other leaders of the USSR and Germany acted on the whole correctly and could not have acted otherwise. The balance of power in the world has developed in such a way that it was not the German Fuhrer who won, but the Soviet General Secretary, and with a different combination

could have gone the other way around. The outcome of the war was determined by the action of factors that were beyond the effective influence of the two dictators, which, of course, does not relieve them of responsibility for what happened at their will.

Another, more complex, question is about the responsibility of peoples for the deeds of their leaders. We agree that the vast majority of the population of Germany and the USSR did not know that these countries acted as aggressors in World War II (the USSR - in the war with Finland, and also as the only and very active accomplice of Germany in aggression against Poland, not to mention the occupation Baltic and other territories). Didn't know about genocide and political terror, or at least their true scope. Of course, millions of German and Soviet citizens were directly involved and complicit in the crimes, although only a minority were brought to justice. However, collective guilt

placed on tens of millions of innocent people, which in no way consistent with the principles of Christian morality. Undoubtedly, every nation has the government it deserves. However, one can hardly seriously say that the Germans in 1933, and the Russians and other peoples of the Russian Empire in 1917, for the most part, had a correct idea of who the National Socialists and Bolsheviks really were, and had real opportunities to prevent their coming to power, especially since Hitler became chancellor in a completely democratic way, and Lenin at the time of the coup did not reject the imminent convocation of a democratically elected Constituent Assembly.

Today, half a century later, the peoples should follow the example of Germany and the Czech Republic, which have forgotten old grievances and officially adopted a declaration of mutual apologies for the crimes of the occupation and the deportation of the Sudeten Germans. Our country also has someone to accept apologies from and to whom to bring them. From Germany - for crimes, for aggression, for tens of millions of dead and countless destruction. But the Germans should also apologize for the crimes of Soviet soldiers on German soil, for the deportation of millions of Germans from the eastern lands, for the displaced cultural property (which must be returned to the owners, regardless of how much property they can return to us). Also, you should apologize to

Finland, Poland, Romania, Moldova, the Baltic states for aggression and occupation. However, the current Russian leadership is clearly in no hurry to apologize. On the contrary, in every possible way opposing the entry of its eastern neighbors into NATO, it seems that it does not exclude that, under certain circumstances, a limited contingent of Russian troops will again enter Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic states and Transcaucasia, and even Poland and Slovakia. Meanwhile, not forgetting past grievances, only their forgiveness and exhaustion can forever draw a line under the most destructive of all wars - World War II. The articles that make up this collection were written at different times and on different occasions. Therefore, many facts and arguments are repeated in them, at the same time creating a kind of roll call. The author did not consider it possible to radically change anything here. Only obvious errors have been corrected and some additions have been made based on new sources, confirming the originally developed theses. Special thanks to our friend David M. Glantz, editor of the Journal of Slavik Military Studies. Without his assistance, many of the articles included in the book could not have been published. Notes: {1} See: Classified removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat operations and military conflicts. Statistical research. - Ed. G. F. Kri-vosheeva. M.: Military Publishing, 1993; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1993, May 8. pp. 1, 6. {2} See: Frieser K.-H. Schlagen aus der Nachhand - Schlagen aus der Vorhand. Die Schlachten von Char'kov und Kursk. - Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Krsg. von RG Foerster, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn: Verlag ES, Mittler Sohn-MGFA, 1996. {2a} Muranov A.I., Zvyagintsev V.E. Marshal's dossier. From the history of closed trials. M.: Andreevsky Flag, 1996. P. 180. {3} As far back as 1942, German

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201. Pyrrhic

victory (New about the war

with Finland) (Published: Historians answer questions. Issue 2.

Compiled by A.V. Polikarpov. M.: Moskovsky worker, 1990. Published from additions.)

What do we know about the Finnish war? That it began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940, that as a result of it the border was moved away from Leningrad and the strategic position of our country improved on the eve of the "treacherous" Nazi attack. Moreover, perhaps this war revealed significant shortcomings in the combat training of the Red Army, which led to the replacement of K. E. Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and the removal of the slogan "Fight with little blood and on foreign territory" .. Until now, not a single monographic study on the Soviet-Finnish war has been published in the USSR. There are only essays devoted to it in the 6-volume History of the Great Patriotic War, in the 12-volume History of the Second World War, and in the 5-volume History of Diplomacy. Of the prominent Soviet military leaders, only N. N. Voronov and K. A. Meretskov devoted separate chapters to the Finnish campaign in their memoirs. But there are opportunities to shed some light on these tragic pages of

our history. Let's look at the history of the conflict. At the beginning of March 1939, the Soviet government asked Finland for consent to lease the islands of Sursari (Gogland), Lavansari, Seiskari (Seskar) and Tiurinsari for the establishment of military bases there. These islands in the Gulf of Finland played an important role in ensuring the security of Leningrad. On March 8, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, A.S. Irie-Koskinen, told the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M.

proposal for the lease of the islands. Litvinov expressed the hope that this answer was not the last word of the Finnish government and that it would be ready to reconsider its attitude towards our proposal. "It seems to me personally," he said, "that it would even be possible to transfer the negotiations to the plane of an exchange of territories. For Finland, for example, it would be more interesting to cede to it a corresponding part of our territory along the Karelian border than the barren islands." Litvinov officially offered to exchange the islands for twice the territory of Soviet Karelia. But the negotiations that began in April 1939 ended in vain." {1} Here is what K. A. Meretskov, then commander of the troops of

the Leningrad Military District, recalls: "At the end of June 1939, I. V. Stalin called me. In his office, I found a

prominent worker of the Comintern, a well-known figure in the CPSU (b) and the world communist movement O. V. Kuusinen ... I was introduced in detail to the Course of the General Political Situation and told about the fears that our leadership had in connection with the line of the Finnish government. Stalin said that in the future, if necessary, I could turn to Kuusinen for advice on matters related to Finland. Later, during the period of the Finnish campaign, when Otto Wilhelmovich was in Petrozavodsk, I repeatedly consulted with him on a number of problems arising from the course of hostilities. After Kuusinen left, Stalin once again returned to the question of Leningrad. The situation on the Finnish border is alarming. Leningrad is under

threat of shelling. Negotiations on concluding a military alliance with Britain and France have not yet been successful. Germany is ready to attack its neighbors in any direction, including Poland and the USSR. Finland can easily become a springboard for anti-Soviet actions for each of the two main bourgeois-imperialist groups - German and Anglo-French American. It is possible that they will generally begin to agree on a joint action against the USSR. And Finland may turn out to be a bargaining chip in someone else's game here, turning into a skirmisher of a big war being urged on us.

Intelligence reports that the accelerated construction of fortifications and roads on the Finnish side of the border continues. There are various options for our response in the event of a Finnish attack on Murmansk and Leningrad. In this regard, I am entrusted with the duty to prepare ... a plan for covering the border from aggression and a counterattack against the Finnish armed forces in the event of a military provocation on their part.

JV Stalin stressed that as early as this summer serious actions could be expected from Germany. Whatever they are, this will inevitably affect either directly or indirectly both us and Finland. Therefore, you should hurry. In two or three weeks I was to report my plan in Moscow. Regardless of this, along the way, just in case, to speed up the training of troops in conditions close to combat. To speed up the military construction that has unfolded in the LVO. All preparations should be kept secret so as not to sow panic among the population. Keep Zhdanov informed. The measures should be camouflaged, carried out in parts and carried out as ordinary exercises, without emphasizing in any way that we are about to be drawn into a big war. "{2} As you can see,

preparations for hostilities against Finland began five months before the war. A lot of interesting things in this conversation, or rather a monologue, of Stalin. For some reason, it is he who informs Meretskov of intelligence data on the military preparations of the Finns, although, apparently, if such preparations really took place, the commander of the border Leningrad military district himself should have learned about them first. Further, Stalin talks about a possible Finnish strike on Leningrad and Murmansk, but then he suddenly instructs Meretskov to prepare a counterattack just in case of a provocation from the Finnish side. But a provocation is almost the same as an attack with the aim of capturing large urban centers (what kind "provocation" served to escalate the conflict at the end of November, we will describe below). These inconsistencies contradict both the official version of the time of writing the memoirs (late 60s) about Finnish responsibility for the conflict and Meretskov's repeated statements in other places that the Finns provoked the war. This suggests that the author of his memoirs thirty years later recounts Stalin's speech quite accurately from memory.

Traditional

Stalin's attempt to present a future strike against Finland as a preventive one is not new either. By an evil irony of fate, the German plan of attack on the USSR "Barbarossa" in 1941 was presented, and by some of the West German historians is presented to this day, as a preventive measure.

In August 1939, while unsuccessful Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations were taking place in Moscow, the Finnish government rejected Soviet offers of military assistance in case of aggression. Apparently, the military preparations of the LVO troops did not go unnoticed in Finland, and this increased suspicions about the intentions of the USSR.

Soon followed by an action on the part of Germany, which really directly affected both the USSR and Finland. On August 23, 1939, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs I. von Ribbentrop, who urgently arrived in Moscow, signed, together with V. M. Molotov, who had replaced M. M. Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. The appendix to the pact - a secret protocol, in which the dividing line of Soviet and German interests in Poland was drawn along the Narew-Vistula-San rivers, also said: "In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states - Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, - the northern border of Lithuania will be a line dividing the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. On September 28, 1939, in connection with the end of hostilities in Poland, a Soviet-German treaty of friendship and border was concluded. In one of the additional secret protocols to this treaty, the line of demarcation in Poland was drawn approximately along the line of actual control of the German and Soviet troops, and therefore it was moved from the Vistula to the Bug. As compensation, Lithuania withdrew into the Soviet sphere of influence, in which Latvia, Estonia and Finland also remained.<sup>{3}</sup> In the light of these agreements, the further development of the Soviet-Finnish conflict becomes clear.

On October 5, 1939, the Soviet government suggested that Finland resume the interrupted negotiations and consider the possibility of concluding a mutual assistance pact with the USSR (such a pact was proposed to the government back in April 1938, and was then



rejected as contrary to Finland's neutrality and violating Finland's right to "self-determination"). In Finland, since the end of August, the combat readiness of the army has been increased and general labor service has been introduced (there is no doubt that the military preparations of the LVO troops that have been carried out since the end of June have not remained a secret for the Finnish side). However, this time the Finnish government has resumed negotiations. On October 11, the Finnish envoy to Sweden, Yu. K. Paasikivi, arrived in Moscow as a plenipotentiary representative. Later, Finance Minister W. Tanner joined him.{4}

On October 14, Finland was offered to lease the Hanko Peninsula, which was the key to Helsinki, to the USSR for 30 years, as well as to transfer the islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas near Murmansk and part of the Karelian Isthmus - a total of 2761 sq. km in exchange for the territory of Soviet Karelia in the area of Rebola and Poros Lake in 5528 square meters. km. At first glance, such a proposal represented considerable benefits for Finland - the territory twice as large was ceded to it. But this is only at first glance. After all, Finland itself would concede in this case the well-developed areas of the Karelian Isthmus, where the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" (named after the commander-in-chief of the Finnish armed forces, Marshal Baron K. A. von Mannerheim) were also located. The example of Czechoslovakia, which was forced to cede the Sudetenland to Hitler and remained defenseless in the face of the aggressor, having lost a strip of powerful border fortifications, was still fresh in memory. In addition, the Finns had no illusions about Stalin's expansionist policy. Negotiations dragged on. In early November, the Finnish side rejected the Soviet proposal that Finland and the USSR mutually disarm their fortified areas on the Karelian Isthmus and leave the usual border guards there. {5} Since at that moment only a madman could seriously think about a Finnish attack on the USSR, such the disarmament of the fortified areas was unprofitable for Finland, as it left her defenseless in the face of a possible invasion. On November 13, negotiations were broken off. The Finnish delegation departed from Moscow, and mobilization was

announced in Finland. November 26 at

near the town of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, a border incident occurred. Here is the Soviet version of these events:

"According to the General Staff of the Red Army, today, November 26, at 15:45, our troops, located on the Karelian Isthmus near the border of Finland, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired on from Finnish territory by artillery fire. In total, seven cannon shots were fired, in as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two from the command staff were wounded. The Soviet troops, having strict orders not to succumb to provocations, refrained from firing back." The government of the USSR protested and suggested that

Finland "immediately withdraw its troops away from the border on the Karelian Isthmus - 20-25 km and thus prevent the possibility of repeated provocations." {6} In response, the government of Finland gave its own version of

events: "In connection with the alleged On the contrary, it appears from these investigations that the said shots were fired on 26 November between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. 5 minutes Soviet time from the Soviet border strip near the mentioned ... village of Mainila. From the Finnish side, one could even see the place where the shells exploded, since the village of Mainila is located at a distance of 800 meters from the border, behind an open field. Based on the calculation of the propagation velocity sound from seven shots, it could be concluded that the guns from which these shots were fired were located at a distance of about 1.5-2 km to the southeast from the place where the shells burst. The observations relating to the mentioned shots were entered in the register of the border guard at the very

moment of the incident. Under such circumstances, it seems possible that the case is about an accident that occurred during training exercises that took place on the Soviet side, which entailed ... human casualties.

Therefore, the Finnish side, rejecting the Soviet protest, also drew attention to the fact that "in the immediate vicinity of the border on the Finnish side, mainly border troops are located; guns of such a range that their shells lay on the other side of the border were not at all in this zone", and expressed readiness to start negotiations "on the issue of mutual withdrawal of troops to a certain distance from the border." However, the Soviet government bluntly rejected the explanations of the Finnish side and on November 28 terminated the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact.{7}

Of course, many circumstances of the Mainil incident remain unclear even today. Perhaps, when historians gain access to the relevant Soviet archives, something will be able to find out more precisely. But in the light of the foregoing, the assumption arises that this incident was worked out from beginning to end by Stalin and his entourage, like Hitler's Gleiwitz provocation, which three months earlier served as a pretext for attacking Poland.

The fact that the initiative in unleashing the conflict belonged to the Soviet side is proved by N. S. Khrushchev's recollections of a conversation in the Kremlin in the late autumn of 1939, in which Stalin, Molotov and Kuusinen participated. Khrushchev got the impression that this was "a continuation of the previous conversation. Actually, already the implementation of the decision to present an ultimatum to Finland. We have already agreed with Kuusinen that he will head the government of the emerging Karelian-Finnish SSR.

It was believed that Finland would be presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature, which she had already rejected in the negotiations, and if she did not agree, then start hostilities. This was the opinion of Stalin. Of course, I did not object to Stalin then. I also thought it was right. It is enough to speak loudly, and if they do not hear, then fire a cannon, and the Finns will raise their hands, agree to our demands. " According to Khrushchev's memoirs, at the same time, "apparently, some conditions were put forward so that Finland became a friendly country. This goal was pursued, but in what way it was expressed, how it was formulated, I do not know. I have not read or seen these documents. Then Stalin said: "Well, today the work will be started."

We sat for a long time, because the hour had already been appointed. expected. Stalin was sure, and we also believed that there would be no war, that the Finns would accept our proposals and thus we would achieve our goal without a war. The goal is to secure us from the north.

Suddenly they called that we fired a shot. The Finns responded with artillery fire. In fact, the war began. I say this because there is another interpretation: the Finns fired first, and therefore we were forced to respond. Did we have the legal and moral right to do

so? Of course, we had no legal right. From a moral point of view, the desire to protect ourselves, to come to an agreement with our neighbor justified us in our own eyes."{8} Of course, dictating his memoirs thirty years after the Finnish war, Khrushchev did

not remember the dates very well, was the testimonies do not contradict, but only confirm, as we will see later, the testimonies of others - Tuominen about the preparations for the creation of the Kuusinen government even before the start of hostilities and the role of Stalin in this, information that the Soviet troops attacked first and that the Soviet leadership did not initially count on November 29, Soviet diplomatic and trade representatives were recalled from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began on the border. Here I would like to recall the words of Pravda

about the intransigence of the Finnish side during the negotiations: "We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking all and all obstacles on the way to the goal. {9} Stalin really decided to go to the end, regardless of the norms of international law and human morality. On December 1, in the Finnish border town of Terioki, occupied by Soviet troops, the government of the so-called Finnish Democratic Republic was formed, headed by O. V. Kuusinen. It is sometimes argued that Kuusinen's government was formed on the initiative of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland. "But most of the members of the Central Committee simply physically could not take part in this

decision, - writes a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland E. Kauppila. - ... The very process of its formation is largely incomprehensible, as well as the motives for Kuusinen's actions at that time. "This event gave reason to opponents of the communists to assert that their actions" are guided by something other than the interests of the Finnish people. "In addition time the party was in deep crisis, its connection with the masses was interrupted, Kuusinen himself experienced a personal crisis. "Stalin's repression severely scorched the Finnish communists, touched his close friends and relatives." Many of those who left Finland with him in 1918 and then he stood at the origins of the party, were members of its Central Committee and worked in the USSR, were, according to Kauppil, destroyed Kuusinen "repeatedly turned to Stalin with questions about the fate of his comrades, but did not wait for any intelligible answer ... Then there was a time of great losses

in the Communist Party of Finland. "{10} On the second day of the existence of the Terioki government, on December 2, the USSR concluded an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with it. According to this agreement, the entire territory of the Karelian ASSR was transferred to the new republic due to the close relationship of the Karelian and Finnish peoples ( 70 thousand sq. km), and the USSR - 3970 sq. km on the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland. {11} The FDR

government included only those Finnish communists who were in exile in the USSR. Almost three weeks before the start of the war, on November 13, an attempt was made to involve the then General Secretary of the Finnish Communist Party A. Tuominen, who lived in Stockholm, into the future government. According to his memoirs, between November 13 and 21, two couriers of the Comintern arrived in Stockholm. They gave Tuominen two written messages (one from Kuusinen and G. Dimitrov, the other from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks)) with a proposal to immediately arrive in Moscow by special plane in connection with the expected rupture of Soviet-Finnish relations and, as the second courier reported orally, the upcoming war and the formation of the people's government of Finland, in which Tuominen was supposed to take the post of prime minister, and Kuusinen - president. Both times the general sec

The government in Terioki did not receive any support in Finland (however, as is clear from Meretskoy's memoirs, throughout the war Kuusinen was not in Terioki, but in Petrozavodsk). The military units of the 1st Finnish People's Corps formed by him numbered less than a thousand people of Finns themselves from among the emigrants, the main part of it was Russians, as well as Ingris, the native Finnish population of the Leningrad Region. In Finland, the Social Democratic Party and the Finnish Trade Union Confederation, after the start of the war and the formation of the government in Terijoki, issued a joint statement, which, in particular, said: "The working class of Finland sincerely desires peace. the class of Finland has no other alternative than to fight with weapons in their hands against aggression and in defense of democracy, peace and self-determination of our country. {13} Former Red Guard soldiers - participants in the Finnish revolution of 1918 - turned to the Minister of Defense to enlist them in the ranks of the Finnish armed forces.{14} A patriotic upsurge was observed throughout the country, and it is no coincidence that the war of 1939-1940 in Finnish historiography. was called the "winter war for the freedom and independence of Finland".{15} There is no doubt that Stalin pursued the decisive goals of the complete defeat of the Finnish army. But the preparation

for the fighting was clearly insufficient. Let us again give the floor to Meretskoy: "In the second half of July, I was again summoned to Moscow. I. V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov listened to my report. to be carried out as soon as possible. When I began to say that a few weeks would not be enough for an operation of this magnitude, they noticed that I proceeded from the capabilities of the LVO, and one must take into account the forces of the Soviet Union as a whole. I tried to make one more objection, linking it with the possibility of participating in an anti-Soviet provocation along with Finland and other countries. I was told that I was not the only one thinking about this, and warned that in early autumn I would again report on how the defense plan was being carried out, after which they were allowed to leave for the district " . Other opinion

adhered to the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov, who believed that the conflict with Finland under any circumstances would drag on for several months. However, Stalin and Voroshilov initially disregarded his opinion.{16}

And here is what N. N. Voronov, then the head of artillery of the Red Army, writes about the pre-war period: "Shortly before the start of hostilities, I visited K. A. Meretskov. L. 3. Mekhlis.

- Arrived on time! - exclaimed one of them, seeing me. - Do you know about the alarming situation? Have you thought about how many shells you need for a possible military operation on the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga? What reinforcement artillery is needed? What can you count on? "I think it

depends on the situation," I replied. Are you going to defend or attack? By what forces and in what directions? By the way, how long does the operation take?

- Ten or twelve days. - I will be glad if everything can be solved in two or three months. My words were met with scathing mockery. G. I. Kulik ordered me to conduct all calculations, taking into account the duration of the operation, twelve days. {17}

Thus, the Soviet leadership was entirely focused on conducting a short-term offensive operation with decisive goals.

The situation was different in Finland. The Finnish government before the start of the war knew for sure that it could not count on the support of Germany. During his second visit to Moscow, Tanner, who after the outbreak of hostilities took up the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, based on the meetings of Finnish and Scandinavian representatives with the German ambassador to the Soviet Union F. von Schulenburg, made a firm conclusion that in the event of a military clash between the USSR and Finland, Germany would adhere to neutrality, more benevolent towards the Soviet than towards the Finnish side.{18} Indeed, with the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German government initially considered the possibility of recognizing the government of the FDR in Terijoki.

The German authorities did not allow volunteers from Hungary and weapons purchased by the Finnish government in Italy and other countries of Western Europe through their territory to Finland, and also three times (in December 1939, February and March 1940) "advised" Sweden not to enter the war on the side of Finland.{19} In addition to the Soviet-German treaties, the position of Germany was influenced by the fear that during the war, under the pretext of helping Finland, England and France would be able to gain a foothold on the Scandinavian Peninsula, in particular in Norway, and such plans really existed at that time in the British and French ruling circles.{20}

From the very beginning of the conflict, when it was still in the diplomatic stage, England and France were entirely on the side of Finland. However, due to the war with Germany and the expectation of a powerful German offensive on the Western Front, they could only help with loans and supplies of weapons and equipment, and even then only a month after the start of the war, when it became clear that the Finnish army was able to withstand the blow. Some of the most anti-Soviet circles in the British and French headquarters thought about the possibility of an attack on the Soviet Transcaucasus (with the participation of Turkey), about the bombing of the Baku oil fields from the air, which in those conditions was an obvious adventure. The question of sending an expeditionary force to Finland through the territory of Sweden and Norway became a practical issue only at the end of the war. Significant support was provided to Finland by the United States, which provided, in particular, a financial loan. The American government also imposed a trade embargo against the USSR, affecting the supply of strategic materials. They helped Finland with the supply of weapons and equipment, sending volunteers and the Scandinavian countries. In total, 11.5 thousand volunteers from Scandinavia arrived in Finland during the war (there were 8.5 thousand Swedes alone), the USA and Hungary. {21} However, all this assistance could not have any decisive influence on the course of the struggle, and the Finns had to rely mainly on their own strength and means.

The first military preparations began in Finland at the end of August 1939; On November 13-30, a general mobilization was carried out. As a result of this, the armed forces of Finland, which in peacetime numbered 30 thousand people, were brought to 600 thousand, which



amounted to about 17% of the 3.8 million population of the country, demonstrating the highest mobilization ability among the countries participating in the Second World War.{22} Such a large number of armed forces was achieved by recruiting 200 thousand members of the paramilitary organization "Schutzkor", created by Mannerheim in 1920. In addition, the recruitment of 80,000 women members of Latta Svaard, an auxiliary organization of Schutskora, to serve in the rear units and units made it possible to free up an additional number of fighters for the front. According to the West German military historian K. Tippleskirch, there were over 300 thousand people in the combat units of the Finnish army. Finland could withstand such a strain on its mobilization resources only for a few months, after which the size of the army would inevitably have to be sharply reduced due to the need to return a significant part of the conscripts to the national economy. This regularity was confirmed by further experience: at the beginning of 1942, Finland was forced to demobilize most of the armed forces.

At the beginning of the war, the Finnish army also had clearly insufficient weapons and military equipment. According to Voronov, "Finnish artillery was much weaker than ours. It was armed with 37 mm Bofors anti-tank guns, 76 mm guns of the old Russian model, 122 and 152 mm Schneider howitzers and an outdated 107 mm gun. Finns they used old shells made before 1917 - some tubes and fuses even turned red from rust. Sometimes more than a third of the shells did not explode."{23} By the end of November 1939, Finland had only 96, mostly obsolete aircraft, 5 anti-aircraft guns. On the eve of the war, the Finnish army had a supply of ammunition for two months, 81 mm mines for 22 days, 76 mm shells for 21 days, shells for 122 mm howitzers for 24 days, heavy artillery shells (from 152 mm and above) - for 19 days, fuel and oils - for two months, aviation fuel - for a month. The military industry of the country was weak and could not provide the armed forces with everything necessary in sufficient quantities.{24}

The Finns pinned their main hopes on the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus, which had been built since the late 1920s, but were built especially intensively in 1938-1939. "The total depth of the territory with defensive structures was 80-100 kilometers," Meretskov recalls. The point was a fortified unit provided with radio and telephone communications, a hospital, a kitchen, ammunition depots and fuel. Combat centers of resistance had mainly 5 strongholds, most often 4 machine-gun and artillery pillboxes in each. Pillboxes built in 1938-1939 were especially distinguished with 1-2 gun embrasures and 3-4 machine-gun embrasures. They were served by garrisons from a platoon to a company, who lived in underground barracks. Only the combat part of the structure with all-round visibility, artillery and machine-gun embrasures rose above the ground. Casemates were covered underground, warehouses, a kitchen, a toilet, corridors, a common room, an officer's room, a machine room, manholes in the domes and an emergency entrance. The coating of such a pillbox, made of reinforced concrete, reached two meters in thickness. For the experiment, I ordered to shoot in my presence at one of the pillboxes that we had not blown up at close range. The slab withstood a direct hit by a 203mm projectile." {25}

The Red Army greatly outnumbered the Finnish. As Meretskov noted, by the end of the campaign, Soviet troops had 2.3 times more personnel and 2.8 times more artillery than the enemy. But by the beginning of the fighting, units of the Red Army were dispersed along the entire border line. If out of 15 Finnish divisions on the Karelian Isthmus at that time 9 were deployed, then out of 26-28 Soviet divisions in the main direction against the "Mannerheim Line" there were only 12-14. In addition, the Red Army command was unable to properly use its almost absolute superiority in aviation and tanks. {26} From the very beginning,

the fighting was extremely fierce. They were successful for the Red Army only in the Far North, where the Finns evacuated the port of Petsamo in the very first days and

retreated 130 km to the south.{27} But the conditions of the tundra here limited the possibility of a large-scale offensive. The most fierce battles ensued on the Karelian Isthmus. Only by December 12 did the Soviet troops manage to overcome the security zone and reach the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line itself. The Red Army suffered heavy losses from mines, but did not have mine detectors, they had to be urgently developed and put into production after the start of the war. "Finnish infantry, - as Voronov emphasizes, - skillfully used the special conditions of the terrain and fought steadfastly in defense. Engineering structures and barriers were covered by multi-layered fire." The Finns were armed with Suomi submachine guns, while the construction of Soviet submachine guns, like mine detectors, began already during the hostilities. By the end of the campaign, the G.S. Shpagin submachine gun (PPSh) entered the troops. {28} Despite repeated attempts after a

short reconnaissance in force to break through the main line of Finnish defense, in December-January this failed, although the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. . Proper interaction between infantry, artillery, aviation and tanks was also not established, and the effectiveness of artillery preparation turned out to be low. As Meretskov recalls, "before the start of operations, I once again requested intelligence in Moscow, but again received information that was later not confirmed, since they underestimated the real power of the Mannerheim Line. Unfortunately, this created many difficulties. The Red Army had to literally run into her to understand what she is."

And here is what he writes about one of the assaults on the main line of defense: "They attacked the main line, but to no avail. The lack of experience and means to break through this kind of fortification again made itself felt ... It turned out that the enemy's defense was not suppressed. The pillboxes were silent, and when our tanks rushed forward, they opened fire and knocked them out with guns from the sides, from behind, they cut off the infantry with machine guns, and the attack failed. with his body.

also that it was impossible to launch an attack from afar: it was required, despite the deep snow, to bring the starting position for the attack closer to the pillboxes. Due to the small number of passages in the engineering barriers, the tanks crowded together, becoming a good target. Poor equipment with field radio stations did not allow commanders to maintain operational communications. Therefore, the various types of troops interacted poorly. There were not enough special assault groups to deal with pillboxes and bunkers. Aviation bombed only the depth of the enemy's defense, little help to the troops overcoming the

barriers. "{29} Combat operations in the area north of Lake Ladoga were extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet troops. Here was the narrowest point of Finnish territory, and the Red Army, having reached the Gulf of Bothnia, could cut it in half. During the fighting on December 10-12, the Finns defeated the 139th Infantry Division and inflicted heavy losses on the 75th Division sent to the rescue. More than 5,000 Red Army soldiers were killed, more than a thousand were captured. Finnish troops captured 69 tanks, about 40 guns, 220 machine guns, other trophies. This was one of the rare cases during the war when, in order to achieve success, the Finns launched a frontal attack on Soviet positions (in most cases they acted with the help of detours and encirclements). Victory was bought. The Finnish army in this battle proportionately suffered the greatest losses of the entire war. Up to 30% of the Finnish officers and non-commissioned officers participating in the clashes and 25% of the rank and file

were killed and wounded. At the end of December, also to the north of Lake Ladoga, the 163rd Rifle Division was surrounded and destroyed, losing more than 5 thousand killed and 500 captured. 11 tanks and 27 guns fell into the hands of the Finns. The same fate befell in early January 1940 the 44th motorized division, sent to the rescue. Part of its fighters and commanders broke back to the border, leaving 70 guns, 43 tanks, 300 machine guns in the hands of the enemy. As Mannerheim notes, due to deep snow and a blizzard, it was impossible to determine exactly how many soldiers of the 44th division died in battle or died from wounds (many of the wounded in severe 50-degree frost froze without waiting for help). The Finns captured 1,300 prisoners. {30} There is evidence of the tragedy of the 44th division from the Soviet

sides. Here is what Muscovite B. Tyagunov, a participant in the battles on the Karelian

Isthmus, writes: "Almost nothing is said about our prisoners in" that unfamous war, "which was the Finnish war of 1939-1940. Then the 44th rifle division (Finnish sources call it motorized. - B. S.), advancing from Karelia in the Ukhta direction to the Gulf of Bothnia, almost cut Finland in half. Frosts that winter on the Karelian Isthmus and in Finland itself reached 45 °, the winter was very snowy, and we had ski units only in In February 1940, the division entered the depths of Finland for 60-70 kilometers, and when the Finnish ski units cut its communications, it was completely surrounded. The division commander, brigade commander Vinogradov, who had grown from a battalion commander (captain) to a division commander (brigade commander) in a year, left the division together with his chief of staff and commissar and somehow managed to break through to his own. For some time, the division, abandoned to the mercy of fate, repulsed the attacks of the maneuverable Finnish troops, for the most part using skis. The division did not receive any help from outside, and after two or three weeks of unequal fighting, it was completely defeated. Several thousand frostbitten, exhausted soldiers and commanders ended up in Finnish captivity. I remember how we, the commanders of the troops on the Karelian Isthmus, at the beginning of January 1940, were read the order of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov about this sad event and that the brigade commander Vinogradov, his commissar and chief of staff were shot "before the formation of the division" "" .{31} On January 7, 1940, the LVO was transformed into the North-Western Front, headed by the commander of the 1st rank S. K.

Timoshenko, and on February 11, powerful artillery preparations for a new offensive on the Mannerheim Line began. the Finnish command, under the threat of a breakthrough, began to withdraw troops to the second line of defense on February 17. The Red Army failed to break through it on the move. The offensive resumed after the regrouping of troops on February 28, and on March 2, due to the deep wedging of Soviet troops, the Finns began to retreat to the rear fortified area of Vipuri (Vyborg) Parts of the 7th Army covered

Vyborg grouping from the north-west, cutting off the Vyborg highway of Helsinki. {32} True, the Finnish army managed to push back the units that had broken through and localize the bridgehead they had captured. The troops of the 13th Army crossed the Vuoksa River and marched on Kexholm.

8 the Finnish leadership began a debate about the conclusion of peace. The military party, headed by Minister of Defense J. Niyukkenen, advocated the continuation of the war. Niyukkenen pointed out that the Finnish army did not allow a breakthrough of its front (the Finns held the citadel of Vyborg until the ceasefire on March 13), suffered relatively small losses and retained combat capability. Supporters of the continuation of the war counted on the approaching spring thaw, which was supposed to fetter the actions of the advancing Soviet troops, and, most importantly, on sending the 150,000th expeditionary force promised by England and France. However, Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim, supported by Tanner, spoke out resolutely in favor of ending the war and on March 7 advised the government to start peace negotiations (the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on March 12). Mannerheim took into account that the Finnish troops had lost their main fortifications, were tired of fighting, and urgent economic needs urgently demanded a reduction in the army. He never received an exact timetable for the arrival of the Allied troops, and he also understood that, since the general German offensive in the West would inevitably follow in the very near future, British and French troops would immediately be withdrawn from Finland. The experience of the Allied operations in Norway after the May offensive in the Ardennes showed that Mannerheim was right here. If the government had followed Niyukkenen's advice, then in the summer of 1940, after the end of the thaw, the Finnish army, ousted from its fortified positions, would have been left face to face with the significantly superior Red Army. {33} / In the light of later discovered facts about the preparation of the USSR for an attack on Germany in the summer of 1940, this assumption no longer looks so unambiguous. Stalin was in a hurry to release the troops in Finland and transfer them to the West in order to be ready for the invasion after the start of the German offensive in France. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that if the Finnish side did not agree to the difficult conditions of the Moscow Peace, it would

would have received peace on the terms of either the "status quo ante bellum" or the pre-war Soviet proposals for the exchange of territories. See also the article in this collection: "Was Stalin going to attack Hitler?". / Shortly before the end of the war, at the end of

February, the Soviet troops north of Lake Ladoga suffered another major setback. Two Soviet divisions were surrounded. One of them, the 168th, was supplied by air and was able to hold out in the Finnish pocket until the armistice was signed. The other, the 18th, was almost completely destroyed in an attempt to break through. On the battlefield, the Finns found 4,300 corpses, including two generals (military commanders with the rank of brigade commander and above), and captured 128 tanks and 91 cannons as trophies. {34} moods and inability to conduct combat operations in the winter in the difficult conditions of the Finnish theater. Before the start of the war, Voronov visited the 18th division. These are the impressions he made about this trip: "I had a long conversation with the commanders about the importance of artillery in

modern warfare, about the lessons of fighting in Spain and Khalkhin Gol, called for studying my potential enemy, objectively

to evaluate his strength, not to be arrogant, not to slip into "hawking", to avoid conventions in combat training. In one of the divisions, after a conversation, several commanders and political workers approached me. They did not agree with the assessment of the forces of our likely opponents. - These are wrong installations, intimidating

personnel, -

they said. They go against the instructions of higher authorities.

- I told you not only my views. This is the requirement of life.

Finally, this is the demand of the people's commissar who sent me here.

Still, my words seem to have had little effect. Tragic for this division was the underestimation of the forces of the opposing enemy. When the fighting began, she was surrounded in the forests of Karelia and suffered heavy losses. {35}

Meretskov also wrote about the same ill-fated division: "It turned out worse with another division, transferred to the front from the Ukrainian steppes without prior training of fighters in the conditions of wooded-marshy-hilly terrain and deep snows. This

the division fought in a different sector than I commanded at that moment, but I was told about its fate. She found herself in a completely unusual situation for her and suffered heavy losses, and the divisional commander died. "{36} to the

fact that victory was bought at a high price. According to the Moscow Peace Treaty, all the territories it had previously demanded, as well as the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus, together with Vyborg and the area north of Lake

Ladoga, plus the territory in the Kuolajärvi region in the north, went to the USSR. Finland Prisoners of war were to be immediately returned by both sides. The Soviet Union again recognized the government in Helsinki, no longer remembering the government of the FDR March 31, 1940, the territories ceded by Finland (except the Karelian Isthmus) were united with Soviet Karelia into the Karelian-Finnish SSR, and the government in Terijoki was transformed into the government of this republic.{37}

During the war, England, France, the United States and Sweden provided diplomatic support to Finland. In particular, on December 14, 1939, mainly through the efforts of French and British diplomacy, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations for aggression against Finland.{38} This decision was the last decision of the Council of the League of Nations and had only a symbolic meaning. England, France and Sweden supplied the Finnish army with 191 aircraft, 28 tanks and tractors, 223 field and naval guns and howitzers, 100 81-mm mortars, 120 anti-tank guns and 200 anti-tank rifles, 166 anti-aircraft guns. {39} About the amount of military equipment in

the units of the Red Army operating against Finland, and on the number of tanks and combat aircraft lost by both sides, there are only Finnish data. In total, Finland used 287 aircraft against the USSR (including 167 fighters), losing 61 of them. Soviet aviation had 2500 aircraft, of which 725 were destroyed by Finnish fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. Of the 3200 Soviet tanks, the Finns captured or destroyed 1600. {40}



the superiority of the new fighters supplied by the Western allies over the obsolete Soviet ones, which, like the bombers, were also vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire due to their low speed. Tanks, on the other hand, were often used not to develop success, but to break through fortified positions, which led to very heavy losses. But the loss of life was even worse.

The Finnish army lost 23.5 thousand killed and died from wounds, more than 1 thousand prisoners, 43.5 thousand wounded, of which about 10 thousand remained disabled. Soviet losses by the Finns were estimated at about 200 thousand killed and died from wounds. The losses of the civilian population of Finland, mainly as a result of the bombing, amounted to 646 killed (since Finnish aviation did not raid Soviet territory, there were no losses among the civilian population of the USSR). {41} The command of the LVO gave different information

about Soviet losses: 48,745 killed and died from wounds, 68,863 wounded. {42} The headquarters of the LVO also questioned the official data of the Finnish side on the losses of the Finnish army, arguing that the Finns lost more than 70 killed thousand people, 15 thousand people died from wounds and more than 250 thousand people were injured. {43} The fantastic nature of this estimate is obvious. If the losses of the Finnish army really reached 85 thousand killed and died from wounds, and, taking into account the disabled, significantly exceeded 100 thousand, this could not have affected the country's mobilization capacity in 1941 (recall that then the army no longer had 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers). However, Finland again mobilized 18 percent of the population, or more than 600 thousand people, into the armed forces. {44} It is clear that the recruitment of 1940-1941. could compensate (obviously, even with some excess, since in 1941 the country put up a few more soldiers than in 1939) the losses of no more than 45 thousand people, counting those who died from wounds, the disabled and foreign volunteers who went home, but by no means twice or three times the large losses given in the message of the LVO headquarters. So the reliability of the official Finnish loss data is beyond doubt.

calls.

The situation is more complicated with Soviet losses. If the official Soviet data are correct, then for one killed Finnish

the soldier accounts for two Soviet; if the Finnish assessment of Soviet losses is correct, then for one Finn there are eight dead of our fellow citizens. In the Great Patriotic War, the ratio of military losses was calculated as 3.7:1, i.e., almost four dead Red Army soldiers per killed enemy soldier. suffering heavy losses. In the Finnish war, the Finns never got surrounded, with rare exceptions they did not advance or counterattack, while the Soviet troops often undertook insufficiently prepared assaults on long-term fortifications and also suffered heavy losses in the encirclement north of Lake Ladoga. Therefore, it seems quite likely that the ratio of losses in the Finnish war was even less favorable for the Red Army than in the Great Patriotic War, and therefore we are inclined to believe that the Finnish assessment of Soviet losses is close to reality. This is also confirmed by the testimonies of the participants in the Finnish campaign. Let's give just one example. The poet Sergei Narovchatov recalled in 1979 how he returned from Finnish: "I understood what adulthood is, what a terrible thing it is ... Out of a battalion of 970 people, 100-odd of us remained, of which 40 people were unharmed." { 46} The Finnish estimate of Soviet military losses coincides with the estimate of German military intelligence, which in 1942 estimated Soviet losses in the "winter war" at 430,000 killed and disabled (the dead here

account for about half of the total).{47} Note also that, apparently, the data on the personnel of the units that participated in the Finnish campaign, preserved in the Soviet archives, suffer from incompleteness. So, according to the director of the TsGASA M. Stegantsev, the archive did not preserve documents for 1940 on the personnel of the 13th, 45th and 69th separate ski battalions {48} (S. Narovchatov also fought in one of them, whose memoirs are quoted above). Therefore, Soviet data on losses could turn out to be underestimated (Stalin and his entourage, no doubt, sought to hide the true size of losses from the people).

From the data cited by Mannerheim in his memoirs on the number of prisoners of war taken during the encirclement of Soviet troops north of Lake Ladoga, it is clear that in Finnish captivity there were

at least 5-plus thousand Red Army soldiers. Their fate was terrible. Let us continue here the quote from Tyagunov's letter: "In May 1940 (most likely a mistake, it must be: in March. - B.S.), when the truce was signed, the Finns handed over our prisoners of war - emaciated, frostbitten, disabled ... They were transported in hospital trains, to which no one was allowed to go. They did not return home. Their families were also deported, apparently as families of traitors. So how can it be now - to continue to consider them traitors too?". {49} The tragedy of Soviet soldiers and commanders, who first fell into Finnish captivity, and then in Stalin's camps, is still waiting for its researcher.

Already after the publication of our article, data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war were made public, significantly exceeding the previous official figures. P. A. Aptekar calculated the losses of the dead according to the books of accounting for the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the war with the White Finns stored in the Russian State Military Archive and compiled nominal alphabetical lists of those killed, who died from wounds (except for those who died in rear hospitals) and missing. He determined the number of dead at 131,476 people, and the number of prisoners at about 6,000, of which about 200 people refused to return to their homeland. The researcher estimates the number of wounded and frostbite at 325-330 thousand people, aviation losses at 640-650 aircraft, and tank losses at more than 2.5 thousand vehicles, of which more than 650 were lost irretrievably. {49a} It should be noted that the number of the dead given by P. A. Aptekar did not include the losses of the fleet and troops of the NKVD, and that it is unlikely that the nominal lists of losses compiled 10 years after the end of the war were exhaustive and complete. Probably, the true number of dead Soviet servicemen is estimated in the range from 131.5 thousand to 200 thousand people.

So was this war fair or unfair for the Soviet Union, was it fair or unfair for Finland? All of the above unequivocally obliges to conclude: fair - for Finland, unfair for the USSR. During the conflict, world public opinion was on the side of Finland. The prestige of the USSR in the world fell sharply. In February 1940, US President F. D. Roosevelt, speaking to the Congress of American Youth, said: "More than twenty years ago ... I

strongly sympathized with the Russian people ... hoped that Russia would solve its own problems and that its government would eventually become a peace-loving government, elected by free vote, which would not encroach on the integrity of its neighbors. Today, however, hope has either disappeared or been put off until a better day. The Soviet Union, as anyone with the courage to face the facts, will realize, is ruled by a dictatorship so absolute that the like is hard to find in the world. It allied with another dictatorship and invaded the territory of a neighbor so infinitely small that it could not pose any threat, could not inflict any damage on the Soviet Union, a neighbor who wanted one thing - to live in peace as a democratic country, free and looking forward a democratic country." {50} Here, the Stalinist regime is given a precise assessment, a regime that destroyed the hopes that arose after 1917 among a part of the democratic public of the world. The 15,000 of you who took to the battlefield will never see your hearths again, and how

many of you have lost the ability to work forever! But you also inflicted heavy blows on the enemy, and if 200 thousand of them lie in snowdrifts and look with unseeing eyes at our gloomy sky, it is not your fault. {51} Moscow conveyed to him the words of the New People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, that "the Russians learned a lot in this difficult war, in which the Finns fought heroically." they were far from enough, which was confirmed by the heavy losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, the major defeats of 1941-1942. who led the troops on the Karelian Isthmus, says that the Finnish army fought heroically. But, say, in relation to the Nazi army, none of its opponents would dare to say that it fought heroically, although German soldiers did in a number of cases, for example, under Stalingrad, showed courage. The fact is that we only call heroic

fair fight. Perhaps, Timoshenko and many other fighters and commanders, in the depths of their souls, vaguely guessed that this time they had to fight for a wrong cause, that justice was on the side of the Finns, who were defending their freedom and independence. That is why the Finnish war remained "unfamous" in the people's memory, and the point here is not only military failures (let us recall the equally serious failures of 1941, which, nevertheless, were reflected differently in folklore and fiction). No, the people's consciousness felt the injustice of the war and did not leave it in their memory. Proof

that a certain sympathy for the cause of the Finns was not alien to at least a part of the Soviet intelligentsia can also be found in Vasily Grossman's novel *Life and Fate*, where the protagonist, the physicist Shtrum, remarks that "bourgeois democracy, which has become obsolete in Finland, collided in the fortieth year with our centralism, and we got into a strong embarrassment. I am not a fan of bourgeois democracy, but facts are facts." {53}

And a very recent example is the assessment of the Soviet-Finnish war by a Soviet sociologist: seems to have been an organic consequence of the Stalinist regime, without its analysis and evaluation it is impossible to get a complete picture of that period, all the more so to analyze such an integral socio-political element of Stalinism as expansionism. a small neighbor who had recently been granted independence provides rich material for this. Take a purely utilitarian aspect: Finland's position could have been completely different in 1941. Perhaps even neutral. USSR in general and Leningrad in particular? There is only one answer: no, it has not increased, but, on the contrary, weakened. In June 1941, Finnish troops, together with the Nazis, attacked the Soviet Union and already on August 31 captured the infamous village of Mainila. In some two or three months, the Finns reached the former border on the Karelian Isthmus and even crossed it, which, however, did not cause the fall of Leningrad. The American historian C. Lundin rightly concludes on this matter: "Even in terms of the most pragmatic reality of politics, it is now obvious that the entire Soviet enterprise was worse

than a crime, it was a mistake. Thanks to the Moscow policy that pushed Finland to cooperate with Germany, the Russians were crowded into the dangerously limited defensive perimeter of Leningrad in conditions incomparably less favorable than in 1939. While the German armies were advancing on the city from the southwest, the Finns, better armed, than ever, hung literally at a distance of a cannon shot from the north. "{55} But now the war was unfair for Finland. She took advantage of the difficult situation of yesterday's enemy and attacked him, counting on a quick German victory. To paraphrase the statement of the mayor of Stuttgart M. Rommel : "It was better for Germany to lose the war under Hitler than to win it with him," one can say that "it was better for Finland to lose the war under Hitler than win it with him." But the injustice for the Finns of that second war of 1939-1944 should not obscure from us the completely different nature of the first "winter war".

Further, comprehensive and deep understanding of the results and lessons of the "winter war" will help us better understand ourselves, our society then and now.

Notes: {1}

See: History of Diplomacy. M., 1975. T. 4. S. 25-26. {2}

Meretskoy K.A. In the service of the people. M., 1971. S.

177-178. {3} See: First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Verbatim report. M., 1989. T. 2. S. 196; Soviet Estonia. 1988. August 17-18. For the first time, the German originals of the secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 were published in 1948 in English, and in 1949 in German. See Nazi-Soviet Relations. 1939-1941. Documents from the German Foreign Office. Washington, 1948; Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion. 1939-1941. Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amtes. Tübingen, 1949.

{4} See: History of Diplomacy. T. 4. S. 24, 26.

{5} Ibid. pp. 27-28.

{6} News. 1939. November 27.

{7} Ibid. November 29, 1939

{8} Twinkle. 1989. No 30. S. 11.

- {9} True. 1939. November 3.
- {10} Kauppila E. He knows and thinks. O. V. Kuusinen in the Comintern // Problems of peace and socialism. 1989. No 9. S. 91-92.
- {11} See: Truth. 1939. December 2; News. 1939. December 3. {12} See: Finland and World War II. 1939-1944. NY, 1948. P. 66; Tanner V. The Winter War. Stanford. 1957.p. 104-106.
- {13} True. 1940. January 14; Tanner V. Op. cit. P. 105-106.
- {14} See: Lundin Ch. Finland in the Second World War. bloomington, 1957. P. 62-63.
- {15} Semiryaga M.I. Resistance movement. M., 1989. P. 42. {16} See: Meretskoy K. A. Decree. op. pp. 178-179. {17} Ravens N. N. In the service of the military. Moscow, 1963, p. 136. {18} See: Tanner V. Op. cit. P. 81-82. {19} See: Finland and World War II. P. 69. {20} See: Liddell Hart B. World War II. M., 1973. S. 62-67.
- {21} See: History of diplomacy. T. 4. S. 32-34; Lundin Ch., Op. cit. P.
59. {22} See: Coates WP and Z. Soviet-Finnish Campaign 1939-1940. L., 1941. P. 92; Tippleskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 49.
- {23} Voronov N. N. Decree. op. C, 141-142.
- {24} See: The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. NY, 1954. P. 324. {25} Meretskoy K. A. Decree. op. P. 190. {26} Ibid. pp. 180-181; Soviet military encyclopedia. M. 1979. T. 7. S. 419.
- {27} See: Truth. 1940. January 14.
- {28} See: Voronov N. N. Decree. op. pp. 136-137, 139.
- {29} Meretskoy K. A. Decree. op. 185.
- {30} See: The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. P. 335-340.
- {31} Banner. 1988. No 10. S. 229.
- {32} See: Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 7, p. 419. {33} See: Lundin Ch. Op. cit. P. 60-63, 76-77. {34} See: The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. P. 348-349. {35} Voronov N. N. Decree. op. P. 135. {36} Meretskoy K. A. Decree. op. P. 181. {37} See: Izvestia. 1940. March 14, April 6.

{38} Ibid. 1939. December 16.

{39} Estimated by: The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. P. 370; Lundin Ch. Op. cit. P. 276-277; Tanner V. Op. cit. P. 132-133.

{40} Ibid.

{41} See: Truth. 1940. June 3; times. 1940. March 14; Lundin Ch. Op. cit. P. 79; The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. P. 370; Coates W. P. and Z. Op. cit. P. 100. {42}

See Izvestia. 1940. March 30. {43}

See Truth. 1940. June 3. {44} See

World War. 1939-1945. M., 1957. P. 136. {45} See

Questions of History. 1988. No 9. P. 119. {46} New

world. 1988. No 11. S. 219.

{47}CM. Gehlen R. Der Dienst. Erinnerungen 1942-1971. Mainz Wiesbaden, 1971. S. 27.

{48} See Pravda, 1989, 6 August.

{49} Banner. 1988. No 10. P. 229.

{49a} Aptekar PA Are the victims justified? - Military historical magazine. 1992. No 3. S. 43-45.

{50} Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret War Time Correspondence. L., 1975. P. 57-58, fn. {51} Cited. Quoted

from: Coates W. P. and Z. Op. cit. P. 91.

{52} The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. P. 371.

{53} October. 1988. No 2. P. 45.

{54} Efirov S. A. White spots. An imaginary dialogue about limits publicity // Sociological research. 1988. No 6. S. 73.

{55} Lundin Ch. Op. cit. P. 113-114.

{56} Cited. Quoted from: Samsonov A. M. Memory of the past. M., 1988. S.

358. Was Stalin going to attack Hitler? The

problem whether the Soviet Union was preparing a preventive or offensive war against Germany on the eve of June 22, 1941, became relevant again after the publication of V. Suvorov's books "Icebreaker" and "Den-M", where he claims that the Soviet attack on Germany was planned on July 6, 1941, and without any connection with the German plan "Barbarossa".{1}



allow us not only to agree with this conclusion of V. Suvorov, but also to very thoroughly assume that at first Stalin was going to attack Hitler in the summer of 1940, but this plan was thwarted by the rapid collapse of France, just as in the summer of 1941 a similar plan was disrupted by the German invasion. The first in time

among the facts under consideration is the message of the former commander of the Baltic Fleet V.F. Tributs that "People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov in February 1940 issued a special directive in which he pointed out the possibility of simultaneous action against the USSR coalition, led by Germany and including Italy, Hungary, Finland", and the actual training of the Baltic Fleet in 1940-1941. took place precisely within the framework of these instructions of the people's commissar. {2} This message deserves full confidence. On the one hand, it was not refuted by N. G. Kuznetsov himself either in his memoirs or in posthumously published manuscripts.{3} On the other hand, although the pre-war operational plans of fleets and flotillas were destroyed after the war, they were detailed compiled in 1946 by the report of the Main Naval Staff on the results of the Great Patriotic War. We consider it necessary to quote this statement in full: "According to the operational plans of 1941, the following tasks

were set for the Soviet fleets and flotillas in the event that an aggressor unleashed a war against the USSR: Northern Fleet 1.

Destruction of the enemy

fleet when it

appeared in the Barents and White Seas.

2. Assistance of the 14th Army in the capture of Petsamo (Pechenga). 3. Joint defense of the coast of the Sredny, Rybachy and Kola peninsulas with the 14th Army, preventing enemy landings.

4. Prevent enemy ships from entering the White Sea. 5.

Joint defense of the White Sea coast with units of the Arkhangelsk Military District. 6.

Cruising operations of submarines at sea  
messages off the western coast of Norway and in the  
Skagerrak. Red Banner Baltic Fleet

1. To prevent German amphibious landings on the coast of the Latvian and Estonian SSR and on the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. 2.

Together with the SC Air Force, defeat the German fleet when it tries to enter the Gulf of Finland. 3. Prevent enemy

ships from breaking into the Gulf of Riga. 4. To assist the ground forces on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and on the Hanko Peninsula, securing their flanks and destroying the Finnish coastal defenses. 5. Destroy the combat fleet of Finland

and Sweden (when the latter opposes the USSR). 6. In the very first days of the war, ensure the transfer of two

rifle divisions from the northern coast of the Estonian SSR to the Hanko Peninsula, as well as a large landing force to the Aland Islands.

7. Interrupt maritime communications of Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia. Black

Sea Fleet 1. Ensure the dominance of our fleet in the Black Sea. 2. Active mine laying and submarine actions to prevent the passage of the fleet of the hostile coalition into the Black Sea. 3. To prevent the transport of troops and

military equipment through the Black Sea to the ports of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. 4. Prevent amphibious landings on the northern coast of the Black Sea. 5. In the event of a speech by Romania, destroy its fleet

and interrupt maritime communications.

6. To prevent the actions of enemy ships against our coast. 7. Be ready for a tactical

landing. 8. Block the coast of Romania, including the mouth of the Danube, and destroy or capture the Romanian fleet. 9.

Assist the left flank of the Red Army in forcing the river. Danube and further advance along the Black Sea coast.

10. Provide air defense to the main naval base and the Kerch coastal defense sector. Danube Flotilla

1. Prevent the enemy from forcing the river. Danube in the area from the mouth of the river. Prut to the mouth of the Kiliya girl. 2. To prevent the passage of military and other ships in the Reni sector, the mouth of the Kiliysk branch. 3. To assist the ground forces in repelling a possible enemy strike from the direction of Galati. Caspian Flotilla 1. Assist the flank of the army on the western and southwestern coasts of the Caspian Sea with naval artillery fire and tactical landings.

2. Together with the Air Force of the Spacecraft, provide communications between the ports on the Caspian Sea. 3. To prevent enemy landings on the western and eastern coasts of the Caspian Sea together with the Red Army. 4. Carry out raiding operations on the bases together with the SC Air Force adversary Pahlavi and Nowshahr.

5. To organize and provide the VNOS service and the marine air defense

sector of Baku. Pinsk (Dneprovsk)

flotilla 1. Assistance to spacecraft troops in their offensive operations: by firing ships, crossing and transporting troops, landing tactical assault forces, covering the flanks of troops abutting the river. 2. Fight against enemy crossings. 3.

Fighting enemy river forces. 4.

Providing water communications. "{4} We will return to these plans. For now, we note

that, in general, in terms of the composition of potential opponents, they correspond to the plans of 1940 as presented by V.F. Tribun. The composition of the hostile coalition here has been expanded at the expense of Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden, Turkey and Iran. It is possible that these countries were not considered as potential opponents in 1940, even before the occupation of Bessarabia, or that Tributs simply omitted them from the list, since, except for Romania, all of them ended up neutrality towards the USSR. The same fact that since February 1940 the Baltic Fleet has been preparing for war specifically against the German coalition proves that Germany and its allies in the directive of N. G. Kuznetsov were named

not one of the likely, but the only possible opponents. For February 1940, such an orientation, adopted, of course, with the sanction of the top political leadership, is amazing. After all, at that time England and France were seriously considering the possibility of landing an expeditionary force with the help of Finland, which was no secret to the Soviet leadership and was traditionally considered one of the main reasons that forced Stalin to conclude the Moscow peace and refuse to completely absorb Finland. {5} February Directive N. G. Kuznetsova suggests that, in fact, the main reason for Soviet peacefulness was the desire to quickly release the significant forces of the Red Army bound by the Finnish war in anticipation of the soon-to-be-expected German offensive in the West. If this assumption is correct, then it turns out paradoxically that it would be most beneficial for the Finnish side to follow the line of Minister of Defense J. Niyukkenen and his supporters, who proposed not to accept Soviet conditions and continue the war in anticipation of the help of the Western allies. If the Finns persisted, Stalin, fearing that the war would drag out due to the spring thaw and the shortage of fuel in the Red Army (in early May, there was only half a month of fuel for the war), {6} probably would have agreed to peace on the basis of a pre-war proposal for an exchange of territories or even on the basis of maintaining the pre-war status quo. In this case, Finland, most likely, would have remained neutral in the event of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 1941. {7}

In favor of the assumption that the peace with Finland was dictated by the desire to free the Soviet troops for action against Germany, in our opinion, is also evidenced by the fate of the Polish officers held in Soviet captivity. On March 5, 1940, even before the Moscow peace, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to execute 14.7 thousand Polish officers and 11 thousand civilian Poles. These people were shot (about 22 thousand in number) in April and the first half of May 1940.{8} It seems to us that this execution was caused by Stalin's calculations for a speedy war with Germany. The vast majority of Polish officers and civilians from among the representatives of the intelligentsia and the propertied classes had no sympathy for either communism or the USSR. In the case

war with Germany, Poland became an ally, and the Poles would have to be released from captivity. In this case, they would certainly have played a major role in the formation of a new Polish army, which would have been virtually beyond the strict Soviet control. The experience of the two armies of the Polish Army, which consisted largely of Soviet citizens associated with Poland only by surnames, or Polish communist emigrants, shows that Stalin attached decisive importance to the control of Polish military formations in converting Poland into his satellite. The only way to prevent Polish officers from entering the new Polish army was to destroy them before the start of the Soviet-German armed conflict, which, obviously, was done by the Soviet leadership. There is indirect evidence that the decision to shoot Polish officers was discussed at the Politburo precisely in the light of the possibility of forming an anti-German Polish army, although the transcript of the meeting has not been preserved (or it has not yet been declassified). According to S. L. Beria, who refers to his father, L. P. Beria opposed the execution at this meeting, arguing as follows: "War is inevitable. The Polish officer corps is a potential ally in the fight against Hitler. One way or another, we will enter Poland, and of course, the Polish army must be on our side in a future war." {9} One of the evidence in favor of the fact that L.P. Beria really was against the destruction of the Poles can be the fact that in the text of the proposal of the NKVD to decide the fate of the captured Poles, who "all ... are inveterate, incorrigible enemies of the Soviet power", as part of the troika called upon to pronounce death sentences, the name Beria was crossed out, probably by the hand of the people's commissar himself and replaced by the name Kobulov. {10} It is quite possible that L.P. Beria actually saw the possibility of an alliance with non-communist Poland, given his post-war ideas about the reunification of non-communist Germany and the granting of greater independence to the countries of Eastern Europe, and therefore was against the execution of the Poles. But, without a doubt, Stalin and the vast majority of the Politburo needed only an absolutely obedient communist Poland after the war, and this predetermined the fate of the Polish officers.

On April 17, 1940, summarizing the experience of the Finnish war at a meeting of the highest command staff, Stalin generally assessed it positively - as a successful rehearsal for a future big war in Europe:

"The question is, whom did we defeat? They say - the Finns. Well, of course, the Finns were defeated. But this is not the most important thing in this war. To defeat the Finns is not God knows what task. Of course, we had to defeat the Finns. We defeated not only the Finns, we also defeated their European teachers - we defeated the German defensive equipment, we defeated the English defensive equipment, we defeated the French defensive equipment. Not only defeated the Finns, but also the technology of the advanced states of Europe. Not only the technology of the advanced states of Europe, we defeated their tactics, their strategy.. "We defeated not only the Finns - this task is not so big. The main thing in our victory is that we defeated the technique, tactics and strategy of the advanced states of Europe, whose representatives were the teachers of the Finns. This is our main victory." The Soviet leader also noted serious shortcomings, "The creation of unresolved tasks, for example: a cultural, qualified and educated staff. We do not have such a command staff, ~~command~~ <sup>commanders</sup> only a few," or: "We need well-knit and skillfully working headquarters. Until recently, they said that such-and-such a commander failed, a hat, he should be sent to his headquarters. Or ... a person with a vein accidentally got into the headquarters, he can command, they say: he does not belong in the headquarters, he needs to be at the command post. (Here, by the way, it turned out Trishkin's caftan: in order to eliminate the acute shortage of field commanders, the headquarters had to be laid bare.) Stalin was not satisfied with the individual qualities of the fighters either: "... Modern warfare requires well-trained, disciplined fighters, initiative. Our fighter does not lacks initiative.

He is individually underdeveloped. He is poorly trained, and when a person does not know the business, where can he take the initiative from, and therefore he is poorly disciplined. New fighters like this need to be created, not those Mityukhs who went into civilian life. We need a new fighter It must and can be created: proactive, individually developed, disciplined." It is felt that the "great leader and teacher" does not have much sympathy for the ordinary "Mityukhs".

experienced and was ready to sacrifice their lives countless to satisfy his own foreign policy ambitions. However, regarding the time frame during which it was possible to eliminate the shortcomings inherent in the Soviet armed forces by the beginning of the Finnish war, Stalin had illusions that were dangerous for himself and the country: "... Our modern Red Army was shelled on the fields of Finland - this is its first baptism. What is there The fact that our people are new people. Despite all their shortcomings, very quickly, within a month and a half, they transformed, became different, and our army came out of this war almost a completely modern army, but something what is still missing. The tails are left over from the old. Our army has stood with both feet strong on the rails of a new, real Soviet modern army. This is the main plus of the experience that we learned in the fields of Finland, allowing our army to fire well to take this experience into account. It's good that our army had the opportunity to gain this experience not from German aviation, but in Finland, with God's help. But that our army is no longer the same as it was in November last year, and the command staff is different, and the fighters are different, this is not there can be no doubt." The reservation about German aviation proves that it was Germany at that moment that was considered as the next enemy after Finland, and since it was planned to attack Hitler at the moment when the main ground forces were occupied in the West, Stalin really should have been seen in the Luftwaffe, which could quickly transfer planes to the East and slow down the advance of Soviet troops with bombing and assault strikes. And Stalin was thinking about a large-scale offensive, declaring in the same speech on April 17, 1940: "An army that has not been trained for an offensive, but for passive defense; an army that does not have serious artillery; an army that does not have serious aviation .. .; an army that

conducts good partisan offensives ... I cannot call such an army an army." {10a} That a Soviet offensive in the West was planned shortly after the Finnish War in case Germany got bogged down on the "Maginot Line" is proved by what happened after the Moscow Peace

changes in the deployment of troops. By the end of the war, the Finnish front had 55 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry and motorized cavalry divisions, 8 tank brigades and 3 airborne brigades of the Red Army with 4,000 tanks and 3,000 aircraft. Of these, starting from April, 37 divisions and 1 tank brigade were transferred to the West, including: to the Odessa district - 2 divisions, to the Kiev special - 15, including 2 cavalry, to the Belarussian (Western) special - 20, including 2 motorized cavalry, and 1 brigade. Another tank brigade returned to the Moscow Military District together with 2 divisions, 1 division each was transferred to Siberia and Transcaucasia. The rest of the formations that participated in the war with Finland remained in the Leningrad Military District or were disbanded. Of those transferred to the western districts, about 30 divisions arrived before June 1940, the remaining 7 or 8 - in July and August. But even before the transfer of formations from the Finnish theater, the western border districts had considerable forces. In the Belorussian special district there were 17 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, reinforced by 5 tank brigades, in Kiev - 23 rifle and 4 cavalry divisions with 6 tank brigades. The Odessa district, intended for operations against Romania, was weaker. But even here there were 8 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, as well as 2 tank brigades. In total, thus, taking into account 3 rifle divisions and 3 tank brigades stationed in the Baltic states, and troops transferred from Finland, Stalin could put up to 84 rifle and 13 cavalry and motorized cavalry divisions against Germany by the end of June, along with 17 tank brigades (according to the number of tanks 200 or more - each such brigade was not inferior to the German tank division).{11} It should be noted that in the event of the invasion of Soviet troops into Germany and Poland (at that time side was incredible), the Wehrmacht at the beginning of June in the East could only oppose these forces with 12 infantry divisions, 9 of which were landwehr and had very limited combat capability. In June, another infantry division was formed here, but this did not change the overall picture of overwhelming Soviet superiority.{12}



Probably, given the possibility of an imminent war with Germany, the start date for the demobilization of 686 thousand military personnel who, after the war with Finland, turned out to be "redundant" in the Red Army, whose staff (excluding the Navy) was set at 3,200 thousand people from May 1, was pushed back to 1 July. {13} An aviation group was also created in the West: the main part of the aviation released after the Finnish conflict was transferred here. As the then commander of aviation of the Leningrad Military District A. A. Novikov admitted at a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in December 1940: "In 1940, the combat training of the Air Force units of the LVO took place in somewhat peculiar conditions: special assignments and returned from Ukraine only by August....{14} It is also indicative that, according to A. M. Vasilevsky, already in April 1940 the plan for the strategic deployment of the war Against Germany, which had to be adjusted only under the influence of the results of Germany's military operations in the West.{15}

The materials of the unfinished spring 1940 deployment plan against Germany have not been published. It is not known if they survived at all. However, based on the published version of the strategic deployment dated September 18, 1940{16} and on our calculations of the distribution of forces by the summer of 1940 between the western border districts, it can be assumed that then the main attack was supposed to be in the Warsaw direction. The September 1940 plan provided for the main option to deliver the main attack south of Brest-Litovsk, but depending on the situation, it allowed the main attack by the northern grouping of Soviet troops in order to capture East Prussia, and in the conditions of lyre time it was considered necessary "to have both options developed." {17} By June 1940, an attack on East Prussia seemed very problematic, since in formally independent Lithuania there was still too weak a grouping of Soviet troops - 1 reinforced rifle division with 1 tank brigade. {18} The main grouping of Soviet troops was then in Belarus, from where a blow to Warsaw suggested itself. The second strike, obviously, was planned in the southwestern direction by the forces of the Kyiv Special Military District, which also had

significant strongwomen. Judging by the timetable for the demobilization of those who were called up for the Finnish war from July 1, 1940, Stalin planned to launch an invasion in the West at the end of June or at the beginning of July, when, according to calculations, Hitler, who launched an offensive against France in the spring, would have to get bogged down in fight against the English and French troops and bring into battle all their reserves. On May 10, 1940, Germany launched a general offensive in the West, having previously notified the USSR about it.{19} districts - the Kiev Special and Western Special, who had extensive combat experience in Mongolia, Spain and Finland, freshly minted General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and Colonel General D.G. Soviet troops in the Finnish war, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko. Stalin, informing Zhukov about the new appointment, pointedly remarked: "Now you have combat experience (successful offensive operation on Khalkhin Gol. - B.S.) ... Take over the Kiev district and use your experience in training troops." And at the same time, already knowing about the beginning of the German offensive in the West, he added that the Western allies "will have to pay for the short-sighted policy" of abandoning the USSR coalition and "appeasement" of Hitler through aggression to the East. {20}

According to former government security officer G. A. Egnatashvili (his father, A. Ya. Egnatashvili, was Stalin's deputy head of security), on the night of May 6–7, 1940, at a party in their apartment, Stalin delivered a remarkable toast. The mistress of the house, a German by nationality, had a daughter from her first marriage then living in America, and her stepmother G. A. Egnatashvili was very afraid that the USSR would go to war with the USA. Stalin reassured her: "Dear Lilia Germanovna, do not worry, do not worry ... - and thought. - We will not fight with America." Then he shifted the glass to the other hand and froze like a sphinx. A minute passed, a second passed, a third passed ... And he stroked his mustache. We do not take our eyes off him, we are afraid to move. And then he raised his right hand, stroked his mustache and minted: "We will fight with Germany! England and America will be our allies! Don't worry, don't worry! To your health!" - and drank...".{20a}

Characteristically, Zhukov was actually ordered to prepare troops for the offensive. There was no doubt that even the Soviet troops, who showed extremely low combat capability in the Finnish war, could cope with 12-13 weak German divisions. But all calculations were confused by Hitler, who in less than three weeks defeated the French army and pushed the British back to the sea. Now the Red Army risked, in the event of an invasion of Poland and Germany, to meet with the main forces of the victorious Wehrmacht, and such an invasion of the herd is too dangerous. Soviet generals, according to L. M. Sandalov, lamented with surprise: "Who would have thought that it would take the Germans only a little more than two weeks to defeat the main forces of the French army?" {21}

It seems to us that Stalin would hardly have waited for a long time for the sides to be exhausted in the course of hostilities in the West. After all, it was impossible to predict in advance when and which of the parties would be the first to lose the ability to resist. Judging by the conversation with Zhukov, Stalin regarded the combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht as higher than the combat effectiveness of the allied armies. If the defeat of Germany did not pose a threat to the USSR, which in this case, obviously, could easily occupy Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe, then the collapse of France threatened to be left alone with Germany. So it was in Stalin's interests not to delay the attack as soon as all German forces were drawn into the fighting in the West. However, Hitler's "blitzkrieg" in France ruled out the possibility of an immediate Soviet attack. The Soviet side began to prepare for war more

thoroughly.

Here, not only, and perhaps not so much, the fact that the Red Army would now have to face the main forces of the Wehrmacht played a role. Even more important was the fact that after the collapse of France, the USSR was faced with the tempting prospect of occupying all of continental Europe in the event of a decisive and quick victory over Germany. But the operation to a much greater depth required even more forces and means, more thorough preparation. In particular, the accelerated formation of airborne corps that unfolded after the defeat of France can be understood precisely in the light of plans for the occupation of Western Europe. As the last weeks of the war with Japan showed in

1945, airborne troops are best used when the enemy is already demoralized, on the verge of surrender and there is little active resistance. In the event of the imminent collapse of the Wehrmacht in a clash with the Red Army, the freshly formed airborne corps could easily land in France or even Spain. In June 1940, the formation of three-divisional mechanized corps began

(previously existing brigades were deployed into tank divisions, while the formation of motorized divisions began in May), and from July - new rifle divisions intended for the western theater. When creating mechanized corps, adventurism and gigantomania, characteristic of Soviet military planning and organization, manifested itself. In the conditions of an acute shortage of communications, a lack of experience in operating equipment and organizing marches, two Soviet tank corps that participated in the invasion of Poland in September 1939 fell behind even the cavalry during the advance, although they almost did not meet resistance. The new mechanized corps had twice as many tanks as the previous tank corps (1031 versus 560) and were even less manageable, since the number of communications equipment had not increased, and the level of personnel training was even lower. At the same time, the formation of 9, and in February 1941, another 20 corps, destined for deployment in the western border districts, including Leningrad, began. For this, neither the equipment nor the trained personnel were enough. As a result, a year later, in June 1941, the corps were not yet fully staffed, so the timing of their formation (at least the first 9) turned out to be unprecedented in world military history. But the incapacity of the new mechanized corps became clear to the Soviet command only after June 22, 1941 {22} Along with the strengthening of the army, Stalin secured new bridgeheads for the invasion of Eastern Europe and Germany. In June 1940, Soviet troops occupied the Baltic States, as well as Romanian Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Thus, a springboard appeared in Lithuania for the invasion of East Prussia, and the Red Army advanced towards the Romanian oil sources. Certain steps have been

undertaken in relation to Poland and Czechoslovakia: no later than October 1940, Stalin instructed L.P. Beria to carry out preliminary measures to prepare for the creation of Polish and Czechoslovak military formations in the USSR. On November 2, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs reported on the work carried out among the remaining Polish prisoners, the work to select those officers and soldiers who would be ready to fight against Germany on the side of the USSR without any sanction from the London government of V. Sikorsky. A selected group of "correctly politically minded" officers, who imagined the future Poland as "closely connected in one form or another with the Soviet Union", were asked to "provide an opportunity for a conspiratorial form to talk with like-minded people in the Poles' prisoner of war camps and select the personnel of the future division." After that, the Polish division was supposed to be formed "in one of the state farms in the south-east of the USSR" with the creation of a Special Department of the NKVD under it, but within the framework of the Red Army. A group of Czechoslovak officers was also prisoners of war, V from among the selected co their who expressed a desire to fight Germany "on the orders of Beneš or, at least, their commander, Colonel Svoboda", in connection with which L. Svoboda was summoned from abroad by the NKVD. {23} Before the Finnish war, the Red Army already had the experience of such formations. As early as October 26, 1939, exactly one month before the Soviet provocation in Mainila, K. E. Voroshilov ordered the formation of: the 106th Special Rifle Corps from the Finnish and Karelian population of the USSR. On November 23, the formed corps was renamed the 1st mountain rifle corps, and with the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, it was immediately transferred to the front and named the 1st rifle corps of the Finnish People's Army with nominal subordination to the puppet government of O. Kuusinen. Initially, the corps had 2 divisions, and from January 1940 - 4,

and to a large extent it was staffed by Russians and people of other nationalities who had nothing to do with Finland and did not know the Finnish language. The combat effectiveness of the corps was extremely low, by May 1940 it was disbanded, and part of its personnel formed the 71st Special Rifle Division in case of a new war with Finland.{24}

As you can see, formations similar to the planned Polish division were created shortly before the military conflict initiated by the USSR. Stalin preferred to hide the existence of the Finnish unit before the start of the war, although in those specific conditions, even a leak of information about the formation of the Finnish corps could not change anything, since Finland was not able to deliver a preventive strike and did not have allies ready to carry out such a strike. The incident with the Polish division not only directly violated one of the secret protocols to the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border, which dealt with the prevention of Polish agitation on its territory, but also, provided that the formation of the division would become known to the German side, could provoke retaliatory military action. Therefore, the Polish division could begin to form only before the start of the war. In the autumn of 1940, the time for this was not yet ripe.

Meanwhile, already in July 1940, Hitler began to transfer divisions from the West to the East and develop plans for a war against the USSR. At the same time, the authors of the first and subsequent developments not only did not fear the active offensive actions of the Red Army, but even considered them a favorable factor for the success of the German invasion of Russia. So, in his drafting of August 5, 1940, General E. Marx noted that "it would be beneficial for us if the Russians conducted offensive operations, but they would not render us such a service," while stipulating, however, the danger of a Soviet invasion of Romania and air raids on the Romanian oil region.<sup>{25}</sup> The German war plan against Russia was built not at all as a preventive against a possible Russian invasion of Europe, but as aimed at waging an offensive war in order to achieve political goals - the expansion of the German "living space" and elimination of a potential ally of England and a competitor in the division of Europe. On December 18, 1940, after the failure of negotiations with Molotov in Berlin, when it became clear that Stalin was demanding an exorbitant price from the German point of view for joining the Triple Alliance: the annexation of Finland and Soviet hegemony in the Balkans and Turkey, <sup>{26}</sup> Hitler signed Directive No. 21, authorizing the Barbarossa plan. In a directive intended only for the top leaders of the Wehrmacht, about the threat

Russia did not say anything about a preventive war, but only stated that "the German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia by a fleeting military operation even before the end of the war with England." {27} In the directive on the concentration of troops from On January 31, 1941, with which at the first stage a much wider circle of people, including the first officers of the general staff in the headquarters of the corps, inclusive, should have been acquainted, the thesis about the possibility of a Russian attack was present, although not in a very explicit form. "In the event that Russia changes her present attitude towards Germany, extensive preparatory measures should be taken as a precautionary measure, which would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England is over." {28} Such a formulation, in our opinion, pursued a propaganda goal to convince the officer corps of the justification for the upcoming war. The German military had not yet recorded any signs of the preparation of a Soviet attack on Germany. After the war, under interrogation, W. Keitel admitted that the German General Staff had information about the beginning of the concentration of Soviet troops in the western border districts only "from the early spring of 1941." {29} The fact that the Wehrmacht was preparing for an aggressive offensive war against the USSR did not mean that the German military did not take preventive measures against a possible Soviet attack. For example, in the strategic development of Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg of September 15, 1940, the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Romania

using aviation, ground and airborne troops was considered. To repel this threat, it was proposed "to use German "training units" and organize anti-aircraft defense by the forces of the Romanians" and it was indicated that "the immediate task of the German military mission in Romania will be in the preparation of appropriate defensive measures for the indicated case." {30} Also in order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) W. Keitel dated April 3, 1941 "defensive was confirmed, preparations being made against Russian preventive measures in the air and on the ground should continue on an increased scale and with

{31} A number of measures to repel a possible Soviet invasion, primarily in Romania, are also recorded in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder, {32} and in the calculation of the time for Operation Barbarossa dated June 1, 1941. The possibility was taken into account that after June 18, when the intention to attack could no longer be disguised, the Red Army would try to deliver a preventive strike. In this case, the German troops were given freedom of action. {33} On the whole, the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops, taking into account the experience of the Finnish war, in the Bulletin "Armed Forces of the USSR" issued on January 15, 1941, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel E. Kinzel, head of the "Foreign armies - East" department of the General Staff, it was noted that "the weakness of the Red Army lies in the lack of flexibility among commanders of all degrees, in the tendency to schematism, in insufficient combat training for modern requirements, in fear of responsibility and in the lack of organization felt in all areas," pointed to the low level of mastery of military equipment and weak tactical training. At the same time, it was believed that the new methods of combat training introduced by the new people's commissar after the Finnish war could give noticeable success "after a number of years, if not decades", in particular because the "tactical principles" contained in the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army are undoubtedly too high for the general educational level of a Russian soldier and by no means are yet the common property of a wide mass of officers. " {34}

In the Red Army, the failures of the Finnish war caused a change in military leadership and order No. 120 of the new People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko dated May 16, 1940, which proclaimed: war." {35} However, the criticism mainly concerned the actions of the troops before, on January 7, 1940, Timoshenko himself led the North-Western Front against the Finns. Already at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army in Moscow in December 1940, the opinion prevailed that "no matter how strong the defense may be, it will always be broken, this is shown by experience on the Karelian front", {36} the validity of G. S. Isserson, based on the experience of the German-Polish war, that "there will be no initial period of war", since



the invasion of the main forces will immediately begin. It was believed that in relation to the USSR with its large army, this conclusion was not applicable and that in the initial period of the war, the Red Army should undertake "invasion operations to solve a number of special tasks." {37} In his final speech, S.K. with the White Finns revealed all the perniciousness of our system of combat training - to conduct classes on conventions, by the armchair method", that "today the operational training of the highest command personnel does not reach the required level", that "combat training is lame on both legs today" and "it is necessary now to achieve a real turning point in the individual training of a fighter." He also emphasized the "excessive cumbersomeness" of our rear. However, the main pathos of the People's Commissar's speech boiled down to statements that "in the sense of strategic creativity, the experience of wars in Europe, perhaps, does not give anything new" (and this is was the first experience of a successful blitzkrieg!) and "the German army did not dare to attack and break through the Maginot Line", preferring to bypass it through Belgium and Holland, while "the Red Army, for the first time in the history of wars, successfully broke through a modern reinforced concrete strip, highly developed in depth" . Timoshenko believed that the Red Army "has excellent personnel and all the latest means of armed struggle." The breakthrough of the Mannerheim line, in his opinion, proved that in the Red Army there is "skillful management, special training and proper education of troops, combined with the heroism and courage of fighters and commanders", and "should be considered mainly as an act of the greatest heroism and selflessness of the Red Army and as a result of the achievements of military equipment and military art in our country." {38} And already in the spring of 1941, the inspection of combat training showed, in the opinion of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, that "in general, the level of combat training of personnel has increased." {39} Here the peculiarity of the Soviet system affected: any undertaking by the new bosses, at least in the reports of subordinates, should give quick and effective results. The Great Patriotic War, when untrained and even unarmed reinforcements often rushed to the front in the last years of fighting, {40} dispelled, among others, the myth of the success of combat training in the prewar period.

On May 5, 1941, Stalin delivered a keynote speech at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies. It had much in common with his speech on April 17, 1940 on the results of the war with Finland. Now Stalin even more insistently declared the anti-German orientation of Soviet policy: "In the ring against Germany, we play a decisive role ... In 1914-1918, our participation predetermined the defeat of Germany ... The USSR is deploying its forces ... There are no resources in Europe, - the United States and the USSR have them. These world forces determine the outcome of the struggle." In addition, the leader directly called Germany the country that started World War II, while in the autumn of 1939 Soviet propaganda placed the main blame for the outbreak of World War II on England and France. {40a} At the Kremlin reception itself, in response to the toast of an unknown major general tank troops for a peaceful Stalinist foreign policy Stalin allowed himself a remarkable remark: "Let me make an amendment. Peaceful foreign policy has ensured peace in our country. Peaceful politics is a good thing. we have not provided the army with modern means of struggle. And now that we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we must move on to the military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an offensive army. "{40b} In practice, these words meant that the Soviet leader considered that the Red Army had overcome all those completely modern army. Stalin's toast testified that the preparations for the invasion of the West had entered the final phase, when it was necessary to think about direct anti-German propaganda among the troops (in the Wehrmacht, such propaganda began literally on the eve of the invasion of Soviet territory). {40c} meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army in January 1941 of the operational-strategic games, it was revealed that the offensive of the Soviet troops on the fortified region of East Prussia would most likely end in failure. {41}

Therefore, in the updated strategic deployment plan of March 11, 1941, preference was finally given to the main attack in the southwestern direction, reinforced by the invasion of Romania. At the same time, it was noted: "The deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West with the grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and in the direction of Warsaw raises serious fears that the struggle on this front can lead to protracted battles." {42} The Soviet command, unwittingly or

deliberately, in order to justify the concentration of its own troops, exaggerated the strength of the Wehrmacht. Thus, in the September 1940 strategic deployment plan, the Wehrmacht forces were estimated at 205-226 infantry divisions (of which up to 8 were motorized) and 15-17 tank divisions, reinforced by 10 thousand tanks and 14-15 thousand aircraft. Of this number, Hitler, according to the estimates of the General Staff of the Red Army, was to throw up to 173 divisions against the USSR, including all tank and motorized, along with 12 thousand aircraft. {43} In the March 1941 strategic deployment plan, the German forces were estimated at 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, 10 thousand tanks and up to 15 thousand aircraft, of which 9-9.5 thousand are combat. Of this number, 200 divisions, including all tank and motorized, and 10 thousand aircraft were expected to act against the USSR. including 12 armored, 7 motorized and 1 cavalry.{45} In fact, by the beginning of May, the Wehrmacht had only 45 divisions against the USSR, including 2 tank and 1 cavalry.{46} In total, by June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 209 divisions (including 1 parachute in the Air Force) and 3 brigades. In the East at that moment they prepared for the invasion, including troops in Finland and the North. Norway, 126 divisions, including 17 tank, 12 motorized, 1 cavalry, 9 security (the latter had limited combat capability) and 3 brigades, which was very far from the Soviet estimates, even taking into account the 27 divisions of the 2nd echelon transferred in July and August. {47} In May 1941, 13 infantry divisions were deployed to the East, {48} but even taking them into account, Soviet intelligence doubled the total number of divisions against the USSR, and the number of tank divisions - 6 times. And on

Based on this intelligence, on May 15, 1941, a plan was prepared for a preventive strike against Germany. It provided for the main attack by the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, where 152 Soviet divisions were to defeat 100 German ones. An auxiliary strike after the transition of the SWF to the offensive was planned by the Western Front against Warsaw and Demblin and by the Southern Front in Romania. {49} In fact, the Wehrmacht neither at that moment nor by June 22 had such forces in the southwestern direction.

Germany in every possible way masked the concentration of troops in the East and did not undertake any misinformation in 1941 to exaggerate the forces of its troops concentrated against the USSR. The only exception was the situation in Romania, where the Germans feared a Soviet attack on the territory in Ploiesti. On behalf of Ribbentrop, the German ambassador W. Schulenburg at the end of February 1941 spread rumors in Moscow that the number of German troops in Romania exceeded 600 thousand people. {49} the enemy in order to justify the buildup of its own troops in the West. According to the March 1941 strategic deployment plan, 158 rifle, 27 motorized rifle and 53 tank divisions and 2 rifle brigades were intended for operations in this theater. Another 13 rifle and 1 tank division were to operate against Finland All these forces were reinforced by 253 aviation regiments.{50} By the beginning of the Soviet-German war, only in the western border districts, the Red Army had 12.8 thousand tanks, including 1475 KB and T-34. Of these, 10,540 were considered combat-ready, or 82.5%. In total, there were 23.1 thousand tanks, of which 18.7 thousand were combat-ready, or 80.9%. Tanks KB and T-34 were produced before the war in 1864 units. The combat readiness of tanks was greatly overestimated by the Soviet command by manipulating wear categories. Only after the defeat and destruction of the main part of the Soviet tank forces in the first weeks of the war did the reports begin to appear that 73% of the tanks of the old designs were not actually combat ready and required major or medium-term repairs. {51} There were combat aircraft in the western border districts at least 10.1 thousand, of which at least 7230 were combat-ready. {52} In total, the Red Army had,

according to various estimates, from 23,000 to 35,000 combat aircraft. {53} In the East, the Wehrmacht could oppose these forces with 3,680 tanks, including the tanks of two divisions of the OKW reserve, which were transferred to the front only in October. Another 350 tanks were at Rommel in the North. Africa. {54} Several hundred obsolete Romanian tanks did not fundamentally change the balance of power. Combat aircraft in the East, including the North. Norway and Finland, the Luftwaffe had about 1830, of which 1280 were combat-ready. {55} German tanks in their characteristics approximately corresponded to Soviet tanks of old designs and were sharply inferior to the new T-34 and KV. The German Me-109 fighter aircraft outnumbered the old Soviet fighters. But there were only a few more than 500 such fighters in the East, since about 1300 aircraft here were bombers or attack aircraft. {56} The new Soviet aircraft were not much inferior to the Messerschmitts, and there were 1540 such aircraft only in the western border districts by the beginning of the war. In total, by June 22, 1941, the USSR had 3,719 aircraft of new designs. {57} As can be seen, the Red Army, even taking into account the 37 formations

put up by Germany's allies, far outnumbered the enemy in the number of divisions, having 252 divisions and 2 brigades in the West in the future, i.e. 1.4 times more than the Wehrmacht and its allies. In terms of making up for human losses, the possibilities of the parties were generally incomparable: the population of the USSR was two and a half times the population of Germany within the borders of 1939. German intelligence miscalculated in assessing the ability of the Soviet Union to mobilize its human resources, believing that the potential strength of the Red Army after mobilization in 12 million people is unlikely to be achieved due to the lack of workers in the national economy in this case and the inability to provide such a mass of people with command staff, weapons and equipment, as well as to sufficiently train the replenishment. {58} The German General Staff officers underestimated the readiness of the USSR in practice stop civilian production and the Soviet ability to accumulate Lend-Lease aid to increase military production, as well as ruthlessly throw untrained and unarmed soldiers into battle without a sufficient number of commanders.

The Soviet preemptive strike plan of May 15, 1941, contained the traditional phrase that "Germany currently keeps its army mobilized, with deployed rears, it has the ability to warn us in deployment and deliver a surprise strike." In this regard, it was proposed to "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of troops. {59} According to V. D. Danilov, written by A. M. Vasilevsky's plan for a preventive strike against Germany was approved by Stalin, and the specific development of the details, called "plans for the defense of the state border", should, according to the orders of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, be completed by June 1, 1941. {60} Well, the opinion of the Russian writer is fair M. A. Aldanov, who wrote with irony that "offensive wars in history have never been and never will be: all wars are divided into defensive and" preventive ". {61} In the same way, according to K. A. Meretskov, an attack to Finland in 1939 was prepared as a "counterattack" as part of the plan to cover the state border, although no one, of course, imagined that Finland would dare to attack the USSR first. Similarly, I. S. Konev, who commanded the 19th Army, advancing from the middle of June 1941 from the North Caucasus to Ukraine, reports that back in January 1941, in connection with the appointment to the North Caucasus with the subsequent planned transfer to the western border, Timoshenko told him: "We are counting on you. You will represent a strike group of troops if it is necessary to strike. "In early June, the People's Commissar, setting the task for the commander of the 19th Army, already spoke about a counterattack:" The army must be in full combat readiness, and in the event of a German offensive in the southwestern theater military operations, on Kiev, to deliver a flank attack and drive the Germans into the Pripyat marshes. {63} Romania.

In reality, the Soviet leadership in 1941 did not expect a German attack and did not prepare for defense. Before the start of the war, defense was considered and worked out on a scale not

greater than the defense of one army, but not the front. In the operational-strategic games of January 1941, the German attack and the battles to repulse it were presented only in the introductory data, while only the offensive operations of the Soviet troops were practiced. {64} None of the options for the pre-war strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West contained any plans for defensive operations in case Germany struck first. That is why, after the German invasion on June 22, 1941, counterattacks were immediately launched as part of the offensive operations planned before the war, and the subsequent defensive actions of the Red Army, due to the lack of pre-war defensive plans, were built as an improvisation. The German side, if it considered the planned war against the Soviet Union as a preventive

one, then only in the broadest sense of the word, as actions aimed at preventing possible future offensive actions of a potential enemy. In these terms, any aggression can be considered "preventive". The former chief of staff of the operational leadership of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) A. Jodl, during interrogation on June 17, 1945, testified: "... There was a political opinion that the situation would become more complicated if Russia attacked us first. And since sooner or later , but war with her is inevitable, we'd better choose the time for the attack ourselves. {64a}

As you know, Hitler masked the preparations for the war against Russia with plans for an allegedly forthcoming invasion of England in the summer of 1941. The trouble is that, due to weather conditions, such an invasion was possible over a wide period of time - from May to October and required much fewer troops - 45-50 divisions than the implementation of the Barbarossa plan.{65} could not interfere with the landing on the British Isles. It was only after the war that it became generally known that a German invasion of England was unfeasible in either 1940 or 1941, due to the loss of the Battle of Britain by the Luftwaffe, the weakness of the German navy, and the lack of tonnage for such a large-scale amphibious operation. However, in the summer of 1941 there could be no such confidence either in Great Britain or in the USSR. Another thing is that in the event of a landing in England, almost all

German armored and motorized divisions. However, the transfer of all motorized and almost all tank divisions to the East, Hitler began only after June 10 and completed literally on the eve of the invasion. To disguise the transfer of the last echelon of troops, an action was carried out with the appearance in the "Völkisch Beobachter" on June 13, 1941 of the article by I. Goebbels "Crete - as an example" with a direct allusion to the imminent invasion of England. On the night of 12/13, the issue was confiscated by military censors, but in such a way that part of the circulation had time to spread in Berlin and reach foreign embassies. On June 14, Goebbels noted with satisfaction the opinion of the British and world media that "our deployment against Russia is pure bluff, with the help of which we expect to mask the preparations for the invasion of Great Britain." As a reaction to this incident, he also regarded the well-known TASS statement, broadcast on the evening of June 13, noting that "the Russians, it seems, still do not suspect anything." {66} The German reaction to the TASS statement, or rather, the absence of any official reaction, was a continuation of the previous game. The fact is that if the German concentration in the East were only a cover for the impending landing on the British Isles, then the German reaction to the TASS statement would be exactly the same: silence in order to create on the British side the conviction that the real German intention is invasion of Russia. Obviously, Stalin initially assessed all these events in this way and did not take measures to increase the readiness of the troops, continuing to prepare for his own invasion of Poland, Germany and Romania. Perhaps the incident with the publication of the Goebbels article convinced the Soviet leader that the Wehrmacht had already begun direct preparations for the invasion of England, and in the coming weeks the main striking forces of the German army would be transferred to the English Channel coast, which would create favorable conditions for a Soviet attack.

The weak point of the Red Army remained the provision of fuel. So, on May 1, 1941, the Red Army was provided with fuel as follows: B-78 gasoline - for 10 days of the war, B-70 - for 3 months 19 days, B-74 - for 1 month 8 days, gasoline - for 1 month 14 days and diesel fuel for 24 days of hostilities. {67} But



it should be borne in mind that the German army also experienced a certain shortage of fuel before the invasion of the USSR. If with aviation gasoline, thanks to the production of synthetic fuel, things were more or less successful, then with gasoline and diesel fuel, a 10% deficit was envisaged already in July, and in August the invasion army was to be supplied to a large extent through direct deliveries from Romania. In autumn, the German fuel reserves were to be depleted, amounting to only 50% of the need for aviation gasoline, 25% for motor gasoline and 50% of the need for diesel fuel. {68} The German leadership hoped for the transience of the Russian campaign, deliveries from degrees, for trophies. The more acute shortage of aviation gasoline in the Red Army was explained both by the lack of own capacities and by the American embargo imposed after the Finnish war, and by the fact that the Soviet fleet of military aircraft was many times superior to the German one. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership, like the German one, counted on a quick successful invasion, hoped to replenish fuel supplies in the western border districts at the expense of other regions of the country and the civilian sector by its beginning, and intended to use Romanian deposits and capacities, as well as trophies in Poland and Germany. In the event of a protracted war, the calculation was on supplies from the UK and the USA. The possible collapse of England in the event of a possible German invasion would have sharply

worsened the geostrategic position of the USSR, allowing Hitler to throw to the East all the aviation and divisions left in the West, as well as making it difficult to receive supplies vital for the war from the USA and Canada. So the threat that England could collapse at any moment, as France had before, forced Stalin to rush. In the second half of May, the recruitment of 800,000 reserve troops began in the border western districts, and from the beginning of June, the transfer of 4 armies and one rifle corps of the reserve of the High Command began there from the internal districts. {69} On June 4, the Politburo decided to form by July 1 as part of the Red Army, the 238th Infantry Division of the Central Asian Military District, "staffed with personnel of Polish nationality and who know the Polish language," a total of 10,298 people. Obviously, despite all the covert work,

carried out by the NKVD and the surviving Polish officers from among the "informers" who had escaped Katyn and "politically correct", there were not enough volunteers from among the captured Poles for the division, and therefore it was decided to form the division by re-staffing not only Poles, but also "persons who know Polish language, serving in the units of the Red Army".{70} This also made the division quite "trustworthy". In practice, as was later the case with two armies of the Polish Army, and earlier with the Finnish Corps, it was most likely that the 238th division was staffed by Red Army soldiers with "Polish" surnames, who did not even know the Polish language. In connection with the beginning of the war, this division was formed only in September and no longer from the Poles, but from the Kazakh and Russian-speaking population of Kazakhstan. "Polish trace" remained only in the name of the chief of staff of the division - Colonel V. L. Mikhlikovsky, who was appointed to this post even before the start of the war.{71}

The decision to form a Polish division by July 1 indicates that the Soviet leadership acted according to the "Finnish version". Then the Finnish connection began to form a month before the start of the war. Now, apparently, Stalin decided that the time had come for an invasion of Poland. It is not possible to explain the formation of the Polish division by any other goals. It was more difficult to form such a division than an ordinary rifle division (Polish regulations, uniforms, teaching the Polish language), its very existence in peacetime posed a considerable risk: find out about the Polish formation of German intelligence, this could push Hitler to war against the USSR, since obviously would have shown Stalin's aggressive intentions. It was quite difficult to hide the existence of the Polish division, to which "persons who knew the Polish language from all over the Red Army were taken and where Poles who were not completely reliable (including me as potential German agents) could get, was quite difficult, especially if it was a question of a long period of time, say, until the spring of 1942 - until that moment, according to some memoirists, Stalin allegedly expected to delay the inevitable clash with Germany.{72} the fact of a long stay in the Red Army, if

At the same time, the USSR still remained a "non-belligerent ally" of Germany. In the event that the Soviet Union was not going to be the first to attack Germany, but only feared a German attack, the most favorable time for the formation of a Polish unit in the Red Army would be the very moment of the German invasion. For the Poles, many doubts and ambiguities about their position in the USSR would immediately disappear. There would be enough time to form a division. Indeed, even according to the very optimistic introductory operational-strategic games of January 1941, in the event of German aggression, the first two weeks of the war were fought on Soviet territory, and only then did the Red Army enter Poland. {73} On the same day, June 4, when the

decision of the Politburo on the Polish division, there was a meeting of the Main Military Council chaired by Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, and it discussed the draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army on the preparation of personnel for waging "offensive and all-destroying war." The draft was sent for revision and approved on June 20.{74} This directive, which lost its meaning two days later, said, in particular: , then this war is considered unfair, and vice versa, if the country was attacked and only defends, then such a war supposedly should be considered fair. From this it is concluded that supposedly the Red Army will wage only defensive war, forgetting the truth that any war that will wage the Soviet Union, it will be a just war."{75} The Soviet military and political leaders beyond measure overestimated the combat effectiveness of their own armed forces and underestimated the decisiveness of Hitler's intentions and the qualitative power of the Wehrmacht. G.K. Zhukov recalled his feelings when, being commander of the

Kiev Special Military District, he attended a meeting of the highest command staff in December 1940: "We foresaw that the war with Germany could be difficult and lengthy, but at the same time we believed that our country already has everything necessary for a long war and struggle until complete victory.

thought that our armed forces would have to enter the war so unsuccessfully, suffer a heavy defeat in the very first battles and be forced to retreat into the interior of the country. "And after he became the chief of the General Staff from the end of January 1941, the following conversation took place with Stalin: "I remember how once, in response to my report that the Germans had strengthened their air, intelligence and ground intelligence, I. V. Stalin said: "They are afraid of us. I'll tell you in secret that our ambassador had a serious conversation with Hitler personally,

and he confidentially told him: "Please don't worry when you receive information about the concentration of our troops in Poland. Our troops will undergo extensive retraining

for especially important tasks in the West" ". {75a} Probably, the conversation between Ambassador V. G. Dekanozov and the German Fuhrer took place as early as December 1940, immediately after his appointment to this post. Stalin's reaction to Hitler's message shows that he was not only not afraid of Germany, but also believed that the Germans themselves should be afraid of the USSR.

The advance to the border and divisions of the western border districts began. The preventive strike plan of May 15, 1941 provided for their concentration at 20-80 km from the border, starting from June 1. {76 }And from mid-June, 32 divisions of the reserve of these districts also received orders to take up positions at the same distance by July 1 from the borders.{77} It is possible that the events associated with the Goebbels article and the TASS Statement prompted the Soviet leadership to speed up the concentration of troops. By July 10, the armies and corps of the RGC were to advance to the line of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. {78} The Soviet absolutely inconsistent with reality and extremely exaggerated idea of the combat capability of the Red Army formations and their capabilities for rapid deployment in wartime states. The mobilization plan of 1941, which bore the ominous name "Thunderstorm", {79} provided that the troops of the first echelon in the West, which included 114 divisions, and fortified areas of the first line, as well as 85% of the air defense troops, airborne troops, more than 75% of the air force and 34 regiments of the RGK were to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the moment the mobilization was announced due to the call of assigned staff

and use of vehicles from nearby areas. 58 divisions of the second echelon completed mobilization for 2-3 days. Another 60 divisions were to become fully combat-ready on the 4-5th day of mobilization, and the remaining 71st division - on the 6-10th day. The mobilization of the Air Force was to be completed in 3-4 days, and all combat units and rear units serving them were brought to combat readiness in 2-4 hours, and the first echelon of air defense forces - in 2 hours. {80} The absurdity of these terms was proved only the war, when conscripts from the newly annexed territories fled or went over to the side of the enemy, transport was sorely lacking, and aircraft were destroyed at airfields before they could take off. According to the plan of May 15, aircraft were also secretly moving up to the border, to field

airfields, and from mid-June several air divisions began to relocate from the eastern part of the country to the West. {81} However, the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of Soviet aviation turned out to be much lower than envisaged by the plans. During the investigation, the former commander of the Western Special Military District, D. G. Pavlov, admitted: "I made a criminal mistake that aviation was deployed at field airfields closer to the border, at airfields intended for training in case of our offensive, but not defense at all." At the trial, he clarified that he was only guilty of "physically unable" to verify the correctness of the report of his subordinates on the dispersal of aviation. {82} The Red Army did not carry out any defensive measures on the borders and did not even have plans to carry them out.

The Wehrmacht, until June 22, did not count on a large-scale preemptive strike from the Russians. True, in June, a report was received from one of the agents in Moscow that the plan for such an attack was discussed in the Kremlin and was rejected. {83} corresponding to the truth. It is also possible that the plans for a strategic deployment against Germany and delivering a preemptive strike to her were never signed by the leaders of the Soviet armed forces precisely for reasons of secrecy. After all, even if such an unsigned document falls into the hands of an enemy agent, he will not

be able to conclude with certainty whether this is indeed a plan with directive power, or only one of a number of possible, tentatively considered options. It is likely that the German agent, from the fact that there were no signatures of the top leaders on the May plan for the invasion of Germany and Poland, made the erroneous conclusion that this plan was finally rejected by the Soviet military-political leadership, i.e. Stalin himself. In fact, the measures actually carried out within the framework

of the plan of May 15, as well as the formation of the Polish division by July 1, clearly prove that the plan for a preventive strike began to be implemented, and the invasion was scheduled for early July. Mobilization actions, due to the underestimation of the real terms of mobilization, have not yet begun to be carried out, with the exception of the call for 800,000 spares. The German command probably did not regard the agent's report as a danger signal and, in any case, did not make any adjustments to their plans. Even in the development of Lossberg, the most unfavorable option for the actions of the Red Army from the point of view of the Wehrmacht was recognized as the one when the Soviet troops would first strive to "take the blow of the German troops with small forces, and concentrate their main grouping in the deep rear." However, such a development of events was considered unlikely.{84} Meanwhile, L. D. Trotsky, in his time as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military Affairs, proposed precisely such a course of action for the Red Army.{85} However, Stalin had very ambitious plans and did not think about defense . Only on June 21, when the signs of an impending invasion became clear, and the German side rejected the proposal for the arrival of V. M. Molotov to Berlin (Stalin hoped to win time through negotiations to complete his own deployment), a directive was issued to bring troops in the West on alert. But it was already too late. {86} The reasons why the developed strategic plans were poorly communicated to the troops in practice and were not really worked

out in the system of combat training were well shown in his memoirs by the then People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov: "Business ties with the People's Commissariat of Defense in being Voroshilov (and with him) I had first of all

along the line of operational plans of the troops. When a world war broke out in Europe, the Naval Staff and I tried more actively to find out what our tasks were in case of war. Now I can say with responsibility that there were no seriously elaborated plans at that time. There were plans for the deployment of troops, classified to such an extent that they were not really put into practice. We prepared the fleets for war in every possible way, but these preparations were not aimed at specific tasks, and without them this is still not preparation.

To teach ships (and troops. - B.S.) to fight regardless of the enemy is important, but far from everything. Specific directives of the People's Commissariat of Defense were issued in February 1941. But already at that time, our policy tied our strategy hand and foot, and the fear of showing Hitler that we were preparing against him did not allow us to truly prepare for war. All the efforts and huge funds expended on the preparation of the army and navy went to waste, since operational strategic issues did not receive the necessary permission from the top political and military leadership. Where our hands were untied was to prepare for an attack and not be taken by surprise. {86a}

Kuznetsov gives examples of Soviet aggressions carried out, when the corresponding plans were not communicated to the troops and navy in time anyway: "How could it happen that the offensive of our troops on Poland and the border crossing after the German attack on Poland in September 1939 took place even without notifying me about this, although the Pinsk flotilla was supposed to participate in this operation? I declared this indignantly to Molotov, saying that if they did not trust me, then I could not be in this position. In response, he suggested that I read the TASS messages that he ordered send me from that

day ... For the first time I was surprised at the lack of instructions from the center while still being the commander of the Pacific Fleet in 1938 during the Khasan events, which could develop into a larger adventure on the part of the Japanese and require more prepared and organized actions on our part. At the time, I just didn't understand how to explain it. Lack of information

about the actions in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, when I was not informed at all,

already disturbed, but, unfortunately, even after my strong protest on this issue, the situation did not change ... I was even more struck by the methods of preparation and "planning" of the offensive on the Finnish front in the winter of 1939/40. - The results confirm this. The war with Finland ended, and it seemed that major shortcomings in the training

system were revealed, measures were taken to correct them ... But the situation in the leadership of all the armed forces and the country militarily did not change at all.

The liberation of Bessarabia in the summer of 1940 also took place without any planning, preparation and coordination of all armed forces. I remember how, already at the last moment, I was told that in a few days certain actions would follow on land against Rumania, and the Black Sea Fleet should be ready to move in case of serious resistance. I had no choice but to quickly give instructions to go to Sevastopol myself and personally discuss everything with the commander of the fleet, and then go on a destroyer to Odessa for personal communication with Timoshenko and other army commanders who were there. {86b} The Admiral made a disappointing, but correct conclusion: "The presence of huge armies, rich and numerous equipment, excellent soldiers and commanders (one can argue about the "beautiful" - B.S.) crashed into the lack of clear leadership, timely orders and coordinated actions between the army, aviation and navy. This, as is known, cost huge unnecessary losses and, it must be said frankly, put the country in a certain period in a critical situation. {86c} Considerations of secrecy in the USSR prevailed over the practical interests of military planning and training of troops. plans for a Soviet attack on Germany, but the Red Army turned out to be ill-prepared not only for a clash with the Wehrmacht, but also for much smaller conflicts in Poland

and Finland. in fact, it was an accelerated improvisation, since a large-scale invasion of Poland and Germany was originally planned, and not at all the capture of the Baltic states and Bessarabia.



planning and preparation of large-scale military operations, as we have seen, took root in the USSR during several pre-war years. As the same N. G. Kuznetsov testifies: "There was a motion picture "If there is war tomorrow", which Stalin liked to watch and show to foreign guests even after the war. But, as experience has shown, directing a motion picture is one thing, but in fact preparing for so that "not to give a single inch of their land to anyone" is another and much more difficult and painstaking task. deeds..."{86d} Consequently, it is absolutely unbelievable that the top officers of the General Staff could develop a plan for a preemptive strike against Germany without Stalin's sanction. The People's Commissar of the Navy, most likely, was not even informed about the preparation of an attack on Germany. The available data make it possible to determine the most likely time for the planned Soviet invasion to begin. By July 1, all Soviet divisions of the first echelon were to concentrate at a distance of 1 to 4 days from the border, and aviation was relocated to field airfields. Not later than July 5, all these divisions could reach the border itself. July 6 Sunday, the most suitable day for a

surprise attack. Hitler attacked Yugoslavia and the USSR exactly on this day of the week - April 6 and June 22, 1941. By July 6, it was possible to transfer to the western borders a freshly formed Polish division from Kazakhstan, although this division, obviously, was intended for the second echelon and had more political than military significance. The second echelon divisions could arrive at the battlefield in the middle or the second half of July, just as the German second echelon divisions were gradually brought into action over the course of two months after June 22. Therefore, the date of July 6, 1941, first named by V. Suvorov as the estimated time of the start of the Soviet invasion, may be based on real

grounds.

The supposed date of the Soviet invasion - July 6, 1941 - is not contradicted by the fact that only on June 19, 1941, the directive of the People's Commissariat of Defense was issued to repaint aircraft in summer camouflage color. This is a labor-intensive and large-scale event.

took about a month. It was to be completed by July 20 with the painting of aircraft and camouflage of runways, and by July 30 - all airfield facilities. It was almost impossible to hide this from enemy intelligence, as well as try to present it as disinformation intended for a potential enemy. Just like that, they would not spend huge amounts of money to paint the entire fleet of the Red Army in summer camouflage color (in winter - in winter). This could only mean that the Soviet side was going to start full-scale hostilities this summer. And if Stalin counted on surprise, then it was impossible to give Hitler a warning long before it began. Therefore, we had to put up with the fact that part of the Soviet aircraft would be hastily repainted after the start of the war. And from July 1, the industry was supposed to produce aircraft only with summer camouflage. {86e} In our opinion, in reality there was an alternative possibility that the Soviet attack would follow before the German one. For this, it would be enough that the

anti-German coup in Belgrade did not take place on March 27, 1941, but, say, in the first ten days of April, after the Wehrmacht launched Operation Marita - the invasion of Greece from Bulgaria, originally scheduled for April 1. { 87} In this case, Germany would have to hastily create a new grouping of troops against Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav army would have had time to complete the deployment, and the Balkan campaign could be delayed. As a result, Germany would not have had time to complete its deployment in the East and was forced to postpone the invasion of the USSR for at least 3 weeks. Then Stalin's blow would have been the first. But the course and outcome of the war, in our opinion, this circumstance could not change. Note that in connection with the events in the Balkans, one of the then heads of Soviet intelligence, P. A. Sudoplatov, reports: "I have to admit that we did not expect such a total and such a quick defeat of Yugoslavia. During all these events on April 18, 1941, I signed a special directive in which all our residencies in Europe were instructed to intensify the work of the agent network and communication lines in every possible way, bringing them into line with wartime conditions. Sudoplatov also confirms that in May and June 1941 L. Svoboda "began

to discuss the plan for the formation of Czech units, in order to then throw them into the German rear to conduct partisan operations in Czechoslovakia. "{87a} Note that for partisan operations, entire units are not thrown by air, but for a campaign in the third echelon of the Red Army liberating Czechoslovakia (as it is and happened later) the Legion of Liberty could be very useful. The option of a strike in

the southwestern direction, practically envisaged by the pre-war plan, was tried to be carried out during a tank battle in the Lutsk-Dubno region, when the Soviet troops, who had almost sixfold quantitative and absolute qualitative superiority in tanks and significant superiority in aviation and personnel, were completely destroyed in a week, irretrievably losing almost two-thirds of armored vehicles.{88} It was the low level of combat training and leadership of the Soviet troops. 10 engine hours, while confident driving a tank required 25, but for such driving practice there was not enough fuel. {89} Soviet pilots had extremely short flight hours before the war - from 4 to 15.5 hours in the first 3 months of 1941, and new types of aircraft are poorly mastered. {90} As a result, due to a lack of fuel and experience, until the summer of 1943, Soviet aviation loitered over the battlefield not at the maximum possible, but at the most economical speeds.{91} As a result, up until the summer of 1943 to the end, Soviet aviation rarely deepened further than 30 km from the front line and did not cause much concern on the part of the Germans. Also, until the end of the war, the offensive was stereotyped. {92 } The Soviet artillery was not very effective either. In the last years of the war, the Red Army had to create a density of artillery and mortars of the order of 300 barrels per 1 km of the front in order to break through the enemy's defenses, {93} while the Wehrmacht, for example, achieved an operational breakthrough on the sector of the Voronezh Front in July 1943 with a breakthrough of 22 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. {94} And at the end of the war, the Soviet troops were not quite ready for combat operations. Characteristic is the diary entry of the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front A. I. Eremenko dated April 4, 1945: "We need to hurry, and the troops are very poorly prepared for offensive operations, on the 4th Ukrainian Front

{95} If Stalin had succeeded in striking first in 1941 or delayed the

outbreak of war until 1942, this would not have saved the Red Army from defeat. An increase in the number of tanks and aircraft would have required more pilots and tankers, who still would not have had time to properly prepare, as well as more fuel, which would significantly increase its shortage. At the same time, in the event of a Soviet attack, the war would very quickly spread to Soviet territory and the majority of the population would still be perceived. The outcome of the war, and at about the same time as in reality, would be decided by the superiority of the USSR in human reserves and territory, the ability of the totalitarian system to survive in critical conditions and the help of the Western allies, whose supplies were crucial in supplying Soviet Union fuel, aluminum, copper, communications equipment, industrial and transport equipment, and many others. {96} The German side underestimated the ability of Soviet industry and the armed forces to accumulate Western aid. England and the United States, which had no more sympathy for communism than for National Socialism, had to help Stalin, and not Hitler, since the German military and economic potential was greater than the Soviet one, and Hitler's victory, inevitable in a one-on-one clash between the USSR and Germany, concealed for them there is a much greater danger than the victory of Russia, dependent on imports of advanced technologies. So by starting the war with Hitler, Stalin actually brought closer the moment of receiving much-needed help from the allies. The Soviet army, and as the battles in Chechnya show, and the Russian army that inherited it, due to fundamental internal vices, was never properly prepared for war and could only buy victory with a lot of blood and not as a result of a blitzkrieg.

The Soviet side began deployment to the West earlier than the Wehrmacht - from April 1940 (compared to July), but planned to complete it a little later - in early July 1941 (compared to June 22). The fact that Stalin deployed much more formations than Hitler played a role here, transferred them to more significant

distances and over a less developed road network. The delay in the beginning of the German deployment in the East was caused by the campaign in France, and in 1941 by the Yugoslav coup, which required a large-scale invasion of the Balkans. The accidental combination and interaction of these factors led to the fact that the German attack took place, and the Soviet one belatedly. The absence of documents in our hands with the exact date of the planned Soviet invasion cannot be an argument in favor of the fact that it should not have happened in the near future. After all, no one doubts that the USSR attacked Finland in the fall of 1939, but documents indicating November 26, 1939 as the date of the provocation in Mainila and November 30 as the dates have not yet been found and, perhaps, do not exist in nature planned Soviet invasion. The last pre-war Order of the Military Council of the Leningrad District dated November 22, 1939 on crossing the border already set specific combat missions for the formations, but it also stipulated that an additional announcement would be made about the day of crossing the border. {97} By that time, almost all the troops of the district had already settled directly on the Soviet-Finnish border, since they did not fear a Finnish preventive strike, and did not count on the surprise of their own invasion. In the case of Germany, there was not only the threat of a preemptive strike by the Wehrmacht, but there was also a calculation for the surprise of the Soviet invasion. Therefore, until the last moment, the divisions had to be at some distance from the western borders. Probably, the date of November 22, 1939 was similar to July 1, 1941, reflecting the same stage in the preparation of the invasion. At the same time, by November 23, 1939, the administration of the "Finnish" corps of the Red Army was formed (before the start of hostilities, only one of the two originally planned divisions had been fully formed). Most likely, on July 1, 1941, Soviet troops in the West would have received an order to advance to the border line in order to cross it on July 6, with the setting of combat missions at the same time. But the German attack on June 22, 1941 directed the development of events in a different scenario. Notes: {1} See: V. Suvorov (V. B. Rezun) Icebreaker. Who started World

War II? M.:

New time, 1992; He is. Day-M When

did the second world war start? M.: JSC "All for You", 1994; as well as the author's edition of these works: Suvorov V. Icebreaker. Day-M Moscow: ACT, 1994. At the beginning of 1996 TKO "ACT" published the first volume of the final trilogy: Suvorov V. The Last Republic. Why did the Soviet Union lose World War II? See also the articles devoted to the analysis of V. Suvorov's books and the problems raised by him: Hoffman I. Preparing the Soviet Union for an Offensive War. 1941// Domestic history. 1993. No 4; Boroznyak A. I. June 22, 1941: View from the "other" side // Domestic History. 1994. No 1 (in this article the historiography of the problem is given); Meltyukhov M. I. Disputes around 1941. The experience of critical reflection on one discussion // Patriotic history. 1994. No 3; Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion. Sat. articles. M.: AIRO-XX, 1995; Nevezhin V. A. Offensive War Syndrome. M.: AIRO-XX, 1997; Hoffman J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945. Munchen: Verlag fur Wissenschaften, 1996.

{2} Tributs VF The Baltics enter the battle. Kaliningrad: Knizhnoe izd-vo, 1972. P. 29. {3} This

statement by N. G. Kuznetsov, who was then alive, was not questioned in any of the editions of his memoirs and the posthumous publication of the manuscript "Sharp Turns" in 1992-1993. in the Military Historical Journal. See also: Kuznetsov N. G. On the Eve. 3rd ed. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1989; He is. On the fleets combat alert. M.: Military Publishing, 1971; He is. Course to victory. M.: Military Publishing, 1975; He is. The day before. Chapters from the book// Moscow. 1988. No 5; He is. Our relations with Zhukov have become truly dramatic...// Military Historical Journal. 1992. No 1. In the "Chronology of the main events in the life, state and social activities of the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov", based on the materials of the state archives and the personal archive of the admiral, the exact date of this directive is February 26, 1940 (Kuznetsov N. G. Steep turns: From the notes of the admiral. M.: Molodaya gvardiya, 1995. P. 209). N. G. Kuznetsov himself notes in his memoirs that later, on February 23, 1941, "a very important directive was issued aiming the command of the districts and fleets at Germany as the most likely enemy in a future war" (Kuznetsov N. G. On the Eve. 3rd edition, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1989, p. 359).

{4} Russian State Administration of the Navy, Department of the Central Military Medical Academy, d. 37093, II.

21-22. Material provided by V. Shlomin. {5} About plans to send an allied expeditionary force to Finland and the impact of these plans on the course and outcome of the Soviet-Finnish war, see: Sipols B. Ya. Secret documents of the "strange war" // Modern and recent history. 1993. No 2; Sokolov B.V. Pyrrhic victory (New about the war with Finland) // Historians answer questions. Issue. 2. M.: Moskovsky Rabochiy, 1990. S. 291-292.

{6} The act of acceptance of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR comrade. Timoshenko S. K. from comrade. Voroshilova K. E. // Military History Journal. 1992. No 1. P. 14.

{7} Previously, we held a different point of view on this matter, believing that Mannerheim and other supporters of peace on Soviet terms saved Finland from inevitable defeat after the collapse of France. See: Sokolov B.V. Decree. op. pp. 291-292. {8} Katyn case // Military archives of Russia. Issue. 1. M., 1993. S.

124-126, 127, 160-161. {9} Beria S. L. My father is Lavrenty Beria. M.: Sovremennik, 1994. S. 354-355. {10} Katyn

case. S. 125, note. {10a} Tomorrow. 1996. No 51. S. 5.

{11} The calculation was made by us together with P. A. Aptekar on the funds of the RGVA: f. 34980, op. 10, dd. 62, 66-3002, 281, 655, 814, 915, 925, 991, 1003, 1056, 1114. Data on the composition of the troops stationed in the Baltics, see: Classified removed. Ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. M.: Voenizdat, 1993. S. 126. {12} Counting according to: Müller-Gillebrand B. Land Army of

Germany. 1933-1945. Per. with him. T. 3. M.: Military Publishing House, 1976. S. 354-409. {13} Act on the reception of the People's Commissariat of Defense... S. 8; The last report of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov // Military History Journal. 1991. No 3. S. 8. {14} On the eve of the war. Materials of the meeting of the top management

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{15} Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of all life, 6th ed. Book. 1. M.: Politizdat, 1988. S. 100.

{16} Was the USSR preparing a preventive strike? // Military historical journal. 1992. No 1. S. 24-29. {17} Ibid. P.

27. {18} Classified

as classified. P. 126. {19} See:

Subject to disclosure. USSR-Germany. 1939-1941: Documents and materials. - Comp. Y. Felshtinsky. M.: Mosk. Rabochiy, 1991, p. 183. Ribbentrop's instruction to Ambassador Schulenburg of May 7, 1940, p. 185.; telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to Ribbentrop dated May 10, 1940.

{20} Zhukov GK Memoirs and reflections. M.: APN, 1970. S. 171. {20a}

Spy. 1993, No1. P. 71. In almost the same words, G. A. Egnatashvili repeated the story of the Stalinist toast in a conversation with us on December 10,

1997. {21} Sandalov L. M. Experience. M.: Voenizdat, 1966. S. 54. {22} Soviet Armed Forces: Questions and Answers. M.: Politizdat, 1987. S. 163-167; Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. pp. 196-197.

{23} Stalin, Beria and the fate of Anders' army in 1941-1942. {//} New and recent history. 1993. No 2. S. 60-62.

{24} Pharmacist P. Unknown army of a non-existent country // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1994. November 25.

P. 4. {25} Abridged text of the development of Major General Marx // Filippi A. The Pripyat problem. Per. with him. M.: Izdatinlit, 1959. S. 148. {26}

See: Subject to disclosure. pp. 240-289. {27}

Directive No 21. Option "Barbarossa"// Defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War. Ed. N. G. Pavlenko. M.: Military Publishing House, 1960. S. 200. {28} Directive on

the concentration of troops (Plan "Barbarossa") // Ibid. pp. 203, 209. {29} Summary of

the results of the survey by V. Keitel // {Payback}: The Third Reich: falling into the abyss. - Comp. E. E. {Schemeleva-Stenina}. M.: Respublika, 1994. P. 116. {30} Lossberg's

strategic development // Military Historical Journal. 1991. No 3. P. 24. {31} The defeat of German imperialism in World War II war. S. 211.



{32} Halder F. Military diary. Per. with him. T. 2. M.: Military Publishing House, 1969. S. 406, 449, 451. Records dated March 16, April 6 and 7, 1941 G.

{33} The defeat of German imperialism in World War II war. S. 219.

{34} Excerpts from the Bulletin of the German General Staff "The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union as of January 1, 1941." // Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War. Issue. 16. M.: Military Publishing House, 1955. S. 79-80.

{35} Soviet Armed Forces: Questions and Answers. S. 196. {36} On the eve of the war. P. 314. Speech by S. A. Kalinin. {37} Ibid. P. 153. Speech by P. S. Klenov. {38} Ibid. pp. 339, 340, 363, 365, 367, 368. {39} Soviet Armed Forces: Questions and Answers. 196. {40} See, for example, the testimony of the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1993, June 24. P. 3. {40a} Cited. in the record Sun.

Vishnevsky by: Nevezhin B. A. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 // Another war 1939-1945. M.: RGGU, 1996. S. 109-110. {40b} Quoted. by:

Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. op. P. 10. {40c} This is evidenced, in particular, by a letter from Private K. Frank from the 102nd Infantry Division dated July 10, 1941: "... On June 4, our regiment set out on a campaign. We did not know where we were going "Originally, we were directed to Poland, and then to East Prussia. But on June 19, we approached the Russian border. Each of us wondered what we were looking for here? They began to say that in Russia they would load us and take us to Iraq, so that together with the Russians to hit the knees of the British ... On June 21, at about 8 pm, the company was gathered for a political lesson. Our company commander spoke about the course of the war with England and the international situation, then spoke about our work near the Russian border. And at the end of the lesson, our captain said real speech." He said, "Comrades! The Soviet Union intends to attack our Fatherland on July 18. Thanks to our Fuhrer and his wise far-sighted policy, we will not wait for an attack, but we ourselves will go on the offensive ... "At 24.00 we took up our starting positions. Now we were told the start time of the offensive: 3.05 ... "(Rodina. 1991. No 6- 7. p. 28). higher authorities

Wehrmacht received appropriate instructions a little earlier. Thus, the famous "decree on commissars" was issued on June 6-8, and the future Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories A. Rosenberg spoke to his employees Deposing Germany's goals in the war against the Soviet Union only on June 20, 1941 (See: The criminal goals of Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union, Documents and Materials, edited by P. A. Zhilin, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1987, pp. 105-110). In the USSR, on June 20, 1941, the Main Military Council approved a draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Beautiful Army for the near future", which directly emphasized: "The war has directly approached the borders of our homeland. Every day and hour an attack by the Imperialists on the Soviet Union is possible, which we must be ready to forestall with our offensive actions... The experience of military operations has shown that a defensive strategy against superior motorized units did not give any success and ended in Defeat. Consequently, the same offensive strategy must be applied against Germany, supported by powerful equipment... All training of all branches of the Red Army troops should be imbued with an offensive spirit... The German army has not yet encountered an equivalent enemy, equal to it both in terms of the number of troops, and in their technical equipment and combat training. the clash is just around the corner" (to this phrase, the head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee, G. F. Aleksandrov, made an interesting note: "Such a formulation must by no means be allowed. This would mean revealing the cards to the enemy. "Meltyukhov M. I. Ideological documents of May-June 1941 on the events of the Second World War (Another war 1939-1945. S. 77, 99-100). Sending a directive to the troops was disrupted by the outbreak of war However, such a frank document could only be approved for mass distribution if only a few days were left before the planned Soviet attack on Germany. If the 102nd German Infantry Division from the central regions of Germany was sent to the Soviet border on June 4, i.e. 18 days before the start of the offensive, then from the Soviet side, for example, the 427th artillery regiment, located in the Shepetovka area, i.e., much closer to the border, moved towards it on June 19, i.e. 17 days before

the estimated date for the start of the Soviet offensive is July 6, 1941 (See: Lotman Yu. {41} See: Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of the disaster // Military Historical Journal. 1993. NoNo 6, 7,

8. {42} Ibid. 1992. No 2. S. 21-22. {43} Ibid. No 1. S. 24-25. {44} Ibid. No 2. P.18-20. {45} Ibid. P. 39. {46} Counting according to: Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 354-409; Defeat of German imperialism in World War II. pp. 213-222; Bezymensky L. Special folder "Barbarossa". M.: APN, 1972. S. 300-301.

{47} Counting according to: Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T, 2. M.: Izdatinlit, 1958. S. 152, 206-208, 257-264; T. 3. S. 354-409; Defeat of German imperialism in World War II. pp. 213-222.

{48} Calculation according to: Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 354-409.

{49} Military history magazine. 1992. No 2. S. 17-18. {49a} Subject to disclosure. pp. 307-308. Telegram from the German Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Schulenburg dated

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Ibid. pp. 21-22. {51} Zolotov N.P., Isaev S.I. Combat ready were... // Military Historical Journal. 1993. No 11. S. 75-77.

{52} Estimated by: Military history magazine. 1992. No 1. P. 27 (where it is noted that there were 6422 aircraft in 159 regiments); No 2, p. 22; Soviet Armed Forces: Questions and Answers. S. 218.

{53} See: Hoffman I. Decree. op. S. 20; Marinichev V. Not in the sky you will find a trace // Neva. 1989. No

6. {54} Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 19. {55}

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{57} Soviet Armed Forces: Questions and Answers. I. 218;  
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{58} Excerpts from the Bulletin of the German General Staff  
"Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" ... S. 77.

{59} Military history magazine. 1992. No 2. P. 17. {60}

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was presented to Stalin. Then you can try to find this white copy in the funds of  
the Presidential Archive, if, of course, it existed and was not destroyed at the  
beginning of the war. {61} Aldanov M. Pilsudsky // Aldanov M. Portraits. M.:

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1971. S. 177-178. {63} Konev I. S. Notes of the Front Commander. M.:  
Military Publishing

House, 1991. S. 538-539.

{64} See: Bobylev P.N. Decree. op.

{64a} Military history magazine. 1993. No 8. P. 83. {65} About  
disinformation measures simulating preparations for an invasion of the  
British Isles and presenting deployment in the East as a mask for such an  
invasion. See: Halder F. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 626-627, according to the index of  
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{66} Vishlev OV Why did Stalin hesitate in 1941? // New and recent history.  
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{68} Halder F. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 534, 536, 574. Entries dated May 19  
and 20 and June 13, 1941.

{69} Kiselev VN Stubborn facts of the beginning of the war // Military Historical Journal. 1992. No 2. S. 14-15. {70} Stalin, Beria and the fate of Anders' army in 1941-1942. P. 62. {71} Potapov A., Gladyshev P. Fiery way. Alma-Ata: Kazakhstan, 1980. P. 4. {72} Meretskoy K. A. Decree. op. P. 202. {73} See: Bobylev P. N. Decree. op. No 7. S. 16-17; No 8. S. 28-29. {74} See: Kiselev V.N. Decree. op. P. 15. {75} Danilov V. D. Decree. op. P. 15. {75a} Zhukov G. K. Decree. op. 12th ed. M.: News, 1995. T. 1. S. 305, 373. {76} Kiselev V. N. Decree. op. P. 15. {77} Kiselev V. N. Decree. op. P. 15. {78} Danilov V. D. Decree. op. P. 15. {79} Sandalov L. M. The first days of the war. P. 106. It says here that on June 22 the command of the Western Front and the General Staff put into effect the "Thunderstorm" scheme (general mobilization). {80} Meltyukhov M. Ya. Decree. op. pp. 12, 17. {81} Danilov V. D. Decree. op. P. 15. {82} "I was ordered to be calm and not panic" // Unknown Russia. 20th century Issue. 2. M.: Historical legacy, 1992. P. 101. {83} Nekrich A. M. The road to war // Ogonyok, 1991, .No 27. P. 8. {84} Lossberg's strategic development. pp. 24-25. {85} Trotsky L.D. How the revolution was armed. T. 3. Book. 2. M.: Gosizdat, 1925. S. 256-257. {86} See: Vishlev O. V. Decree. op. S. 86; Halder F. Decree. op. T. 2. P. 579. Record dated June 20, 1941. {86a} N. G. Kuznetsov. Sharp turns. pp. 76-77. {86b} Ibid. pp. 47-48. {86v} Ibid. P. 49. {86g} Ibid. P. 46. In another of his memoirs, the former People's Commissar of the Navy expressed the opinion that Stalin overestimated the true degree of combat readiness of the Soviet troops (See: Kuznetsov N. G. On the eve. M.: Voenizdat, 1966. S. 323-324). According to Kuznetsov, on May 5, 1941, "having spoken out in favor of the possibility of war, Stalin thought that all high officials on whom it depended would take appropriate measures" (Pravda. 1991. July 20).

{86d} Kuznetsov N. G. Sharp turns. P. 51. {86e}

Proceedings of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No 2. S. 208-209. The well-known aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev recalled that on the eve of the adoption of this resolution, in late May or early June, the leaders of the Air Force and the people's commissariat of the aviation industry were summoned to the Kremlin on camouflage issues. The meeting was supposedly convened because of a letter "from one pilot that our camps were lined up at the very border as if in a parade: they set up white tents in rows, so that they are clearly visible from above." Within three days, the participants in the meeting were required to propose proposals for camouflaging aircraft (Yakovlev A.S. The purpose of life. 3rd ed. M.: Politizdat, 1973. S. 238-239). Characteristically, the Decree in the first place - already by July 1, 1941, demanded to completely disguise the ill-fated tents, which really made the task of the Luftwaffe easier on June 22. Undoubtedly, disregard for issues of camouflage was characteristic of the Red Army, and this fact alone proves how poorly they really prepared for military operations in 1941. This, however, does not mean the absence of aggressive intentions, but only the inability to carry them out in accordance with the principles of military science.

{87} Halder F. Decree. op. T. 2. P. 403. Record dated March 17, 1941.

{87a} Sudoplatov P. A. Intelligence and the Kremlin. M.: Geya, 1996. S. 137-138.

{88} Gurov A. Combat actions of the Soviet troops in the southwestern direction in the initial period of the war // Military History Journal. 1988. No 8. S. 38-39. {89} Melnikov S. I.

Marshal Rybalko, 2nd ed. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1984. S. 50-51. {90} Marinichev V. Decree. op. S. 186; History

of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945; in 6 vols. T. 1. M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. S. 476. {91} Semenov A.F. On takeoff. M.: Voenizdat, 1969. S. 125.

{92} Mellentin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. Per. from English. M.:

Izdatinlit, 1957. S. 148, 244-249. {93} See: Vorobyov F. D., Parot'kin I. V., Shimansky A. N. The last assault (Berlin

operation 1945). 2nd ed. M.: Voenizdat, 1975. S. 402. In the Berlin operation, the density reached 148-270 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front.

{94} The operational density and the balance of forces in the direction of the main attack of the enemy, see: Battle of Kursk (Under the editorship of I. V. Parotkin. M.: Nauka, 1970. S.

486.) {90} Eremenko A. I. Year 1945: "We need to hurry, and the troops are very poorly trained ..." // Military History Journal. 1994. No 7. S. 20.

{96} For the role of Lend-Lease in the Soviet military effort, see: Sokolov Boris V. Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941-1945 - The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Vol. 7. September

1994. No 3. {97} RGVA, f. 34980, on. 5, d. 2, ll. 2-6. Reported by P. A. Aptekar.

Battle for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov. strategic intentions and results. Critical review of Soviet historiography

(Published: Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Hrsg. von Roland G. Foerster. Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn; Verlag Mittler Sohn Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1996. Reprinted with the kind Military Historical Research Institute in Potsdam. Translated from the English author.) The Battle of Kursk is considered in

Soviet historiography as one of the three main decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War (the other two are Moscow and Stalingrad). The operational and tactical aspects of the Battle of Kursk have been studied quite well, {1} but its strategic significance is characterized only in the most general phrases in works devoted to the history of the Soviet-German front of the Second World War. The purpose of this work is to analyze the strategic intentions and results achieved by both sides during the battle for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk is relatively well documented, much better than the other two decisive battles.{2} Soviet historians study the

Battle of Kursk more objectively, as the official mythology of the war claims that only the turning point - Stalingrad - as well as the victory at Moscow, were achieved without Soviet superiority in people and weapons. In 1943, the advantage gained by the Germans from the surprise attack in 1941 practically vanished, and Soviet industry reached its maximum productivity after a decline in

first year of the war. These facts turned out to be very useful in creating a new myth - about the triumph of the Soviet political system and the Soviet people in the Battle of Kursk, the third great battle of the war after Moscow and Stalingrad, in which more people, tanks and aircraft participated than in any other battle on the Eastern front. But for such a myth, it is very important not to clarify the issue of strategic intentions and results. JV Stalin, in an order dated

February 23, 1943, congratulated the Red Army on the Stalingrad victory, but warned: it is stupid to think that the only task of the Red Army is to pursue the Germans to the western borders and that "the Germans will leave even a kilometer of our land without a fight" {3} Also in the order of May 1, 1943, Stalin repeated that "the German-Italian fascist camp is going through a severe crisis and faces its own catastrophe," but "this does not mean that the catastrophe of Nazi Germany has already begun ... "Hitler Germany and her army are shaken and in a crisis, but they have not yet been defeated. It would be naive to think that the catastrophe will come of itself, in the order of its own accord. Two or three more such powerful blows from the west and east are needed, such as were inflicted on the Hitlerite army in the last 5 -6 months, in order for the catastrophe of Hitler's Germany to become a fact." {4}

Stalin was rather cautious in his forecasts. In May 1942, he was much more optimistic and called for "to ensure that 1942 becomes the year of the final defeat of the German fascist troops and the liberation of the Soviet land from the Nazi scoundrels." {5} But the major defeats of the Red Army in the Crimea and near Kharkov and her retreat to Stalingrad and the Caucasus forced him to be cautious in his predictions. The actual course of events proved that not two or three, but more than a dozen blows, including ten so-called Stalinist blows in 1944, were required for the German surrender. The first work devoted to the Battle of Kursk in Soviet

historiography was the article by N. Talensky "Operation Oryol". Its author emphasized that the German summer offensive of 1943 began very late, on July 5th. This was unusual for the practice of two world wars. {6} He quoted the statement of the German General K. Dietmar that, against the principles of military strategy, it is more profitable to yield



initiative to the enemy and wait for an opportunity to strike. By the way, this was the Soviet strategy in the Battle of Kursk. But in his article, Talensky argued that the German command, contrary to Dietmar's opinion, was interested in starting their offensive operations as early as possible, before the Allied offensive in Western Europe began. He associated the delay of the German offensive on Kursk with the heavy defeat of the German army in the Battle of Stalingrad. Talensky also believed that the defeat of the German troops in the Battle of Kursk proves that "the military power of Hitler's Germany is weakened to such an extent that 2-3 such attacks from the east and west are enough to defeat it." {7} Here he actually repeated Stalin's words. In the same article, Stalin himself was called the main architect of the Soviet victory in the Battle of Kursk.{8} This thesis was repeated by I.V. Parotkin, the author of the second large article on the Battle of Kursk.{9} themselves created a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. Parotkin, like Talensky, argued that during the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army showed that "a properly organized and conducted defense, in the presence of stamina and high morale of the troops, is insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be." Parotkin also stated that the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the brilliant interaction of the five Soviet fronts and that "in the defensive battle near Kursk, the offensive power of the two main German groups was exhausted and conditions were again created for the Red Army to go on the general offensive." He believed that "in the course of offensive operations near Orel and Kharkov, the Red Army showed the high operational training of its command staff, their ability to successfully carry out the plans of the supreme command in difficult conditions." Parotkin claimed that in the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed several enemy groups. {10} Obviously, this statement is not true. It should be said that Stalin assessed the outcome of the Battle of Kursk as proof of the ability of the Red Army to attack both in winter and summer and singled out the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk as turning points in the war. He believed that these defeats put Nazi Germany in front of a catastrophe.{11} It is easy to see that the authors

The first articles about the Battle of Kursk simply repeated Stalin's formulas.{12}

It should be emphasized, however, that in the Soviet mythology of the war, the Battle of Kursk in the early years was often replaced by the Battle of the Dnieper. So, only 180 soldiers and officers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the battle on the Kursk Bulge, while 2438 were awarded the gold stars of the Hero for crossing the Dnieper in October 1943. {13} This gave rise to the special expression "Dnieper hero" in the troops, which meant a second-class hero. Also, in one of the first articles devoted to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, not the Battle of Kursk was named among the great battles, but the Battle of the Dnieper (along with Moscow, Stalingrad, the defense of Leningrad and the capture of Berlin). {14} Perhaps this was caused by a very heavy losses that the Soviet side suffered during the Battle of Kursk, as well as the fact that during this battle not a single encirclement of the enemy grouping was possible. In the first

Soviet official history of the Great Patriotic War, published in 6 volumes, a separate chapter was devoted to the Battle of Kursk. It stated that in April 1943, the Headquarters, having received reports from the command of the Central and Voronezh fronts, decided to meet the expected German attack on the Kursk salient with a well-prepared defense and only after repulsing the German attack to begin the Soviet offensive. The plan of the Soviet summer offensive was based on the proposals of the command of the fronts and the General Staff. It provided for reaching the line Smolensk-r. Sozh-lower and middle reaches of the Dnieper. The main blow was planned in the southwestern direction to liberate Eastern (Left Bank) Ukraine and the Donets Basin. It was decided that the Red Army, although it had enough forces for the offensive, would defend the Kursk salient from the expected German offensive in the near future, exhaust the enemy forces and then launch its own offensive.{15} This work does not contain any figures characterizing the forces and means of the Red Army during the Battle of Kursk. The authors exaggerated the role of N. S. Khrushchev in this battle. In the chapter on the Battle of Kursk, his name is mentioned 10 times, in contrast to the only mention of Stalin and three times - G.K. Zhukov. The authors of the book also drew very

an idealized picture of the actions of the Red Army in this battle, without once criticizing the fundamental decisions of the high command.

General S. M. Shtemenko wrote in his memoirs about the strategic intentions of the Soviet Headquarters that the command of the Voronezh Front proposed to concentrate efforts south of Kursk in the direction of Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk, and then Kremenchug and Kherson. Under favorable conditions, the troops could reach the Cherkassy-Nikolaev meridian, pose a threat to the borders of Germany's Balkan satellites, and defeat Army Group South. But the Headquarters for the future offensive preferred the central direction - to Kharkov, Poltava and Kyiv. In this case, the Soviet offensive could disrupt the interaction between Army Groups "Center" and "South" and liberate Kiev - an important political and economic center. and the destruction of the strongest German army group "South". The main line of advance in this case was too far from the Romanian oil fields, critical to the German war effort. The offensive plan approved by Stalin brought the Soviet troops closer to the German borders, but at the same time, the distance to German territory was much greater than to Ploiesti. It seems that the reason why Stalin preferred the central offensive option to the southern one was the political importance of Kyiv, which, for reasons of prestige, he tried to keep to the last in 1941, even at the cost of the death of an entire front.

In the 12-volume "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945", Soviet historians repeated Shtemenko's description of two strategic plans between which the Soviet Supreme High Command had to choose in the spring of 1943, without expressing any critical remarks about the accepted option for an attack on Kiev. {17} They also approved of the deliberate defensive move adopted by the Soviet Headquarters. It was called evidence of "the creative approach of the Soviet Supreme High Command to the solution of the strategic tasks of the war." The authors of the "History of the Second World War" argued that "going over to the counteroffensive after the enemy is exhausted

in the course of fruitless attacks, made it possible to count on much greater successes with fewer losses. The development of events confirmed the absolute correctness of the plans of the Soviet command. {18}

The results of the Battle of Kursk were also traditionally assessed as very favorable for the Soviet side. The "Brief History of the Great Patriotic War" states that during the Battle of Kursk "Soviet troops defeated 30 enemy divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft ... The backbone of the Nazi army was broken. The whole world was convinced of the superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in combat skills, weapons, strategic leadership. The strategic initiative was firmly entrenched in the Armed Forces of the USSR. {19} One of the main Soviet

military leaders, former Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal G.K. Zhukov believed that the decision taken by the Headquarters to abandon the idea of a Soviet preemptive offensive was absolutely correct. But he criticized the decision to attack the Oryol ledge frontally without trying to encircle the enemy. Zhukov subsequently believed that the Soviet offensive on Orel began too early, without proper preparation. {20} The former chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, also expressed the opinion that "the development of operational-strategic In battle, Soviet military art surpassed German. {21} General N. F. Vatutin, who commanded the Voronezh Front in 1943, was a supporter of a preventive Soviet offensive. He feared that the Red Army would miss the summer time, favorable for offensive operations. {22} The former commander of the Steppe (Reserve) Front, Marshal I. S. Konev, criticized the use of two armies of his front in a defensive operation. He believed that it would be better to use the entire Steppe Front for a major offensive.{23}

The strategic plans of the German high command were critically analyzed in Soviet historiography. The most objective description of them is given by V. I. Dashichev in his collection of German documents of the Second World War. He emphasizes that the main goal of Operation Citadel was

exhaust the strength of the Soviet summer offensive and seize the strategic initiative. At the same time, the mobile defense of the German troops in the East, proposed by Field Marshal E. von Manstein, was rejected both because of Hitler's opposition to leaving the territory of the Donets Basin, and because of the lack of fuel and ammunition. {24} Soviet sources admit some

mistakes of the Soviet Supreme Command during the Battle of Kursk. For example, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, the former commander of the Central Front, in his memoirs criticized the planning and conduct of the operation against the Oryol ledge, when Soviet troops acted separately. He believed that it would be better to deliver only two blows to Bryansk from the north and south, with a corresponding regrouping of the Western and Central Fronts. But the operation began too hastily, and the German troops were only forced out of the Oryol ledge, but not defeated. Besides. The Stavka did not take into account that the German troops defending the Oryol ledge were reinforced by divisions that participated in the Citadel.{25}

But none of the Soviet generals and historians has ever criticized the very idea that the results of the Battle of Kursk were very favorable for the Soviet side, and the decision to cede the offensive initiative to the Wehrmacht was correct. However, an objective analysis shows that the decision to defend instead of attacking the Kursk Bulge was a mistake of the Soviet Headquarters and front commanders. Firstly, the balance of forces and means on the Kursk ledge was in favor of the Soviet side already on April 10, 1943. At that time, the Red Army, according to Soviet estimates, had 958 thousand personnel, 11,965 guns and mortars, 1220 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,130 combat aircraft compared to about 700,000 personnel, 6,000 guns and mortars, 1,000 tanks and assault guns and 1,500 combat aircraft from the German side. In addition, the Soviet troops of the reserve front (Steppe Military District) near the Kursk Bulge numbered 269,000 soldiers and officers, 7,406 guns and mortars, 120 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 177 combat aircraft. At the same time, all Soviet reserves on the Soviet-German front amounted to 469,000 soldiers and officers, 8,360 guns and mortars,

900 tanks and self-propelled guns and 587 combat aircraft, compared with the German reserves of 60,000 soldiers and officers, 600 guns and mortars, 200 tanks and assault guns (there were no combat aircraft at all). The number of German reserves practically did not change until the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. {26}

The real ratio on the Kursk Bulge before April 10, 1943 was 1.8:1 for personnel, 3.2:1 for artillery, 1.3:1 for tanks and self-propelled guns (in all cases in favor of the Soviet side). In aviation, the Germans formally had a superiority of 1.1:1, but, taking into account more than 400 combat aircraft in Soviet reserves in addition to the reserve front, as well as long-range aviation and air defense of the country, which were subsequently used in the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation in the area of the Kursk salient, in fact, could count on a numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. At the beginning of July, the German troops deployed to carry out the "Citadel" numbered 900,000 soldiers and officers, 10,000 guns and mortars, 2,700 tanks and assault guns and 2,050

combat aircraft, compared with 1,910,000 soldiers and officers, 30,880 guns and mortars, 5,130 tanks and self-propelled guns and 3,200 combat aircraft of the Voronezh, Steppe and Central fronts. In addition, the Soviet side had long-range aviation and air defense of the country, which was practically all used in the Battle of Kursk. The balance of forces was practically the same as in April: 2.1:1 in personnel, 3.1:1 in artillery, 1.9:1 in tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1.5:1 in combat aircraft. { 27} The Soviet numerical superiority in tanks and aircraft even increased. But in April, the Soviet side also had a qualitative superiority, since the Soviet T-34 and KB were technically superior to the German tanks of the previous models: T-III, T-IV, etc. Only in July did the Wehrmacht receive new "tigers" and "panthers", which were superior Soviet tanks. Also, the new German aircraft "FV-190A" and "Henschel-129" provided a qualitative superiority

in aviation.

It is common knowledge that Hitler delayed the Citadel because he wanted to have a significant number of new tanks and aircraft before the start of the offensive. He wasn't sure of success. G. Guderian

testified that at a meeting on May 10, he tried to convince Hitler to abandon the plan of attack on Kursk because of the great difficulties in its implementation. Guderian rejected W. Keitel's opinion that the Germans should attack for political reasons, and noted that "the world is completely indifferent to whether Kursk is in our hands or not." Hitler replied that when he thought about this offensive, he experienced severe pain in his stomach. {28} Perhaps Hitler did not have much faith in the success of the "Citadel" and postponed it as long as he could, because in this way he postponed the inevitable Soviet offensive, which was almost impossible to repel. By the way, at the end of April, German intelligence made a correct forecast of the possible development of events:

"The leadership of the Reds was able to carry out a clearly expressed preparation for a major offensive operation against the northern flank of Army Group South in the direction of the Dnieper .. that it is free in its decisions before it starts and, by maintaining sufficient operational reserves, may not make a final decision on conducting this operation until the last minute of an exact determination of the time of the German attack ... After new ... information arrives, it is possible that the enemy will unravel the preparations for the offensive ... first he will wait and will constantly increase his readiness for defense, meaning the achievement of his own offensive targets with the help of a retaliatory strike ... One must reckon with the ever-increasing enemy forces and the fact that the enemy has already reached a high readiness against possible German attacks. {29} Nevertheless, the

Soviet offensive against Orel and Kharkov was not successful. The German troops were not defeated, and the Soviet losses both during the offensive and defensive operations were much higher than the German ones. Comparing the losses of both sides helps us evaluate the results of the battle. Official figures for

Soviet casualties and losses in tanks and aircraft during the Battle of Kursk were published only in 1993.{30} German losses were exaggerated by Soviet historians several times long before that. According to them, German losses amounted to about 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, and more than 3,700 aircraft. {31} These figures are very far from reality. German casualties throughout

Eastern Front, according to information provided to the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), in July and August 1943 amounted to 68,800 killed, 34,800 missing and 434,000 wounded and sick. {32} German losses on the Kursk Bulge can be estimated at 2 /3 from losses on the Eastern Front, since during this period fierce battles also took place in the Donets Basin, in the Smolensk region and on the northern sector of the front (in the Mga region). Thus, the German casualties in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated at about 360,000 killed, missing, wounded and sick, but by no means at 500,000. Luftwaffe losses were also much lower. In July and August 1943, according to sources from the German military archive in Freiburg, losses in the East amounted to only 1030 aircraft, and even in all theaters the total losses reached no more than 3213 combat vehicles. {33} Thus, the Soviet version in 3,700 enemy aircraft destroyed in the Battle of Kursk is completely absurd. This figure is based on wartime Soviet aviation commanders' reports,{34} where enemy losses were exaggerated several times over.

The first documented publications containing official figures for Soviet military losses in manpower and military equipment appeared only 48 years after the end of World War II. The authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" claim that Soviet losses during the Kursk defensive operation amounted to 70,330 killed and missing, and 107,517 wounded and sick. Losses in the Oryol offensive operation they define as 112,529 killed and missing and 317,361 wounded and sick. In the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, Soviet troops also lost 71,611 people killed and missing and 183,955 wounded and sick. {35} But all these figures are obviously wrong. For example, all the losses of the Central Front during the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to July 11 amounted to 33,897 soldiers and officers. By July 5, this front had 738,000 personnel. Taking into account the figure of total losses, on July 12 the Central Front should have numbered about 704,000 soldiers and officers, while in reality the number of its troops for this number was only 645,300 people. During this period of time, the composition of the front changed very slightly: two



rifle brigades and one tank brigade arrived.{36} Due to this, the number of troops of the Central Front could be reduced by no more than 5-7 thousand people. In addition, it is very likely that during the Kursk defensive operation the front received marching reinforcements.{37} Taking into account all these circumstances, the total losses of the troops of the Central Front in the period from July 5 to July 12 can be estimated at about 90,000 officers and soldiers, but in no way not in 33,897 people.

Also, the losses of the Voronezh Front were reduced by 2.5-3 times. E. I. Smirnov, the former head of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Red Army, claimed that during the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to 18, two armies of the Voronezh Front, the 6th and 7th Guards, lost 23,332 people only as wounded and that more than one third of all the wounded came from these two armies. He also writes that in the same operation, the losses of the Voronezh Front in the sick amounted to more than 13% of its total losses in the wounded and sick. 000 people. However, the authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" argue that the losses of the troops of this front, even for a longer period from July 5 to July 23, amounted to only 46,350 wounded and sick. to reach 90,000 men, and that the official Soviet figures in this case are underestimated by about half.{40} The irretrievable losses of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the period from 5 to 23 July, defined as 54,994 killed and missing, also seem to be underestimated. E. von Manstein claims that, according to the documents of the Army Group "South", during the attack on Kursk from the south, the Germans took 34,000 prisoners. {41} G. A. Koltunov and B. G. Solovyov write that during the defensive operations, the 6th Guards Army lost about 30,000 killed and wounded. {42} If we compare this figure with the data of E. I. Smirnov about 12,810 wounded in this army from July 5 to its composition can be estimated at a minimum of 15,000 people, excluding the missing). Manstein, based on intelligence information and combat reports from German units, estimates Soviet losses on the southern face of the Kursk salient during the German offensive at 34,000 prisoners and at least

at least 17,000 killed and 34,000 wounded.{44}In fact, he even downplays the losses of the Red Army. We assume that the losses of the 6th Guards Army killed during the defensive operation amounted to approximately the same part in the losses of the entire Voronezh Front as its losses in the wounded in relation to the losses of the front, i.e., about one sixth. Then the loss of the killed of the entire Voronezh Front during the Kursk defensive operation can be estimated at about 45,000 soldiers and officers. It is known that the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front alone lost more than 14,000 men during the defensive battle.{45} for more personnel). In this case, the figures for the losses of the Steppe Front in the Kursk defensive operation, given in the book "Secret Class Removed" - 27,452 killed and missing and 42,606 wounded and sick, may be close to the true. {46} We assume that about one third of the prisoners captured by the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge before July 23 were soldiers and officers of the Steppe Front. The losses of all Soviet troops defending Kursk from the south can be estimated at 34 prisoners, about 60,000 killed and 133,000 wounded and sick (including about 116,000 wounded). These figures seem to us closer to the truth than those that appear in the book "Secrecy Removed". The troops of the German Army Group "South", led by Manstein, in the offensive against the Kursk salient from July 5 to 23, lost about 3,300 people killed and missing and 17,420 wounded. {47} Soviet losses exceeded German ones by a ratio of 7:1. The losses of the Central Front during the Kursk defensive operation can be estimated, as already mentioned, at about 90,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick. The losses of the German 9th Army, which attacked the troops of the 9th

Front, by July 13 amounted to 20,000 killed, missing and wounded, as Field Marshal G. von Kluge, who commanded Army Group Center, reported at a meeting held that a day with Hitler (this report is cited by Manstein).{48}In this case, the loss ratio will be more than 4:1 in favor of the Wehrmacht.

The official Soviet casualty figures during the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive from 3 to 23 August are also completely wrong. The number of two fronts, Voronezh and Steppe, at the beginning of the operation is estimated at 1,144,000 soldiers and officers, consisting of 50 rifle divisions, 11 tank and mechanized corps and 5 tank brigades. Losses during this operation allegedly amounted to 255,566 killed, missing, wounded and sick. {49} But at the beginning of the next, Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation, which began on August 26, only 1,001,700 soldiers and officers remained in two fronts, now consisting of 72 rifle divisions, 5 airborne divisions, 9 tank and 4 mechanized corps and 6 tank brigades. {50} It seems completely incredible that the newly arrived 22 rifle and 5 airborne divisions, 1 tank and 1 mechanized and 1 tank brigade were able to compensate for the loss of only 113 thousand of the total losses of more than 255 thousand people. At that time, a Soviet rifle division usually consisted of about 7,000 soldiers and officers (in July 1943 its regular strength was 9,435), a tank corps about 11,000, and a mechanized corps about 15,000 soldiers and officers. {51} The number of all we can estimate the newly arrived formations at approximately 250,000, taking into account here the number of headquarters of rifle corps and units of corps subordination. In addition, during the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts received strong march reinforcements. So, after August 6, but even before the start of the attack on Kharkov, the 69th Army was replenished with 20,000 soldiers and officers, and the 53rd and 7th Guards 15,000. corps of two fronts in the period from 3 to 26 August, can be estimated at 100,000 people. Taking into account marching reinforcements and newly arrived formations, we determine the total losses of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts at about 500,000 soldiers and officers. The losses of Soviet troops in the Oryol offensive operation between July 12 and August 18 can be estimated at about 860,000 people, twice as much as in the book "Secrecy Removed", since, as we saw above, the losses in the Kursk defensive

transactions were underestimated in this source by half. The total losses of the Soviet troops during their offensive operations during the Battle of Kursk we estimate at approximately 1,360,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick. German losses can be estimated at about 310,000 soldiers and officers (from an estimate of losses over the entire period of the battle of 360,000 people, 40,000 dead, missing and wounded and 10,000 sick - German losses during the offensive on Kursk). The loss ratio turns out to be about 4.4:1, i.e., less favorable for the German side than during the attack on Kursk, when it was close to 7:1, especially due to the successful actions of Army Group South under Manstein. Over the entire duration of the battle, Soviet losses reached an estimated 1,677,000 killed, captured, wounded and sick, compared to about 360,000 for the Wehrmacht. By the way, Soviet losses in the wounded in July and August 1943 reached their maximum for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, {53} mainly due to losses in the Battle of Kursk. The official figures for Soviet combat aircraft losses during the Battle of Kursk are also

significantly underestimated. The authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" claim that the irretrievable losses of Soviet aviation in the Kursk defensive operation amounted to 459 aircraft. {54} However, another Soviet source shows that during this operation, the Soviet Air Force irretrievably lost about 1,000 aircraft in air battles alone, without taking into account those aircraft that were destroyed at airfields or shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. {55} True losses in combat aircraft according to official publications are underestimated by more than half. It can be assumed that the official data on the losses of Soviet aviation in the Battle of Kursk underestimate the real ones in approximately the same proportion. Thus, the losses in the Belgorod-Kharkov and Oryol offensive operations can be estimated at a minimum of 300 people and 2000 vehicles, respectively, compared with the official 153 and 1014. {56} We estimate the losses of the Luftwaffe in this battle at approximately 2/3 of all losses, incurred on the Eastern Front in July and August, that is, approximately 700 aircraft. The loss ratio is at least 4.7:1. By the way, the number of losses of Soviet aviation obtained according to our estimate - 3300 aircraft -

very close to the Soviet figure of irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Kursk - 3700

vehicles. It should be said that the German assessment of the losses of Soviet aviation, made during the Battle of Kursk, was quite correct, contrary to the opinion of the famous Australian military historian J. Jukes, that this assessment exaggerated the actual losses several times. According to the War Diary of the German High Command (OKW), between July 5 and 10, Luftwaffe pilots shot down 1269 Soviet aircraft, losing only 62 of their own. {57} The main reasons for the ratio of

losses in aircraft, which was so disappointing for the Soviet side, were the lack of combat training among the pilots, the lack of fuel and the qualitative advantage of German aircraft. Until the summer of 1943, Soviet fighters loitered over the battlefield not at their maximum, but at the most economical speed. {58} The Germans also had an advantage in the tactics of using aviation and in the operational leadership of the air force and usually concentrated almost all available aircraft in decisive paragraphs. Soviet irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns during the Battle of Kursk amounted to 6064 vehicles.

{59} This figure is confirmed by data on the irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the Soviet tank armies during certain operations of this battle. {60} These losses are 4 times higher than the German, even if we take the traditional Soviet estimate (most likely overestimated) of 1,500 enemy tanks and assault guns destroyed. Such an unfavorable ratio of losses for the Red Army can be explained both by the qualitative superiority of the new German tanks and by the superiority of the German command in the use and control of tank forces. As a Soviet source admits, German commanders used tanks in compact groups and struck in pre-selected directions. The same source claims that the new German "tigers" and "panthers" were superior to the Soviet T-34s "in a number of important combat indicators." {61} Another reason was the relatively low level of training of Soviet crews, especially driver mechanics, 1942 had driving practice

from 5 to 10 hours, while for confident control of the tank, the minimum required was 25 hours.{62}

We also add that the Soviet production of tanks in 1943 was not as high as it is shown in Soviet sources. According to N. A. Voznesensky, Soviet resources of armored steel increased by 350,000 tons in the first two and a half years of the war.{63} amounted to the necessary mobilization reserve.{64} In 1942, the production of armored steel in the Eastern regions of the country (where it only existed at that time) exceeded by 1.8 times the entire Soviet production of 1940.{65} But in 1940, the production of tanks in the USSR it was less than 10 thousand vehicles, mostly light tanks. In this case, the pre-war Soviet stocks of armored steel could not possibly exceed 50,000 tons. Consequently, the Soviet war economy in the first 2 1/2 years of the war could not use more than 400,000 tons of armored steel. However, according to official data, from the beginning of the war until the end of 1943, about 53,000 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced, including at least 30,000 T-34s.{66} Taking into account that the armor of one T-34 tank weighed 15-20 tons (the total combat weight of its various models ranged from 28.5 to 30.9 tons), the production of "thirty-fours" alone required during this period at least 450,000 tons of armored steel, i.e. more than it was at the disposal of the industry. Soviet irretrievable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in 1943 reached 23,500.{67} Soviet tank production in 1943 amounted to 24,100 vehicles,{68} and with delivery under Lend-Lease in 1943 - 3123.{69} But as of January 1, 1943, the Red Army had 13,176 tanks and self-propelled guns on the Soviet-German front,{70} and by January 1, 1944, only 5,254.{71} The real shortage of tanks in this case amounted to about 11,600 vehicles. This deficit can only be explained by a deliberate distortion of the data on Soviet tank production, which was approximately doubled.{72} in the memoirs of Manstein, {73} is close to

reality, if we actually add Lend-Lease deliveries to Soviet production.  
Results of the Kursk

battles were enough

disappointing for the Soviet Union in terms of loss ratio. German superiority in the field of military art turned out to be unconditional. The possible start of the Soviet offensive earlier than the German one, back in May, would have given better chances of success than the attack on Orel and Kharkov that actually began in July-August. Firstly, in May, the Germans did not yet have new tanks and aircraft, and therefore they did not then have a qualitative superiority in weapons. Secondly, the strikes of the Red Army in July and August were directed at sectors of the front adjacent to those that had previously been attacked by German strike groups on Kursk, so that when the German offensive was stopped, the Wehrmacht command was able to quickly transfer significant forces to internal operational lines in threatened sectors of the front. The best option for the Soviet side in carrying out operations on the Kursk Bulge would be to concentrate the efforts of the main advancing groupings, respectively, on the extreme northern base of the Orlovsky bridgehead (west of Krom, as suggested by Zhukov and Rokossovsky) and on the extreme southern base of the Kharkov bridgehead. The success of the Soviet shock groups would most likely have led to a deep bypass of the German troops, which would have forced the German generals to quickly retreat from heavily fortified positions in the Orel and Kharkov region and to abandon the attack on Kursk. In fact, this is what happened: the implementation of the "Citadel" was stopped after the start of the Soviet attack on the Orlovsky bridgehead, and when the Soviet offensive began on July 17 in the Donbass, the Germans finally abandoned the hope of resuming the "Citadel". In addition, at the last stage, the German command began to consider the "Citadel" only as a means of exhausting the enemy's forces. {74} The troops of the Soviet Central Front were significantly weakened during the German offensive on Kursk and did not have time to regroup and prepare a deep flank attack. However, the Soviet command could not postpone the attack of the Bryansk and Western fronts, since the troops on the Kursk ledge, under strong German pressure, fell into

difficult position. The start of the offensive of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was postponed until August 3, oae, as the rear services were not ready, and the troops suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment during the offensive of the Manstein Army Group. The Soviet troops, despite their superiority in men and weapons by 2-3 times, practically obeyed the will of the enemy and were forced to attack in those sectors of the front where it was easiest for the Germans to defend, based on the disposition of the German

forces. In the event of an earlier Soviet offensive in May, the ratio of casualties, of course, would still not be in favor of the Red Army. The high level of losses of the Soviet troops was a consequence of the fundamental internal defects of the communist totalitarian system. But then, in May, the ratio of losses could have been better for the Soviet side than it actually turned out during the Battle of Kursk. By the end of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet troops would have been able to move much further to the West, thus bringing the end of the war closer. The course of action chosen by the

German high command turned out to be the most optimal under the existing conditions. Tactically and to some extent operationally, the Wehrmacht won the Battle of Kursk. But the superiority of the Red Army in human and material resources was so overwhelming that it was impossible for the German side to win the battle for Kursk completely operationally and especially strategically. Notes: {1} See: Koltunov G. A. Solovyov B. G. Battle of Kursk. M., 1970; Battle of Kursk Ed. I. V. Parotkina. M., 1970.

{2} See statistics related to the Battle of Kursk:

Battle of Kursk. Ed. I. V. Parotkina. pp. 476-504. {3}

IV Stalin. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 5th ed. Moscow, 1949, p. 94. {4} Ibid.

P.100. {5} Ibid.

pp. 57-58. {6}

Talensky N. Oryol operation // Bolshevik. 1943. No 17. P. 32. {7} Ibid.

P.40.



{8} Ibid. P. 41. {9}

Parotkin I. V. The Battle of Kursk // Historical Journal. 1944. No 7-8. P.

8. {10} Ibid. pp. 21-22.

{11} Stalin I. V. Decree. op. pp. 113-114.

{12} See, for example: Parot'kin I. V. Decree. op. S. 3, 21-22.

{13} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945: A Brief History. Ed. B. S. Telpukhovsky. 3rd ed. M., 1984. S. 230, 237. {14}

Galaktionov M. The military defeat of Germany // War and working class. 1945. No 10. May 15. pp. 4-6. {15} History of

the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

Ed. P. N. Pospelova. T. 3. M., 1964. S. 245.

{16} Shtemenko S. M. The General Staff during the war. M., 1968. S. 160-162.

{17} History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Ed. A. A. Grechko. T. 7. M., 1976. S. 118-119. is Ibid. P. 117. {19} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. P. 229. {20} Zhukov GK

Memoirs and reflections. M., 1970. S. 479-480.

{21} Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of all life, 6th ed. M., 1988. T. 2. S. 29-30.

{22} Ibid. P. 24. {23}

Konev I. S. Notes of the Front Commander. M., 1991. S. 17, 18, 591-592. {24}

Dashichev VI Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 393-394. {25}

Rokossovsky K. K. Soldier's duty. M., 1968. S. 226-227. {26} Battle of Kursk. pp. 499-500, 504. {27} Ibid.

P. 500. {28} Guderian

G. Memoirs of a soldier. M., 1954. P. 301. {29} See: Heinrici

G., Hauck FW Zitadelle (II). Der Angriff auf den russischen, Stellungsvorsprung bei Kursk - Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 1965. S. 529-530. Cit. Quoted from: Projector D. M. Aggression and catastrophe, 2nd ed. M., 1972. S. 532.

{30} Classified as classified: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat actions and military conflicts. Statistical research. Ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. M., 1993. {31} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. P. 229. {32} Pavlenko NG

The decisive role of the USSR and its Armed Forces in the defeat of German imperialism in World War II // Defeat of German imperialism in World War II. Ed. N. G. Pavlenko. M., 1960. S. 95.

{33} Murray W. Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe 1933-1945. Wash., 1983. P.

159. {34} See: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. T. 3. S. 397-399; Timokhovitch I. Soviet Air Forces in defense and counteroffensive // Military Historical Journal (hereinafter - VIZH), 1973, No 7. P. 64. The figure of 3700 destroyed German aircraft refers only to vehicles shot down in air combat, and does not include aircraft, destroyed at airfields and by air defense artillery. This serves only as additional proof of the fantasticness of this figure. {35} The classification has been removed. pp.

188-190. {36} Ibid. pp.188-189. {37} The fact of sending newly arrived marching reinforcements to the front during the Kursk defensive operation is mentioned in the memoirs of the participants in the battle. See, for example: Ivanov S. Defensive Operation of the Voronezh Front // VIZH, 1973, No 8. P. 22. {38} Smirnov E. I. War and military

medicine, 2nd ed. M., 1979. S. 289. {39} Classified as classified. 188. {40}

D. A. Volkogonov, based on combat reports, calculated the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942 at 5,888,000 soldiers and officers (Izvestia, 1933, May 8, p. 5), i.e. . 1.8 times more than the figure of 3,258,000 given in: "Secrecy removed." pp. 146-147.

{41} Manstein E. Lost victories. Moscow, 1957. P. 449.

{42} Koltunov G. A., Soloviev B. G. Decree. op. P.

385. {43} E. I. Smirnov, decree. op. S. 289.

{44} Manstein E. Decree. op. P. 449.

{45} Koltunov G. A., Solovyov B. G. Decree. op. P.

385. {46} Classified as classified. P.

188. {47} Manstein E. Decree. op.

P. 449. {48} Ibid. P.

448. {49} Classified as classified. P.

190. {50} Ibid. P.

193. {51} Construction and combat use of Soviet tank troops during the Great Patriotic War. Ed. O. A. Losika. M., 1979. S. 69-70; Development of the Soviet Armed Forces and military art in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Ed. R. A. Savushkina. M., 1988. S. 280-281.

{52} Victory at the Kursk Bulge: Documents // VIZH, 1983, No 7. P. 61-62.

{53} See: Smirnov E. I. Decree. op. S. 188, tab. 3.

{54} Classified as classified. P. 370.

{55} History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. T. 3. S. 397. Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Ed. S. I. Rudenko. M., 1968. S. 186.

{56} The classification has been removed. S. 370.

{57} Jukes G. Kursk. The Clash of Armour. NY, 1969. P. 153; Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1945 (Geführt von H. Greiner und P. E. Schramm. Frankfurt a. M., 1963. Bd. 3. Teil 2. S. 755 (6.7.1943), 757 (7.7.1943) ), 759 (8.7.1943), 762 (9.7.1943), 765 (10.7.1943),

769 (11.7.1943). {59} Classified removed, p.

370. {60} Construction and combat

use of Soviet tank troops during the Great Patriotic War, p. 326, table 23. For the size and reinforcements of the Soviet tank armies participating in the Battle of Kursk, see : The Third Guards Tank Army. M., 1982. S. 69, 81, 88; Roads of Victory: The Battle Path of the 5th Guards Tank Army. M., 1969. S. 28, 56, 90; Babadzhanyan A. Kh. et al. Manholes opened in Berlin, Combat Route of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow, 1973, p. 67;

Frolov B. Tank battle near Bogodukhov // VIZH, 1978, No 9. P. 18, 29. {61}  
Frolov B.

Decree. op. P. 21. {62} Melnikov  
S. I. Marshal Rybalko, 2nd ed. Kyiv, 1984. S. 50-51.

{63} Voznesensky H. A. Military economy of the USSR during the  
Patriotic War. M., 1947. S. 71. {64}  
History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. 3. M., 1974. S. 387-388.

{65} Voznesensky H. A. Decree. op. P. 70.  
{66} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. S. 94,  
211; History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. 4. M., 1975. S. 149,  
158. T. 7. M., 1976. S. 54. {67}

The classification has been removed. S. 357. This figure is practically  
confirmed by the difference between the total number of tanks and self-  
propelled guns evacuated from the battlefield (32,539) and the number of  
those that were sent for repair (9344-23,195 vehicles). See: Construction  
and combat use of Soviet tank troops during the Great Patriotic War. S.  
320, tab. 22.

{68} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. P. 211.  
{69}

History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. T. 4. M.,  
1962. S. 585.

{70} Dunaeva N. Lend-Lease: Facts and Fiction // VIZH, 1977, No 3.  
P. 104.

{71} The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. P. 515. {72} On  
the falsification of data on Soviet military production in 1941-1945.  
See: Sokolov B.V. The price of victory (the Great Patriotic War: the unknown  
about the known). M., 1991. S. 40-69. {73} Manstein E. Decree.  
op. P. 438. {74} Ibid. pp. 448-449.

The role of lend-lease in  
the Soviet war effort, 1941-1945. (Published (in English  
translation): Journal of the Slavic Military Studies, 1994, vol. 7, No 4.  
December.) The role of Western supplies during  
the Great Patriotic War has traditionally been downplayed by Soviet  
historiography since the beginning of the Cold War. So, in the book of N. A.  
Voznesensky "Military

not a word was said about the lend-lease of the Western allies (it was only said that all Western supplies accounted for 4% of Soviet production), and a recent ally in the anti-Hitler coalition was called: "Obese on people's blood during the period the second world war monopoly capitalism of the United States of America", which "now stands at the head of the imperialist and anti-democratic instigator of imperialist expansion in all parts of the world." {1} historians. And in the "Brief History" of the Great Patriotic War, it is noted that "during the Lend-Lease war, the USSR actually received certain types of weapons, as well as machines, equipment, materials important for the national economy, in particular, steam locomotives, fuel, communications, various kinds of non-ferrous metals and chemicals. For example, the supply of 401,400 cars by the USA and England was a significant help. However, on the whole, this assistance was not in any way significant and could in no way have a decisive influence on the course of the Great Patriotic War. "Further, the authors argue that in relation to Soviet production, foreign deliveries amounted to: for artillery pieces of all systems - 1.9%, for tanks - 7%, for combat aircraft - up to 13%, and in the automobile fleet of the Red Army of imported vehicles in 1943 there were 5.4%, and in 1944 - 19%. % of Soviet military production. {2} As will be shown below, data on the share of Lend-Lease in Soviet military production is most likely underestimated due to the overestimation of the volume of production of certain types of weapons and military equipment in the USSR.

The belittling of the role of Western supplies in the Soviet military conditions was aimed primarily at asserting the myth of the "economic victory of socialism" in the Great Patriotic War and the superiority of the Soviet military economy over the war economies of the capitalist countries, not only Germany, but also Great Britain and the USA. It was only after 1985 that other assessments of allied assistance began to come across in Soviet publications. Thus, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, in post-war conversations with the writer K.M. Simonov, stated:

"Speaking of our preparedness for war from the point of view of the economy, the economy, one cannot ignore such a factor as subsequent assistance from the Allies. First of all, of course, from the Americans, because the British in this sense helped us minimally. When analyzing all sides war, this cannot be discounted. We would be in a difficult position without American gunpowder, we would not be able to produce the amount of ammunition that we needed. Without American "Studebakers" we would have nothing to carry our artillery. Yes, they are largely In general, they provided our front-line transport. The production of special steels, necessary for the most diverse needs of the war, was also associated with a number of American supplies. " At the same time, Zhukov emphasized that "we entered the war while still continuing to be an industrially backward country compared to Germany."{3} Zhukov, recorded as a result of interception by security agencies in 1963: "Now they say that the allies never helped us ... But it cannot be denied that the Americans sent us so many materials, without which we would not be able to form our reserves and could not continue the war ... We did not have explosives, gunpowder. There was no way to equip rifle cartridges. The Americans really helped us out with gunpowder, explosives. And how much sheet steel they drove us! How could we quickly set up production tanks, if it were not for the American help with steel? And now they present it as if we had all this in abundance."{4} continue the war. The most fundamental military and economic role of American aid to the USSR is covered in a 1969 monograph by the American researcher Robert X. Jones.{5} However, he was unable to show the share of American and British supplies in the production

of certain types of vital products in the USSR due to lack of data on Soviet production, although he was able to give a very detailed nomenclature of Lend-Lease deliveries.

The importance of American lend-lease and deliveries from Great Britain and Canada for the Soviet military economy, primarily from the point of view of its balance, is also considered by the British researcher Mark Harrison in a monograph published in 1985. {6} However, he analyzes a much smaller range of products than Robert X. Jones and is strongly influenced by the theory of economic balances, developed by V. Leontiev impact of economic planning. M. Harrison makes calculations mainly for weapons and military equipment and, as a rule, without subdividing general indicators into a specific product range (petroleum products in general, and not specific types of fuel; rolled products in general, and not individual types of rolled products, etc. .), which makes the situation more favorable experience Soviet for the Soviet economy than it actually was. In our work, we are trying to calculate the share of Western supplies in Soviet production of some of the most important types of products for the conduct of the war, using both some recently published information and our own calculations.

One of the bottlenecks of the Soviet economy before the war was the production of aviation and, to a lesser extent, motor gasoline. Especially lacking high-octane benzins. Thus, in 1941, on the eve of the war, the demand for aviation gasoline B-78 was satisfied by only 4%. {7} In 1940, 889 thousand tons of aviation gasoline were produced in the USSR, in 1942 - 912, in 1943 - 1007, in 1944 - 1334 and in 1945. - 1017 thousand tons. {8} In total, during the years of the war, 666 thousand tons of aviation gasoline were delivered to the United States under Lend-Lease and as part of Soviet orders, of which 37.65 thousand tons were redirected to other places after shipment, so that the net supply amounted to 628.4 thousand tons. {9} In addition, the net supply of gasoline light fractions from the USA to the USSR reached 732.3 thousand tons. tons of aviation gasoline and 902.1 thousand tons of gasoline light fractions (these deliveries were compensated by the United Kingdom and the United States). To this must also be added 573 thousand tons of aviation gasoline supplied to the USSR from oil refineries

Great Britain and Canada.<sup>{10}</sup> In total, all this gives 2850.5 thousand short tons of aviation gasoline and light gasoline fractions received by the USSR from the USA, Great Britain and Canada, which is equal to 2586 thousand metric tons. In the Soviet Union, imported aviation gasoline and light gasoline fractions were used almost exclusively for blending with Soviet aviation gasolines in order to increase their octane rating, since Soviet aircraft were adapted to use gasoline with a much lower octane rating than in the West. Suffice it to say that more than 97% of imported gasoline had an octane rating of 99 or higher, while in the USSR, as we have already seen, even B-78 gasoline was in huge deficit. Therefore, aviation gasoline actually delivered under Lend-Lease was included in the Soviet production of aviation gasoline and, therefore, (together with light gasoline fractions) amounted to 51.5% of Soviet production in 1941-1945. If we deduct from the total the Soviet production of aviation gasoline for the first half of 1941, estimating it at about half of the annual production, then the share of Lend-Lease deliveries rises to 57.8%. It turns out that Lend-Lease supplies of aviation gasoline, which took place from August 1941 to September 1945, were 1.4 times higher than Soviet production itself. From other sources of aviation gasoline supply, the USSR was able to capture in 1944-1945. 82.8 thousand tons of captured gasoline in Romania, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, <sup>{11}</sup> which was a drop in the ocean. Obviously, without Western supplies of fuel, Soviet aviation simply would not be able to maintain its troops in the required volume. It should also be taken into account that, due to the much higher octane numbers of Western aviation gasoline, its role in providing Soviet aviation was actually even more significant than one could conclude from weight indicators alone. Gasoline in the USSR in 1941-1945. 10,923 thousand tons were produced (including 2983 thousand tons in 1941), <sup>{12}</sup> and 267.1

thousand short, or 242.3 thousand metric tons, were received from the USA under Lend-Lease, <sup>{13}</sup> which amounted to only 2.8% of the total Soviet production' during the war (excluding production for the first half of 1941). True, the actual role of American gasoline was somewhat higher due to higher octane numbers. own needs for



The USSR could not satisfy this type of fuel, and the shortage of gasoline in the Red Army continued until the end of the war. So, for example, at the end of 1944, in the report of the commission of the General Staff, the headquarters of the rear and the Main Motor Transport Directorate of the Red Army on checking the correct use of vehicles on the fronts, it was noted that on the 1st Belorussian Front "a further increase in the front's vehicles without increasing the supply of fuel is inexpedient." The same picture was observed on the 1st Ukrainian Front. {14} Obviously, this situation was partly a consequence of the irrational drawing up of applications for Lend-Lease assistance by the Soviet side, it would be more expedient to ask for fewer cars and more gasoline.

The fleet of the Red Army was also provided to a large extent by Western supplies. Automobile production in the USSR in 1940 was 145,390; in 1941, 124,476; in 1942, 34,976; in 1943, 49,266; In 1941, 73.2 thousand cars were produced, and in the second - only 46.1 thousand {16}, so from the beginning of the war until the end of 1945, the total production of cars can be determined at 265.6 thousand units. During the war years, 409.5 thousand cars were delivered from the USA to the USSR, which was 1.5 times higher than Soviet production during the war years. By the end of the war (as of May 1, 1945), Lend-Lease vehicles accounted for 32.8% of the Red Army's fleet of vehicles (58.1% were domestically produced vehicles and 9.1% were captured vehicles). {17} C taking into account the greater carrying capacity and better quality, the role of American vehicles was even higher ("Studebakers", in particular, were used as artillery tractors). The pre-war fleet of Soviet cars (both those that were in the Red Army and withdrawn from the national economy with the outbreak of war) was badly worn out. Before the war, the needs of the Red Army in vehicles were determined at 744 thousand cars and 92 thousand tractors, but there were 272.6 thousand cars and 42 thousand tractors. It was planned to withdraw 240 thousand cars from the national economy, including 210 thousand trucks (GAZ-AA and ZIS-5), however, due to the heavy wear and tear of the fleet (for passenger cars, cars belonging to the 1st and 2nd categories, i.e. not requiring immediate repair, was 45%, and for

freight and special - 68%), in fact, only 206 thousand cars were withdrawn from the national economy in the first months of the war, while by August 22, 1941, irretrievable losses of cars reached 271.4 thousand {18} Obviously, without Western supplies The Red Army would not have acquired the degree of mobility that it had enjoyed at least since mid-1943, although until the end of the war the use of motor vehicles was hampered by a lack of gasoline. Also, the functioning of

the Soviet railway transport would have been impossible without Lend-Lease. The production of railroad rails (including narrow gauge rails) in the USSR changed as follows (in thousand tons): 1940 - 1360, 1941 - 874, 1942 - 112, 685.7 thousand short tons of railway rails were delivered to the USSR, {20} which is equal to 622.1 thousand metric tons. This is about 56.5% of the total production of railway rails in the USSR from mid-1941 to the end of 1945. If we exclude narrow gauge rails from the calculation, which were not supplied under Lend-Lease, then American deliveries will amount to 83.3% total Soviet production. If, however, production for the second half of 1945 is excluded from the calculations, assuming it to be equal to at least half of the annual production (in fact, significantly more than half of the annual production of rails was produced in the second half of 1945 due to a reduction in military production proper), then Lend- leasing on rails will amount to 92.7% of the total volume of Soviet rail production. Thus, almost half of the railroad tracks used on Soviet railroads during the war came from the United States. A sharp reduction in the output of rails by the Soviet industry made it possible to direct additional capacities and resources of steel to the production of weapons (in 1945, the output of rails amounted to 13% of the 1940 level, and in 1944 - only 5.4%). Even more noticeable was the role of Lend-Lease deliveries in maintaining the number of Soviet locomotives and railway cars at the required level. The production of mainline steam locomotives in the USSR changed as follows: in 1940 - 914,

in 1941 - 708, in 1942 - 9, in 1943 - 43, in 1944 - 32, in 1945 - 8. Mainline diesel locomotives in 1940 were produced 5 pieces, and in 1941 - 1, after which

their release was discontinued until 1945 inclusive. Mainline electric locomotives were produced in 1940, 9 pieces, and in 1941 - 6 pieces, after which their production was also discontinued. {21} Under Lend-Lease, 1900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel locomotives were delivered to the USSR during the war years. {22} Thus, lend-lease deliveries exceeded the total Soviet production of steam locomotives in 1941-1945. 2.4 times, and electric locomotives - 11 times. Production of freight cars in the USSR in 1942-1945. amounted to a total of 1,087 units compared to 33,096 in 1941.{23} Under Lend-Lease, a total of 11,075 wagons were delivered,{24} or 10.2 times more than the Soviet production of 1942-1945. It is known that during the First World War, the transport crisis in Russia at the turn of 1916-1917, which largely provoked the revolution of February 1917, was caused by insufficient production of railway rails, steam locomotives and wagons, since the industrial capacity and the resources of rolled metal were reoriented to the production of weapons . During the Great Patriotic War, only Lend-Lease deliveries prevented the paralysis of railway transport in the Soviet Union.

Allied deliveries of gunpowder and other explosives also played an important role. In the USSR, the production of explosives in the period from mid-1941 to mid-1945, we estimate approximately 600 thousand tons. {25} thousand metric tons. In addition, 22.3 thousand tons of gunpowder was delivered from Great Britain and Canada.{27} Thus, Western deliveries of explosives reached 53% of the total Soviet production. In providing the national economy with non-ferrous metals, Western supplies were of decisive importance. Figures of Soviet production of

basic non-ferrous metals in 1941-1945. are still secret, so here you have to rely not on official data, but on estimates. Thus, the production of copper in the USSR in 1941-1944, according to D. B. Shimkin, amounted to about 473 thousand tons, and according to M. Harrison, copper production in the USSR during the war years changed as follows (in thousand tons) : 1942 - 118, 1943 - 105, 1945 - 135.{28}If we extrapolate M. Harrison's estimate based on data in

open Soviet publications for 1944, then we will get a production of 120 thousand tons of copper for this year. Production for the second half of 1941 can be roughly estimated at half of the annual production of 1942, i.e., 59 thousand tons of copper. Taking the figures of M. Harrison as a basis, the Soviet production of copper in the period from mid-1941 to the end of 1945 can be estimated at 537 thousand tons, and in the period from the beginning of 1941 to the end of 1944 - at 461 thousand tons, which practically coincides with the estimate of D. B. Shimkin. Copper production from the middle of 1941 to the middle of 1945, taking into account M. Harrison's estimate, we determine at 470 thousand tons. thousand short tons of electrolytic and refined copper. {29} Assuming the ratio of 1.3 tons of primary copper == 1 ton of refined copper and converting the Lend-Lease data to metric tons, we find that the American supply of copper to the USSR was equivalent to about 387, 6 thousand tons of primary copper, which amounted to about 82.5% of Soviet copper production during the war. In addition, the shortage of copper in the USSR was largely reduced due to the supply of communications equipment from the United States. Thus, the USSR received 956,700 miles of field telephone cable, 2,100 miles of marine cable, and 1,100 miles of submarine cable. In addition, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 receivers and 348 locators were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease, which provided the basic needs of the Red Army. The United States also received 32,200 motorcycles, {30} which was 1.2 times the Soviet production of motorcycles in 1941-1945. - 27816 pieces.{31} A

situation similar to that with copper is also observed in the Soviet production of aluminum during the war period. According to D. B. Shimkin, for 1941-1944. 315 thousand tons of aluminum were produced in the USSR. {32} M. Harrison estimates the Soviet production of aluminum as follows (in thousand tons): 1942 - 51.7, 1943 - 62.3, 1944 - 82.7, 1945 - 86.3.{33} If we take the production of aluminum in 1941 approximately equal to the production of 1942, then the total production of aluminum in 1941-1945, based on the figures of M. Harrison, can be determined in 335 thousand tons, and in 1941-1944. - 249 thousand tons. Thus, M. Harrison's estimate turns out to be significantly lower than D. B. Shimkin's. Our assessment of Soviet aluminum production is based on N.A.

Voznesensky that by November 1941, capacities were lost, which produced 60% of all aluminum before the war, and the total underproduction of aluminum during the war years due to capacities in the territories subjected to occupation reached 136 thousand tons. {34 } Taking into account data on losses of capacities for coal mining - 63% and steel - 58% and on physical terms of the total losses of these types of products - 307 million tons of coal and 38 million tons of steel, given by N. A. Voznesensky, as well as information on production in 1940, 165.9 million tons of coal and 18.3 million tons of steel, {35} you can get the ratio between the total amount of losses and the annual level of production in 1940. For coal, this ratio will be 2.0: 1, for steel - 2.1 : 1. For aluminum, this indicator can be taken as an average between these two values - 2.05 : 1, given that the share of losses for aluminum also occupies an intermediate position between the corresponding indicators for steel and coal. In this case, aluminum production in 1940 can be estimated at 66 thousand tons. Then the drop in production in the second half of 1941 can be estimated at least 60% of the average quarterly production in 1940, or 10 thousand tons. The annual production of aluminum in 1941 should be estimated at 56 thousand tons, and in the second half of 1941 - at 23 thousand tons. It is known that in 1942 the aluminum production capacity in the USSR increased by 18.5 thousand tons {36 } According to our estimates, in 1941 about 40 thousand tons of aluminum production capacities were lost or temporarily put out of action, so that, taking into account the commissioning of new capacities, aluminum production in 1942 should still have been below the level 1940 by about 21 thousand tons and probably amounted to about 45 thousand tons. In 1943, aluminum production in the USSR exceeded the pre-war level by 4% {37} and can be estimated at 69 thousand tons. In this case, M. Harrison's estimates regarding aluminum production in the USSR in 1944 and 1945. look close to reality (82.7 and 86.3 thousand tons, respectively) - the growth compared to 1943 is 13.7 thousand tons for 1944, and 17.3 thousand tons for 1945 , which is close to the rate of growth in capacity in 1942 - 18.5 thousand tons. The total production of aluminum in 1941-1945. we estimate at 339 thousand tons, and from mid-1941 to mid-1945 - at 263 thousand tons. During the war years, 189.2 thousand short tons of primary and 71.9 thousand short tons of recycled aluminum.{38} Taking 1 ton of recycled aluminum is

tons of primary aluminum and converting all indicators into metric tons, we get that the lend-lease from the USA to the USSR was equivalent to 256.4 thousand tons of primary aluminum. In addition, the USSR received 35.4 thousand tons of aluminum from Great Britain and 36.3 thousand tons of aluminum from Canada, {39} so that the total western supplies of aluminum to the USSR in 1941-1945. amounted to 328.1 thousand tons, which is 1.25 times higher than our estimate of Soviet aluminum production in the period from mid-1941 to mid-1945. The Soviet aviation industry, the main consumer of aluminum, worked mainly due to Western supplies. We also note that aluminum was also used in the production of engines for the famous Soviet T-34 tanks.

The total amount of aluminum supplied for the needs of the Soviet economy in the period from mid-1941 to mid-1945, about 591 thousand tons, makes official data on the production of aircraft in the USSR during the war completely unrealistic. The Soviet Union allegedly produced from July 1941 to August 1945 112.1 thousand tons of combat aircraft. {40} Meanwhile, Germany in 1941-1945. produced 84,420 combat aircraft. {41} The German industry produced aluminum in 1941-1944. received about 1,704 thousand tons (of which 1,466 thousand tons were produced in Germany), and already in 1943, 80.3% of all aluminum was used directly for military needs. {42} It remains completely mysterious how Soviet industry, having almost three times less aluminum resources, was able to produce 1.3 times more combat aircraft than Germany, if the structure of aircraft production in the two countries was very similar. Neither the USSR nor Germany almost built heavy bombers, and the takeoff weight of similar types of aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft and light bombers) produced in these countries differed very little. {43} to replace a number of aluminum parts, wood and a special tarpaulin were used (supplied, by the way, under Lend-Lease), but this factor could not have reduced the consumption of aluminum to such an extent, which was used mainly for the needs of aircraft construction. Most likely, the point here is that the Soviet production of aircraft during the war years was at least twice as high due to the deliberate overstatement of reporting back in the war years. There is reason to believe that a similar phenomenon

also took place in the case of Soviet tank production. This idea is indirectly confirmed by data on a sharp drop in labor costs for the production of a unit of the main types of aircraft and tanks in the USSR in 1941-1943.{44}

According to N. A. Voznesensky, during the first two and a half years of the war, Soviet resources of armored steel increased by 350 thousand tons, and in 1942 the production of armored steel in the eastern regions exceeded steel production throughout the country by 1.8 times. 1940 (in 1942, armored steel was produced only in the East). {45} These data contradict the information on the production of armored steel contained in the reference book "The National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", where the dynamics of armored steel production steel is presented as follows (in thousand tons): 1940 - 75, 1941 294, 1942 - 527, 1943 - 446, 1944 - 588, 1945 - 510. {46} However, here we tend to trust only the data on production in 1940. The fact is that the reference book, prepared back in 1959 under the heading "secret", also included data on the production of weapons and military equipment, according to which the production of tanks and self-propelled guns, for the manufacture of which the armor plate was mainly used, amounted to 1941 to August 1945 102.8 thousand units. {47} Most likely, the discrepancy between the primary data on the production of armored steel and the production of tanks caught the eye of either the compilers of the reference book or one of their predecessors, and data on production of armor steel were adjusted upwards. In the work of N. A. Voznesensky, data on the annual or total volume of production of tanks or aircraft were not given. In addition, if he wanted to distort the data on the production of armored steel in the USSR, then in his largely propaganda book he would most likely do it in the direction of overestimation, not underestimation. If we take the production of armored steel in 1940 at 75 thousand tons, then the data of N. A. Voznesensky are in perfect agreement with this number. Then, in 1942, the production of armored steel can be determined by multiplying the level of production in 1940 by 1.8, i.e., 135 thousand tons. In this case, the production for the second half of 1941 and for the entire 1943 should in total amount to 215 thousand tons. Since in the second half of 1941 due to the shutdown and evacuation of factories, the production of armored steel was significantly reduced, it

it was certainly less than the average half-year production of 1942, i.e., less than 67.5 thousand tons. We estimate it at about 50 thousand tons, and the production of 1943 at 165 thousand tons of armored steel.

Meanwhile, only in the period from July 1941 to the end of 1943 in the USSR, according to official statistics, 53.3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns were produced, {48} including at least 30 thousand T-34 tanks, {49} each of which required up to 20 tons of armor steel.

Meanwhile, the mobilized stock of armored steel in the USSR before the war was small and did not even cover the 6-month needs of the industry.{50} Taking this into account, we estimate it at no more than 50 thousand tons. Almost no armored steel was supplied under Lend-Lease. In 1942 alone, 5,786 short tons, or 5,249 metric tons of armored steel, were delivered (another 2,600 tons died on the way).{51} there were about 405 thousand tons of armored steel, while only the production of 30 thousand T-34 tanks could take up to 600 thousand tons. The supply of armor under Lend-Lease was the most extreme means caused by its sharp shortage, since, in general speaking, a certain type of tank always requires a certain grade of armor and type of armor plate, and American armor was not very suitable for Soviet types of tanks. If we accept the data on the production of armor in 1942 from the reference book "The National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War" - 527 thousand tons, then the supply of 5.2 thousand tons of armor plate from the United States looks mysterious - such an amount of armor, which was only 11.8 % of the Soviet monthly production, could not be enough to cover any deficit. It is another matter if our estimate of the production of armor in 1942, based on the data of N. A. Voznesensky, is correct - 135 thousand tons. Then the armor supplied under Lend-Lease will be about 46.7% of the Soviet average monthly production in 1942 which makes American armor a significant factor in covering a possible shortage, especially considering that in the first half of 1942 production was lower than in the second half of the year. The facts of deliberate

overestimation of reporting - an indelible vice of the socialist planned economy, are known in relation to weapons and military equipment in the USSR both in the pre-war and post-war years. So, on the eve of the war, according to mobilization plans, units that did not exist in



cars.{52} And even in the last years of the USSR, in 1985, one of the future leaders of the August 1991 putsch, A. Tizyakov, artificially overestimated the number of missiles produced by double counting.{53} And during the war, German intelligence already in 1942, it recorded a deliberate distortion of Soviet statistical data.{54} During the war years, emergency conditions made planned targets often obviously impossible to fulfill, and current control difficult. It is also possible that production was artificially inflated by double counting defective products. Air Chief Marshal A. Novikov, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was arrested in 1946 for accepting defective aircraft from factories during the war years. By his own admission, G. Malenkov, an authorized representative of the State Defense Committee (GKO), was perfectly aware of this practice and silently covered it up. after the war, and the distortion of reporting actually acted only as a pretext covering the true, political, reason for disgrace (A. Novikov was actually arrested because of his closeness to Marshal G. Zhukov, and the post-war disgrace of G. Malenkov was associated with the struggle within the Politburo) . During the war years, repressions would still not help to establish accountability and increase the production of weapons and equipment, but most likely would only disorganize management, which could only reduce, not increase output. According to our estimates, based on the decrease in labor costs per unit of various types of weapons and equipment in 1941-1943, the production of tanks and combat aircraft during the war years was at least doubled. With this in mind, the share of Western deliveries of weapons and military equipment turns out to be approximately twice as high as it is commonly believed.{56} 7057 tanks and self-

propelled guns were delivered from the USA, 5480 from England and Canada. the total number of 18,865 combat aircraft amounted to about 17,000.

not 15%, as traditionally believed, but about 30%, for tanks and self-propelled guns, the share will increase from the traditional 12% to 24% of the total production level in the USSR during the war years. As for artillery, only anti-aircraft artillery was supplied from the USA - 7944 guns. {58} Soviet historians usually correlate this number with the total production of guns and mortars in the USSR - 482.2 thousand guns and 351.8 thousand mortars, which makes the share of American supplies is less than 2% of the total Soviet production of guns, and less than 1% of the total production of guns and mortars. Meanwhile, it is necessary to compare here only with the Soviet production of anti-aircraft guns - the most scarce type of artillery for the Red Army, and here the share of American deliveries turns out to be much higher (unfortunately, an accurate calculation is not yet possible due to the lack of data on the production of anti-aircraft guns in the

USSR). We also note that American deliveries played a significant role in supplying the USSR with tires and certain types of food. Under Lend-Lease, 3606 thousand tires were delivered to the Soviet Union, {59} while the Soviet production of automobile tires in 1941-1945. amounted to 8368 thousand pieces (of which only 2884 thousand large tires "Giant" were produced), and in 1945 the production of tires amounted to 1370 thousand compared to 3389 thousand in 1941 {60} American deliveries amounted to 43, 1% of Soviet production, but if we take into account that mainly large tires were supplied from the USA, then the role of these supplies increases even more. In addition, Great Britain supplied 103.5 thousand tons of natural rubber.{61} The USSR also received 672.4 thousand short

tons, or 610 thousand metric tons of sugar, from the USA, {62} in the USSR in 1941-1945. 1460 thousand tons of granulated sugar were produced, and in 1942-1943. - only 231 thousand tons. {63} Lend-lease deliveries amounted to about 41.8% of the total level of Soviet production. An important role in the supply of the Red Army and the civilian population was played by the supply of canned meat from the United States - 732,595 short, or 664.6 thousand metric tons. {64} In 1941-1945. 3,072 million cans of canned goods were produced, and meat (with by-products, but without production in households) - 3,715 thousand tons. {65} If we assume that 5 thousand conventional cans of canned food are approximately equivalent to 1

tons of canned food, then only canned meat under Lend-Lease amounted to about 108% of the total production of canned food in the USSR (by no means all of them belonged to canned meat). In relation to Soviet meat production, Lend-Lease supplies of canned meat amounted to 17.9%, in fact, their share was even higher if offal is excluded and considering that canned meat is equivalent in weight to a much larger amount of raw meat. But perhaps most

important to the Soviet Union was the supply of sophisticated machine tools and industrial equipment. Back in 1939-1940. the Soviet leadership placed orders for imported equipment for the production of artillery weapons. Then these orders, placed mainly in the United States, were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Namely, in special machines for artillery production during the war years in the USSR there was the greatest need. However, these orders contained a major miscalculation. A significant proportion of the equipment was intended for the production of purely offensive weapons - powerful naval and super-heavy land guns designed to destroy enemy fortifications. Naval guns were not needed, since shipbuilding was curtailed with the start of the war, super-heavy land artillery was also not needed, since the Red Army had to fight the corresponding fortifications only at the very end of the war, and not on the scale that was thought before it began. { 66} In total, 38.1 thousand metal-cutting machine tools were delivered from the USA to the USSR during the war years, from Great Britain - 6.5

thousand machine tools and 104 presses. In the Soviet Union in 1941-1945. 115.4 thousand metal-cutting machine tools were produced, {67}

i.e. 2.6 times more Lend-Lease deliveries. However, in reality, if we take cost indicators, then the role of Western machine tools will be much more significant - they were much more complicated and more expensive than Soviet ones. Only from the USA in 1941-1945. under Lend-Lease, machines and equipment for industry worth 607 million dollars were delivered to the USSR.{68} At present, it is not possible to estimate the corresponding Soviet products in dollars, but it can be assumed that it could be even less than the cost of deliveries according to lend-lease,

taking into account the higher quality and complexity of Western machine tools and other equipment. Some of the equipment, in particular the rolled aluminum plant, arrived at the final stage of the war, and played a role not only in the war efforts, but in the restoration of the Soviet economy. the production of weapons and military equipment during the war years, but also to establish the production of machine tools and equipment, which was also served by the supply from the United States of special types of rolled steel and ferroalloys.

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In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F. D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin considered it impossible to resist the material power of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe, without American help from Great Britain and the USSR. {70} Roosevelt still in October 1940, announcing its decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are redundant for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that can protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of Russia in the number of these countries. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible. On the other hand, the USSR, long before the start of the Soviet-German war, considered Germany as its potential adversary. So, in February 1940, at the height of the Soviet-Finnish war, when the USSR was threatened by the Anglo-French coalition on the side of Finland, according to the testimony of the former commander of the Baltic Fleet V. Tributs, People's Commissar

of the USSR Navy, N. Kuznetsov "issued a special directive in which he pointed out the possibility of simultaneous action against the USSR by a coalition led by Germany and including Italy, Hungary, and Finland." {72} It is unlikely that such a directive, which did not correspond to the then existing international situation, could be given away without the knowledge of Stalin. In addition, on the eve of the war, the Soviet leadership was too optimistic about the combat capability of its armed forces and, in particular, their tank Odarka. As of June 1, 1941, out of 23,106 tanks of the Red Army, 80.9% of the tanks were considered combat-ready (in the western border districts, 10,540 tanks were considered combat-ready). It was only after the loss of the bulk of tanks in border battles that it was retroactively recognized that out of the tanks of old designs, which accounted for up to 80% of the entire tank fleet, 29% required major, and 44% - medium-term repairs. {73} These facts work, in particular, on the version that the USSR was preparing a preventive strike, defended by V. Suvorov. {74 } USA and UK. Most likely, the calculation was both on the one and on the other, depending on the development of events. In any case, the unpreparedness of the USSR for a long war could not be overcome in half a year or a year, and, according to the testimony of Soviet military leaders, Stalin believed that the Soviet Union would not be able to stay out of the war longer than before 1942. {75} The preemptive strike of the USSR could be equally driven by the fear of a German attack on Soviet territory, and the fear that Germany might in 1941 make a successful invasion of the British Isles and defeat England. Namely, the disinformation measures of the German intelligence to ensure the operation "Barbarossa" - the plan for the invasion of the USSR - were oriented to this scenario of the development of events. The defeat and withdrawal of Great Britain from the war would not only allow Germany to send additional forces against the Soviet Union, but would also deprive the Soviet economy of assistance from the British side, and would also sharply worsen the conditions for aid from the United States and Canada.

The Western allies assisted the USSR in preparing for war not only with Lend-Lease supplies. The struggle against the USA and Great Britain forced Germany to build submarines, diverting scarce metal, equipment and skilled labor to this. Only in 1941-1944. German shipbuilding produced submarines with a total displacement of 810 thousand tons. {76} The main forces of the German fleet were thrown into the fight against the fleets and merchant shipping of Western countries (including here and convoys with supplies to the USSR under Lend-Lease). The Western allies also diverted significant ground forces of the Wehrmacht (in the last year of the war - up to 40%).{77} The strategic bombing of Germany by the Anglo-American aircraft slowed down the growth of its military industry, and in the last year of the war, gasoline production in Germany was practically brought to naught. , finally paralyzing the Luftwaffe. From March to September 1944, the production of aviation gasoline in Germany, which was carried out almost exclusively at synthetic fuel plants - the main object of allied bombing at that time, decreased from 181 thousand tons to 10 thousand tons, and after some growth in November - up to 49 thousand .t, in March 1945, completely came to naught.{78} The main forces of German aviation, especially fighter aircraft, acted against the British and US Air Forces, and it was in the fight against the Western allies that the Luftwaffe suffered the bulk of their losses. The Soviet estimate of the losses of German aviation on the Soviet-German front: 62,000 vehicles and 101,000 aircraft, which amounted to irretrievable combat losses of German aviation throughout the war, {79} is far from reality, since it was obtained by simply multiplying the number of German aircraft in individual theaters war for the duration of the deployment of hostilities in a given theater, without taking into account the comparative intensity of hostilities (to sorties) in various theaters. Meanwhile, in the West, the intensity of air battles was generally higher than in the East, and the best German pilots fought there. So, in July and August 1943, when significant forces of the Luftwaffe were concentrated on the Eastern Front during the battles for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, out of 3213 irretrievably lost combat aircraft, only 1030 aircraft, or 32.3%, fell on the Eastern Front. { 80} Probably about the same proportion of all

irretrievable losses during the war were suffered by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern

Front. Since, without the assistance of England and the USA, the USSR could not have waged war against Germany, the assertions of Soviet propaganda about the economic victory of socialism in the Great Patriotic War and the ability of the USSR to defeat Germany on its own are nothing more than a myth. Unlike Germany, in the USSR, the goal of creating an autarkic economy capable of providing the army in wartime with everything necessary for waging a modern war, which had been outlined since the early 1930s, was not achieved. Hitler and his advisers miscalculated not so much in determining the military and economic power of the USSR, but in assessing the ability of the Soviet economic and political system to function in the face of a severe military defeat, as well as the ability of the Soviet economy to effectively and quickly use Western supplies, and Great Britain and the United States to implement such supplies in the required quantity and in a timely manner. Historians are now faced with a new problem of assessing how Western Lend-Lease deliveries of industrial equipment, as well as reparations from Germany, contributed to the formation of the Soviet military-industrial complex, capable of conducting an arms race on equal terms with the West, right up to the most recent time, and to determine the degree of dependence of the Soviet military-industrial complex on imports from the West for the entire post-war period. Notes: {1} Voznesensky N. A. The military economy of the USSR in the period

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{33} Harrison M. Or. cit. P. 124, 153.

{34} Voznesensky H. A. Decree. op. pp. 42, 163.

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{37} Ibid. S. 239.

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{39} The foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. T. 2. S. 145, 147. {40} The national economy

of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War... S. 15. {41} World War

1939-1945. Per. with him. M.: Izdatinlit, 1957. S. 514. {42} German industry during

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{43} See: Yakovlev A. S. Soviet aircraft: A brief essay. Ed. 4th. M.: Nauka, 1982. S. 85, 110-111. During the first 2.5 years of the war, by replacing aluminum with air plywood, more than 30,000 tons of rolled aluminum were saved (Voznesensky N. A. op. op. p. 71), which, of course, could not but change the picture dramatically and more 3.5 times to reduce the cost of aluminum per Soviet aircraft in comparison with the German.

{44} Voznesensky N.A.

Decree. op. pp. 114-115. For details see:

Sokolov B.V. Decree. op. pp. 40-54.

{45} Voznesensky N.A. Decree. op. pp. 70-71.

{46} National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War... P. 46.

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The cost of war: the human losses of the USSR and Germany, 1939-1945.

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1. Methods, goals and objectives of the study

The problem of human losses in wars is one of the most complex and interesting problems of the historical and demographic sciences, which also opens up wide opportunities for various philosophical and cultural constructions and generalizations. In the Second World War, mankind suffered the greatest losses so far, and the population of the Soviet Union and Germany suffered the heaviest losses among the participating countries. Only the loss of Poland due to

Hitler's genocide of the Jewish people are comparable to the human losses in Germany. The losses of the Soviet population, obviously, exceed the total human losses of all other peoples during the Second World War. The main losses of the USSR and Germany suffered in the struggle against each other. These losses left their deep mark on the memory of the German and Russian peoples.

In the half century that has passed since the end of the Second World War, neither German nor, especially, Soviet losses can be considered definitively established. This is due both to their absolute size - millions and tens of millions of people, and to the difficulties and incompleteness of accounting for losses. In the totalitarian Soviet Union, the problem of human losses in the last war remained a topic closed to scientific study until the second half of the 1980s. In Germany, which had suffered a defeat, it was not possible, in hot pursuit, to make a total calculation of the losses of both the army and the civilian population. Determining the ratio of the losses of the two countries helps us to comprehend the features of the political regimes and social systems of Nazi Germany and communist Russia. To establish the most accurate loss figures, a

comprehensive analysis of the primary act material on the losses and the size of the army and population is necessary, which has not yet been carried out either in Russia or in Germany, and even beyond the power of one researcher. Therefore, our work does not pretend to close the problem of calculating Soviet and German losses in World War II.

Exploring the problem of military losses, we also encounter an objective contradiction between the unique and the universal. The death of each person in the war from the point of view of history is a unique event. Also, any document that fixes the amount of losses in a given particular war or a separate battle is unique in its own way, and its reliability depends on the subjective intentions and actual information that its author had at the time the document was compiled. At the same time, an assessment of the military losses of the army and the civilian population of a country as a whole is possible only by statistical methods. At the same time, human losses are considered not as a unique, but as a mass phenomenon, confirmed by universal

statistical regularities. This increases the likelihood of errors. To minimize them, it is necessary to take into account that we are dealing with historical, not physical phenomena, and we strive to eliminate the influence of all subjective factors distorting reality that are present in the material subjected to statistical analysis. The purpose of this study is to determine with the greatest possible accuracy and taking into account all the material available today, the loss of the population of the USSR and Germany in the Second World War. First of all, we will focus on

determining the irretrievable losses of the armed forces, since the volume and ratio with the losses of the enemy of this particular type of losses mainly characterizes the level of the military art of the parties and the ability of the relevant political and economic systems to wage war / During hostilities under irretrievable combat losses refers to the dead, those who died from wounds, the missing and prisoners. Irretrievable non-combat losses are understood as those who died from illness, accidents, as a result of suicides and sentences of tribunals, and for other reasons. The concept of sanitary losses covers the wounded in battles and the sick. In contrast to the term "wounded", which usually covers the actually wounded and shell-shocked, the "thrown in battle" includes those who are still frostbitten and burned. The irretrievable losses of the country include all those who died as a result of the war. At the same time, prisoners of war and the missing who survived the war are excluded from irretrievable losses. Potential losses are understood as the approximate number of those who were not born during the war due to the fall in the birth rate caused by the war /. The total volume of human losses, including losses of the civilian population, characterizes the damage suffered by a particular country in a war. At the same time, it should be remembered that the magnitude of the irretrievable losses of the USSR and Germany in 1939-1945. is calculated in millions and tens of millions, and, therefore, it will always be determined by researchers only by estimates, regardless of what other documents will be put into circulation in the future. When it comes to determining the loss of life in a short-term and small-scale armed conflict, where the victims

numbered in the hundreds or a few thousand, it can be hoped that

that the loss figures contained in the final reports will coincide or be very close to the true number of victims. The situation is quite different when the war continues for several years, and the number of dead and wounded is in the millions and tens of millions. In this case, of course, the researcher is not able to cover the entire array of primary loss reports, and the reports often underestimate (rarely overestimate) the true amount of losses. Here the researcher is inevitably forced to follow the path of estimates, and the greater the amount of losses, the greater the limits of fluctuations in estimates become. The subjective moment also increases, since different authors can make different estimates based on the same data. In the case of Soviet losses in World War II, the situation is aggravated by the fact that there are still almost no publications of documents on losses, and access to them is difficult for researchers. There are almost no works devoted

to determining the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by scientific methods. In 1950, the book Soviet Colonel K. D. Kalinov, who had defected to the West, "Soviet Marshals Have a Word", was published, where, with reference to a document at the disposal of the author, data were given on the losses of Soviet troops in the war with Germany: 8.5 million. died on the battlefield, 2.5 million died from wounds and 2.6 million died in captivity (a document with such figures was not found in the Soviet archives). Kalinov's data were accepted by a number of Western researchers as being close to the true losses of the Red Army. {1} In the Soviet Union, until 1988, researchers did not refer to Kalinov's work, and did not calculate the losses of the Soviet armed forces. Later, they began to make such estimates, but without specifying the method of calculation. For example, D. A. Volkogonov, relying "on a number of available in the military department statistical data, including the number of Soviet prisoners of war" and his own analysis of censuses, the dynamics of the number of formations and data on losses in major operations, believes that "the number of dead military personnel, partisans, underground workers, and civilians during the Great Patriotic War fluctuates, apparently within at least 26-27 million people, of which about 10 million fell on the battlefield and died in captivity", and "the ratio of irretrievable losses is 3.2: 1, and not in our favor." {2} And N. Mertsalov, referring to the "research of some

scientists from the Institute of Theory and History of Socialism under the Central Committee of the CPSU", as well as from the GDR and the FRG, the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front determines 2.8 million people, and the Red Army - 14 million, which gives a ratio of 1: 5, but, like D. A. Volkogonov, does not substantiate the given figures in any way.<sup>{3}</sup> The attempt of V. V. Alekseev and V. A. Isupov in 1986 to determine the losses of persons of the draft contingent born in 1890-1924 by analysis deserves mentioning. data on male preponderance in these ages according to the censuses of 1926 and 1959. They estimate losses at 11.8 million men (in the overwhelming majority - Red Army soldiers) and 2.1 million women. However, these authors do not take into account that in the losses of peaceful of a population comparable in size to the losses of the army, a large female preponderance inevitably arose at these ages, which makes their calculations of losses greatly underestimated.<sup>{4}</sup>

The methodology for calculating the losses of the Soviet and German armed forces and their ratio was proposed by us in 1991 in the book "The Price of Victory".<sup>{5}</sup> references to sources, about the losses of the Red Army in 1939-1945. However, there is no clear presentation of the calculation methodology here, it is not even clear what kind of documents on losses were used as their basis: personal (by name) or current generalizing (daily, ten-day and monthly) reports.<sup>{6}</sup> Concerning the losses of the Wehrmacht, the most reliable (of the known to the author) information is contained in the work of B. Müller Gillebrand. For the

period from 1939 to the end of 1944, they are based on personal (personal) loss reports processed by the military registration authorities in Germany, due to which undercounting and double counting are minimized here. For the period from the end of 1944 until the end of the war, the Müller-Hillebrand estimates are based only on rather incomplete current loss reports and are much less accurate.<sup>{7}</sup> victory." This is primarily due to the introduction of new materials into circulation. It is necessary to calculate losses in several independent ways and only when obtaining close to each other

numbers, you can try to draw conclusions about the reliability of the selected methods. We are well aware that in order to establish as close as possible to the true figure of the irretrievable losses of the armies (as well as the civilian population) of the USSR and Germany, a thorough analysis of the primary reports of losses in comparison with data on the number of personnel is necessary. For the Second World War, such work obviously requires time exceeding the time of the conscious life of one researcher, and only large teams can do it, provided they have free access to the archives, and even in this case it would take many years. To compare the effectiveness of the combat operations of the parties, the irretrievable losses of the Western allies of the USSR and Germany's allies on the Eastern Front are also given. 2. Losses of the Red

#### Army During the invasion

of Poland from September 17 to October 2, 1939, the Red Army lost 852 killed and died from wounds and 144 missing. 2002 people were killed in battles, 381 were sick.{8} in rear hospitals) at least 131.5 thousand people. About 6 thousand Red Army soldiers ended up in Finnish captivity. The number of those killed in battles amounted to 330,000 people.{9} Due to the deaths in the rear hospitals and losses among the border guards and in the navy, we estimate the total number of dead in the Red Army at 135,000 people. There are also higher estimates - up to 200 thousand dead. For comparison, the Finnish army during this war lost 23.5 thousand killed and died from wounds, more than 1 thousand prisoners and 43.5 thousand wounded. {10} The German land army until June 1941 lost dead and missing lead 97.2 thousand people, {11} which is 1.5 times less than the Soviet irretrievable losses of 142 thousand people (of which 136 thousand died).

The official figure for Soviet military casualties in 1941-1945. - 8,668,400 military personnel (including border and internal troops) who died on the battlefield or died from wounds, illnesses, accidents and in captivity, as well as those executed by tribunals and returned from captivity (often to Soviet camps ) intended to emigrate. Of this number in the war against



In Japan, 12,031 people died and went missing (along with those who died from wounds and accidents, as well as due to illness). {12}

Determining the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War is an extremely difficult task due to poor record keeping and incomplete preservation of documents, especially for 1941-1942. The fact is that in the Red Army, privates and sergeants after the Finnish war were deprived of identity cards - Red Army books, which not only opened up wide opportunities for the activities of enemy intelligence officers and saboteurs (it was enough for them to have a Red Army uniform and know the numbers of the units stationed in the area ), but also made it extremely difficult to determine the number of personnel and the magnitude of losses, even in peacetime. N. N. Vashugin, a member of the military council of the Kiev Special Military District, in December 1940, at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army, told the case, "when one Red Army soldier hid in the surrounding villages for four months, during this time he learned to speak Polish, systematically went to church. He was arrested, and only then it became clear that he was not in the unit. And on the other hand, in the same regiment, the Red Army soldier Stepanov was declared a deserter, although he never left the location of the unit. "{13} Order of the Commissar of Defense on the introduction of the Regulations on the personal accounting of losses and burial of the personnel of the Red Army in wartime appeared on March 15, 1941. This order introduced medallions for military personnel with basic information about the owner. But, for example, this order was brought to the troops of the Southern Front only in December 1941. Even at the beginning of 1942, many military personnel at the front did not have medallions, and by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the medallions were canceled on November 17, 1942, which further confused accounting for losses, although it was dictated by the desire not to oppress the military with thoughts of possible death (many therefore refused to take the medallions at all). Red Army books were introduced on October 7, 1941, but even at the beginning of 1942, the Red Army soldiers were not fully provided with them. The order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of April 12, 1942 stated: "The accounting of personnel, in particular the accounting of losses, is completely unsatisfactory in the army ... The headquarters of the formations are not sent in a timely manner to the ce

dead. As a result of the untimely and incomplete submission of lists of losses by military units (as in the document. - B.S.), there was a large discrepancy between the data of numerical and personal accounting of losses. At present, no more than one third of the actual number of those killed is on a personal record. The personal records of the missing and captured are even more far from the truth. "And in the future, the situation, taking into account personnel and losses, has not changed significantly. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of March 7, 1945, two months before the end of the war with Germany, stated that "the military councils of the fronts, armies and military districts do not pay due attention" to this issue.{14} The underestimation of the official figures of

Soviet military losses in the war with Germany, calculated by the group of authors of the book "Secrecy Removed", is striking. , for example, the number of missing and captured in the Soviet Armed Forces in 1943-1945 is determined here at 604 thousand people, while according to German data, 746 thousand Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner during this period.{15} Even more striking an example in connection with the losses in the Battle of Kursk. The book "Secrecy Removed" provides data that on July 5, 1943, by the beginning of the battle, the troops of the Central Front numbered 738 thousand people and during the defensive phase of the battle from 5 to 11 July suffered losses (sanitary and irretrievable) of 33,897 people. According to all the laws of mathematics, by the beginning of the offensive on July 12, the troops of the front should have had 704 thousand people in their composition, however, the authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" testify that on July 12 the Central Front numbered only 645,300 people, and during the week of defensive battles it the composition practically did not change: one separate tank brigade was added and two rifle brigades were lost, which in the end could reduce the number of front troops by no more than 5-7 thousand people. {16} Moreover, most likely during a defensive battle, and especially on the eve of the offensive on the Central Front, marching reinforcements were transferred to compensate for losses (for the neighboring Voronezh Front, the fact of transferring marching reinforcements directly to the troops during defensive battles was recorded in the memoirs of the participants). {17} And anyway, by the beginning of the offensive, the number of troops turned out to b

almost 60 thousand less than it should be, based on the size of losses announced in the book "Secrecy Removed". This

example also proves the viciousness of the methodology used by the authors of the book to calculate losses in individual strategic operations. According to them, monthly reports were taken as the basis, and if the operation lasted less than a month, ten-day reports from the fronts.{18} The number

of such examples can be multiplied ad infinitum. Let us dwell in great detail only on the last of them, since it is he who will allow us to find a way to estimate the irretrievable losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War close to the truth. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed

Forces in 1942 were determined by the authors of the book Classified as 3,258,216 people (including those who died from diseases and accidents, and other non-combat losses).{19} The Red Army for 1942 is given by D. A. Volkogonov - 5,888,236 people, according to him, "the result of long calculations according to documents." {20} This figure is 1.8 times higher than the figure given in the book "Secrecy has been removed" , and D. A. Volkogonov gives its breakdown by months. For comparison, we have the monthly dynamics of the losses of the Red Army defeated in battles in the period from July 1941 to April 1945 inclusive: the graph is reproduced in the book of the former head of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Red Army E. I. Smirnov "War and military medicine ".{21} Since in the case of those killed in battles, we are dealing with a more accurate numerical account, in contrast to the much less accurate (in Soviet conditions) personal account of irretrievable losses, given by E.I. Smirnova, when comparing them with other data , can be used as the basis for estimating the irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, taking into account a certain proportional relationship between the number of those killed and those who died from wounds and the number of those killed in battle. D. A. Volkogonov does not break down his figure of irretrievable losses into combat and non-combat losses. But since he nowhere says that he is talking only about combat losses, we assume that the figure of 5,888,236 and its component monthly figures include all

irretrievable losses - both combat and non-combat, related to the active army. This somewhat distorts the proportion, since non-combat losses, strictly speaking, are not proportional to the number of those killed in battles. However, taking into account that non-combat losses were an insignificant part of all irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1941-1945. (according to the authors of the book "Secrecy has been lifted" - 555.5 thousand out of 8668.4 thousand dead, or 6.4%, and the underestimation of combat losses here, of course, is disproportionately greater than non-combat ones), {22} a large error one way or the other, it can't be here. Monthly data for 1942 on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces are given in Table 1. Table 1 Losses of the Red Army in

1942

Month Irretrievable losses

(thousand people) Losses by those struck in battles (in % of the average monthly level for the war == 100)

January 628

112 February

523 98

March 625

120 April

435 81 May

422 78 June

519 61 July

330 83 August

385 130

September

473 109 October

819 80 November

413

83 December 318 12 3 Total for the year 5888 1158 Sources:

Smirnov E.I. War and military medicine. 2nd ed. M.:, 1979. S. 188; Volkogonov D.A., We won despite the inhuman

system // Izvestia. 8.5.1993. P. 5. Comparison of these figures allows us to conclude that the data of D. A. Volkogonov significantly underestimate the true amount of irretrievable losses. So, in May 1942, irretrievable losses allegedly amounted to only 422 thousand, and even decreased by 13 thousand compared to April. Meanwhile, it was in May that the German

thousand Red Army soldiers on the Kerch Peninsula {23} and about 240 thousand in the Kharkov region. {24} Whereas in April, the loss of prisoners was insignificant (the largest number - about 5 thousand people, was taken during the liquidation of the group of General M. G. Efremov in the Vyazma region). It turns out that in May the losses of those killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and accidents did not exceed 32 thousand people, and in April they reached almost 430 thousand, and this despite the fact that the number of those killed in battles from April to May fell by only 3 points, or less than 4%. It is clear that the whole point is in the colossal underestimation of irretrievable losses during the period of the general retreat of the Soviet troops from May to September inclusive. After all, it was then that the vast majority of the 1653 thousand Soviet prisoners of 1942 were captured by the Germans. According to D. A. Volkogonov, during this time, irretrievable losses reached 2129 thousand against 2211 thousand in the 4 previous months, when losses by prisoners were insignificant. It is no coincidence that in October the irretrievable losses of the Red Army suddenly increased, by 346 thousand compared to September, with a sharp drop in the rate of those killed in battles by as much as 29 points and the absence at that time of any large encirclement of Soviet troops: the October losses were partially included underestimated loss of previous months. The most reliable data seems to us on irretrievable losses for November, when the Red Army suffered almost no losses in prisoners, and the front line was stable until the 19th. Therefore, we can assume that the losses in killed and dead from wounds were taken into account in this month more fully than in the previous and subsequent ones, when the rapid movement of the front and headquarters made it difficult to count, and that irretrievable losses in November fell almost exclusively on those killed and died from wounds, diseases and accidents (note that here non-combat losses can be taken into account only for the active army, without military personnel of the rear districts and the Far Eastern Front who died from illnesses). Then, for 413 thousand killed and dead, there will be an indicator of 83% of those killed in battles, i.e., for 1% of the average monthly number of those killed in battles, there are approximately 5.0 thousand killed and died from wounds and diseases. If we take January, February, March or April as the baseline, then there the ratio, after excluding the approximate

1% of the average monthly number of casualties in battles. The December figures clearly suffer from a large underestimation of irretrievable losses due to the rapid

movement of the front line. It can be assumed that the ratio of the number of those killed in battles and the number of those killed and those who died from wounds, diseases, accidents, as well as from the verdicts of the tribunals, established for November 1942, is close to the average for the war as a whole. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Red Army (without prisoners) in the war with Germany can be estimated by multiplying 5 thousand people by 4656 (4600) - the sum (in percent) of losses defeated in battles for the period from July 1941 to April 1945, 17 - casualties in the battles for June 1941, 39 - casualties in the battles for May 1945, taken by us for one third of the losses, respectively, in July 1941 and April 1945. As a result, we come to a figure of 23.28 million dead. From this number, obviously, one should subtract 939,700 military personnel who were reported missing, but after the liberation of the respective territories, they were again drafted into the army. Most of them were not captured, some escaped from captivity.<sup>{25}</sup> Thus, the total number of dead will be reduced to 22.34 million people. With non-combat losses in the rear districts, we will increase this number to 22.4 million people killed in action and died from wounds, diseases, accidents and as a result of tribunal sentences and suicides.

To determine the total value of irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the war, we need to establish the total number of Soviet prisoners of war and estimate how many of them did not live to see liberation. According to the final German documents, 5754 thousand prisoners of war were taken on the Eastern Front, which were distributed over the years as follows: 1941 - 3355 thousand, 1942 - 1653 thousand, 1943 - 565 thousand, 1944 - 147 thousand, 1945 - 34 thousand. The American historian A. Dallin, <sup>{26}</sup> who published this document of the Wehrmacht command, considered the data on the number of prisoners incomplete. Indeed, according to earlier data from the OKW, 3,806,861 prisoners of war were captured on the Eastern Front between June 22 and December 1, 1941, and according to a statement made by government official Mansfeld on February 19, 1942 in the Reich Economic Chamber, there were 3 Soviet prisoners of war .9 million (almost all of them were

captured in 1941). We are inclined to join the highest estimate of the number of Soviet prisoners of war in 1941 at 3.9 million people, {27} since, most likely, the minimum estimate of 3355 thousand prisoners of war does not take into account those 200 thousand who were already enlisted in 1941 for performing auxiliary service in the ranks of the German armed forces, {28} as well as those who died in the first weeks of captivity without proper registration from hunger, disease and as a result of German repressions. The number of these latter can be estimated (together with those who fled from captivity back in 1941) at about 345 thousand people. In 1941, the death rate among prisoners was especially high, and the underestimation due to their huge number was maximum. Data on the number of prisoners in 1942-1945, when their number and mortality decreased, and records improved, we accept close to reality. Then the total number of Soviet prisoners of war for the war can be estimated at 6.3 million people. 1836 thousand people returned to their homeland from German (as well as Finnish and Romanian) captivity, and about 250 thousand more, according to the USSR Foreign Ministry in 1956, remained in the West after the war. {29} By May 1, 1944, according to German data, 67,000 Soviet prisoners of war fled from the camps of the deep rear and were not found. {30} An even larger number of prisoners, undoubtedly, fled from the front line and front-line rear camps, and many, if not most of them, when leaving for their own, preferred to hide in every possible way their stay in captivity, as the former prisoners of war in the USSR were repressed. The number of such prisoners who managed not only to escape, but also to hide their stay in captivity and not be included in the number of 1836 thousand who returned from captivity, we estimate at about 200 thousand people. Then the number of Soviet prisoners of war who died in captivity can be estimated at about 4 million people, or 63.5% of the total number.

Our estimate of the total number of dead in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces at 26.4 million people finds some confirmation in the electronic data bank on the dead and missing military personnel during the Great Patriotic War at the Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow. It has already collected personal data on 17 million people. But the organizers of the bank themselves assume that they covered only about 90 percent of irretrievable losses, that is, the real figure of the dead is about 20 million servicemen. {30a}

they seem to exaggerate the completeness of accounting for losses within the framework of the electronic data bank. Half a century after the end of the war, there is no real chance to take into account by name a significant part of the irretrievable losses of the armed forces, especially if such a record was never made in the war and the first post-war years. Therefore, a shortfall of 9.4 million people compared to our estimate of 26.4 million people, or 36% of the total number of military dead, seems quite possible. There are different data

on the number of wounded and sick soldiers of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. According to the authors of the book "Secrecy stamp removed" in 1941-1945. taking into account the war with Japan, the number of those injured in battles (wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbite) reached 14,685,593 people, and 7,641,312 people fell ill. These figures, according to the authors of the book, are sanitary losses taken into account by military medical institutions. However, contradictory data on sanitary losses according to the reports of the troops are also given here - 15,296,473 hit in battles and 3,047,675 sick. In the book "Secrecy Removed" the difference in figures is explained by the fact that the first of them refer to all armed forces, while the second only to the active army. This can really explain the difference in 4,593.4 thousand cases, but how 610.9 thousand more people were killed in battles in the active army than in all the armed forces remains a mystery and indicates an incomplete record. It is also undoubted that the given data refer only to those who were evacuated in battles and sick, excluding those who returned to duty or died in medical battalions and hospitals for the treatment of the lightly wounded and sick. Note that this actually takes into account the number of defeats in battles and diseases, since many military personnel were wounded or ill several times during the war (by October 1, 1945, more than 1,191 thousand military personnel remained in the ranks, having received two or more wounds).{ 31}

There are other data, according to which the number of those killed in battles and the sick in the Soviet armed forces was much greater. So, in the archives of the Military Medical Museum in St. Petersburg, more than 32 million records of servicemen who entered during the Great Patriotic War have been preserved.



to military medical institutions. We are talking here about those who were evacuated to field and rear medical facilities, since there are no personal registration cards for those who died or recovered in medical battalions and regimental medical posts. {32} It is known that at this stage of medical care was returned to 10.5% of all wounded, 10.9% of frostbitten and 49.3% of patients, and in total - about 23.8% of all those injured in battles and patients (including 20.5% in medical battalions). {33} The proportion of those killed in battles, who died on the PMP and in the medical battalions can be estimated at no more than 5%, since it was 2-2.5 times less than the proportion of those returned to service. The number of patients who died in the PMP and in the medical battalions was negligible. Thus, approximately 27% of all the wounded and sick of the Red Army during the war years were not evacuated. If 32 million wounded in battles and sick, on whom registration cards have been preserved, is about 73% of their total number, then all sanitary losses can be estimated at 43.9 million

people. An alternative calculation of sanitary losses can be made in terms of the average workload of the final network of evacuation hospitals during the war - 85-87 hit in battles for every 10 beds out of the maximum number deployed.{34} The indicator of the maximum deployment of the final network is 1,719,450 beds.{35} Known also that 51.5% of the total number of wounded went through evacuation hospitals during the war years. Since the wounded and shell-shocked soldiers of the Red Army accounted for 96.9% of all those who were wounded in battle, {36} it is possible to attribute the figures for the wounded to all those who were wounded in battle and vice versa without much error. Therefore, the total number of those killed in battles can be estimated at 28.7 million people (including 27.8 million wounded and shell-shocked). The number of sick people can be estimated at 15.2 million people, taking into account that there were about 34% of the sick people who passed through medical institutions.{37} In total, this gives 43.9 million sanitary losses - a figure that does not differ from the one that we received above according to the number of personal registration cards of servicemen who entered military medical institutions. The number of evacuated patients can be estimated at 50.7% of the total number (including those who died in medical battalions), or at 7.7 million people, and

million people, or 89.9% of the total (this includes those who died in medical

battalions). According to the data given in the book "Secrecy Removed", during the war with Germany and Japan, 1,104,110 military personnel died from combat defeats, and 267,394 died from diseases. In addition, 3,798.2 thousand people were demobilized due to injury and illness. , of which 2576 thousand became disabled.{38}It can be assumed that at least part, if not most, of the 1222.2 thousand military personnel demobilized due to injury or illness, but not recognized as disabled, was re-conscripted.

The total loss of the Soviet Armed Forces in the course of the war with Germany in those killed and those who died from wounds, illnesses, accidents and other causes, as well as prisoners and invalids, is, according to our estimate, about 31.1 million people. This contradicts official data on the total number of citizens of the USSR called up for military service - 34,476.7 thousand people (including the peacetime army), of which 3,614.6 thousand people were transferred to work in the national economy and in military formations of other departments. By July 1, 1945, 11,390.6 thousand people remained in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and, in addition, 1,046 thousand were treated in hospitals.{39} dated July 10, 1945, out of 918,000 prisoners repatriated by that time, 425,000 were returned to the Red Army, {40} and out of 1,046,000 who were in hospitals, up to 100,000 were probably disabled, and some part - on those who returned from captivity. But in any case, if our estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army is close to reality, the total number of those mobilized should have exceeded the official figure by about 12 million people, which corresponds to a net conscription, minus those sent to the national economy, of 42.9 million people . According to V. S. Kozhurin, based on data from the Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR on the population of the country as of January 1, 1941, by the end of June 1941, the population of the USSR totaled 200.1 million people. However, this estimate is based on a preliminary calculation of the population made by the CSO in June 1941.

preliminary calculation.<sup>{41}</sup> Therefore, we are inclined to increase the estimate of V. S. Kozhurin by 4.6% and determine the population of the USSR at the end of June 1941 at 209.3 million people. Then the total number of mobilized 42.9 million people will be 20.5% of the pre-war population. Note that the volume of the German conscription during the Second World War turned out to be quite comparable with the Soviet one. In total, the Wehrmacht (including the peacetime army) was called up 17.9 million people, of which about 2 million people were recalled to work in the national economy. Thus, a net conscription of 15.9 million people was 19.7% of the German population of 80.6 million people in 1939 (including the population of Austria and the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia).<sup>{42}</sup> The mobilization capacity of the USSR and Germany was almost equal to the total population. The Soviet Union could mobilize a somewhat larger share of the population thanks to the help of the Western allies in the form of lend-lease, which made it possible to release additional labor from industry for the needs of the front, and also due to the almost complete cessation of all civilian production already in 1941, while in Germany it was also in 1943, a significant part of the industry produced products to meet the needs of the civilian population. In addition, in the USSR, on a much larger scale, women, the elderly and adolescents were recruited to work in the national economy. In Germany, the mobilization capacity increased due to the use of the labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war (5655 thousand people in September 1944), <sup>{43}</sup> as well as the resources of the occupied and allied countries.

The official figure of those mobilized in the USSR, in addition to the possible underestimation of conscripts by the military registration and enlistment offices, also does not include militias, the formation of which was carried out by party, and not military, bodies. In total, more than 4 million people signed up for the militia. More than 2 million people entered the active army through the militia. <sup>{44}</sup> The militia were poorly trained or even not at all trained, poorly armed, many before their first (and often last) battle had never held rifles in their hands. Losses among them dead and captured in: 1941-1942. were especially large. Due to the militias, the official figure mobilized in! 34,476.7 thousand people could be underestimated by 2-4 million people, depending

on whether it includes those 2 million militias who eventually joined the army after the transformation of militia divisions into regular ones. In addition, the official figure does not include those called up directly to the units, the number of which is difficult to estimate, but it was undoubtedly large and numbered in the millions. This category of conscripts was the least trained, even at the end of 1943 they often rushed into battle undressed, in civilian clothes, and also suffered very heavy losses. In sum, all three of these factors (underestimation of military enlistment offices, militias and those called up directly to the units) may well increase the above official figure by 12 million people, to a net conscription of 42.9 million people.

It should be noted that in the Wehrmacht, approximately 1,630,000 people were dismissed from service as representatives of the senior military age (including more than 1 million after the end of the French campaign of 1940).<sup>{45}</sup> In the Red Army, a similar demobilization of senior military age during the war was not observed, with the exception of the recall of a part of the militias with poor health or advanced age. Meanwhile, the first draft in 1941 provided an excess manpower. According to calculations, in order to transfer the armed forces to wartime states, it was necessary to additionally call up 4,887 thousand people, while in reality, when mobilization was announced, 14 ages of those liable for military service, numbering about 10 million people, were called up. Mobilization in three districts - Trans-Baikal, Far Eastern and Central Asian, initially not announced, was secretly carried out a month after June 22, 1941 under the guise of large training camps. It was also proposed to additionally call on the senior conscripts of age (1895-1904), with a total number of 6.8 million people. The conscription of such a huge mass of people not only disorganized the economy to a certain extent, but also exceeded the real capabilities of the military department in training and arming conscripts. As a result, until the end of the war, the newly mobilized went into battle poorly or even completely untrained in military affairs, and in 1941-1942. - often even without rifles. All this led to very large losses. In general, by the end of 1941, more than 14 million people were called up from a total mobile resource of 32 ages of more than 20 million people.<sup>{46}</sup>

And in the future, the nature of the preparation and use of marching reinforcements remained unsatisfactory. For example, in the description of unsuccessful actions in the Vyazma direction in the winter in the spring of 1942, compiled at the General Staff by Colonel K.F. Vasilchenko in May 1942, it was noted that the units were replenished not by marching units, but by unorganized marching reinforcements. As a result, unfired and insufficiently trained people immediately "flow into battle formations and begin to fight. There was a large disproportion in fighting qualities between fighters seasoned in battles and newcomers who had not yet been fired on. The first in a combat situation were stable and fought well "The latter were less stable and often panicked at first. As a result, the often dissolved old units among poorly trained newcomers did not perform combat missions and suffered heavy losses."{47}

One can also cite a very revealing directive on losses dated March 30, 1942, signed by the commander of the Western Front G.K. Zhukov and addressed to all commanders and commissars of divisions and brigades: commanders and political workers, testifying to the criminally negligent attitude towards saving the lives of Red Army infantrymen.

Hundreds of examples are given in letters and stories when commanders of units and formations kill hundreds and thousands of people during attacks on undestroyed enemy defenses and undestroyed machine guns, on unsuppressed strongholds, with a poorly prepared offensive. These complaints are certainly true and reflect only

part of the existing frivolous attitude towards saving.

replenishment.

I demand:

1. Each abnormal loss of people should be thoroughly investigated within 24 hours and, based on the results of the investigation, immediately make a decision, reporting to the highest headquarters. Commanders who have criminally thrown units into the enemy's unsuppressed fire system should be brought to the strictest accountability and appointed to a lower position.

2. Before an infantry attack, the enemy's fire system must necessarily be suppressed and neutralized, for which each commander organizing an attack must have a carefully developed plan for destroying the enemy by fire and attack. Such a plan must necessarily be approved by the senior commander, which at the same time should serve as the control of the senior commander.

3. Attach to the loss reports a personal explanation on the merits of the losses, who is the culprit of the abnormal losses, what measures are taken against the guilty and to prevent them in the future. {47a} We specially quoted

Zhukovsky's directive in full. Well, the picture of senseless attacks on the unsuppressed system of enemy fire, leading to huge losses with almost no result. Only, except for naked declarations and threats of reprisal against the perpetrators of "abnormal" losses (what "normal" losses are is not explained), there is nothing here. After all, the German defense failed to suppress and break through due to very specific reasons: poor reconnaissance of targets, poor organization of fire control, its adjustment, poor interaction between infantry and artillery and tanks, insufficient training of Red Army soldiers and commanders in actions in the attack. did not provide for the commander and military council of the Western Front, remaining an empty piece of paper - this is how Colonel K. F. Vasilchenko characterized the Zhukovsky orders in the report cited above. Such orders, in no way reducing the actual size of losses in the future, led the commanders, fearing punishment for "abnormal" losses, to underestimate their size or not even report them to higher headquarters, standardly reporting that the size of losses is being specified. This practice only made it difficult and confusing to account for irretrievable losses. The figures we received of irretrievable losses of 22.4 million Soviet servicemen who died on the battlefield and died from wounds, illnesses, accidents, and also for other reasons, and 4 million who died in captivity, are

confirmed by data on irretrievable loss of officers of the Red Army. Combat losses of officers in the Great Patriotic War by a group of employees

The Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense were mainly identified by the end of 1960 as a result of more than 7 years of work. Combat irretrievable losses of officers in 1941-1945. defined in 1,023,093 people. In addition, 5,026 people died from disease and other causes, 20,071 officers were convicted by a tribunal with deprivation of military ranks, about 150,000 survived captivity, and 1,030,721 were dismissed due to injury. At the same time, the irretrievable losses of the officers of the ground forces reached 973 thousand people. {48} According to the reports of the ground forces available to us about the irretrievable losses of privates and officers, the share of commanders in irretrievable losses was 3.36%. {49} In this case, the irretrievable losses of all the ground forces of the Red Army, corresponding to the irretrievable losses of officers in 973 thousand . people can be estimated at 28.96 million people, while according to our estimate, the irretrievable losses in dead and prisoners reached 28.5 million people. In fact, our estimate, which spreads data on the ratio of losses of commanders and privates from combat reports of troops to all ground forces, overestimates the total volume of losses, since in the special branches of the military and in the rear units the proportion of officers and, accordingly, the proportion of losses among them was higher. Thus, in the infantry / during the war the term "rifle troops" was used / the irretrievable losses of officers amounted to 570 thousand people, which could correspond to the total irretrievable losses of infantry in 16.96 million people. In this case, the remaining 458 thousand officers of other military branches who died on the battlefield or died from wounds, illnesses or in captivity should account for the total irretrievable losses of the corresponding military branches of 9.5 million people, if our estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces is correct. A force of 26.4 million who died on the battlefield, died from wounds, diseases, accidents and in captivity. Then in all branches of the military, except for the infantry, there are on average 19.7 privates per dead officer, 28.8 privates in the infantry, and 24.7 privates in general for the armed forces. If, however, to the irretrievable losses of officers we add 150 thousand survivors of captivity, and to the total irretrievable losses - 2.1 million prisoners who survived the war, then there will be 23.2 privates per irretrievably lost officer, since, obviously, the chances of surviving in captivity an officer had more than a private. No

In the German armed forces, the ratio of the number of officers and soldiers in irretrievable losses is close to those established for the Red Army. Thus, the total irretrievable losses of the officers of the German ground forces in the period from September 1, 1939 to December 31, 1944 amounted to 95.1 thousand people, and the total irretrievable losses of the ground forces for the same period - 3360 thousand people, {50 } i.e., for one officer in irretrievable losses, there were 34.3 privates, and given that the German army also had military officials, who in the Red Army corresponded to officers of the legal, administrative, medical and veterinary services (by the beginning of the war in the German active army had 23 thousand military officials for 81.3 thousand officers), {51} then the ratio between the irretrievable losses of officers and soldiers for the Wehrmacht will be even closer to the corresponding indicator we derived for the Red Army.

### 3. Losses of the civilian population and total losses of the population of the USSR Regarding the

losses of the Soviet civilian population in 1941-1945. there are no reliable statistics. They can be determined only by estimation, by first establishing the total irretrievable losses of the entire Soviet population, and then subtracting from them the irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces established by us above at 26.4 million people. To find out the total Soviet casualties during the war years, it is necessary to compare the population of the USSR on the eve and after the war. As of June 22, 1941, we have already estimated the population of the USSR at 209.3 million people. The population of the country as of January 1, 1946 is estimated at 167 million people, based on data on the population in 1950, the birth rate and death rate of the population in the same year, since the data of the first post-war years on the size and natural movement of the population do not seem reliable due to the imperfection of accounting and large mechanical movements of the population in the process of the return of residents to territories liberated from occupation, which lasted for several years, or, conversely, the movement of the population from war-torn areas inland, as well as the return of demobilized military personnel.{52}



In this regard, it should be taken into account that during the period from June 22, 1941 to January 1, 1946, the territory of the USSR grew due to the annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine, whose population numbered about 800 thousand people. {53} Significant groups of Russian emigrants from European countries and from China - up to 50 thousand people. In addition, up to 250,000 Armenians voluntarily returned to their homeland.{54} On the other hand, about 620,000 former Soviet prisoners of war and civilians who were taken to work in Germany, as well as those who left with the German army, preferred to stay in the West.{ 55} In general, the increase in the population of the USSR due to the increase in territory and migrations can thus be estimated by 1950 at 480 thousand people. With this in mind, the estimate of the population of the USSR on January 1, 1946 should be reduced from 167 million to 166.6 million people to the number of those inhabitants of the USSR who lived within the borders of the USSR on June 22, 1941 and actually remained on the same territory by January 1, 1946. In order to determine the total human losses of the USSR during the war, including both the irretrievable losses of the army and the losses of the civilian population due to hostilities, repression by the German and Soviet authorities and increased mortality due to the deterioration caused by the war living conditions, it is necessary to subtract from 166.5 million people the value of natural population growth for 1944-1945. and the size of the natural increase in the population of the non-occupied territories for 1942-1943. This increase, which actually took place, was ultimately "eaten up" by the huge losses of the armed forces and the population of the occupied territories. We must also subtract the natural increase for the second half of 1941 and the first quarter of 1942, when there was still no drop in the birth rate caused by the war. To determine the specified conditional natural increase, the pre-war mortality rate must be deducted from the actual birth rate achieved (mortality exceeding this level refers to excess wartime mortality). Note that it is not entirely correct to take the 1940 mortality rate as the pre-war mortality rate, since it was influenced by irretrievable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to our estimates, out of 135 thousand who died in this war, about 110 thousand, given the intensity of the fighting, can be attributed to the losses of 1940,

due to which the death rate this year increased by 0.05%. Consequently, the "normal" pre-war mortality rate can be estimated not at 1.80% of actual mortality in 1950, but at 1.75%. natural increase in 1940. amounted to 1.32% with a death rate of 1.80% and a birth rate of 3.12%, adjusted for losses during the war with Finland, the increase in peacetime can be estimated at 1.37%. In 1946, the first post-war year, the natural increase reached 1.30% (with a birth rate of 2.38 and a death rate of 1.08%). the amount of the corrected natural increase in 1940, which in absolute terms will give about 2.8 million people, and in the second half of the year - about 1.4 million people. The conditional increase for the first quarter of 1942 can be estimated at one quarter of the conditional increase in 1941, that is, at 0.7 million people. The conditional natural increase in 1945 (with the exception of the losses of the last months of the war from the calculations) can be approximately taken equal to the natural increase in 1946, i.e. 1.30%, or about 2.1 million people.

However, in relation to the second, third and fourth quarters of 1942, 1943 and 1944. we can talk about a conditional natural decline in the population, since during this period the birth rate fell below the pre-war death rate. So, in Siberia in 1940, the death rate was 2.03%, and the birth rate in 1943 was reached 2.15, in 1943 - 1.23 and in 1944 1.25%. Assuming that in the 1st quarter the birth rate remained the same as in 1941 - 3.32% on an annualized basis, for the remaining months of 1942 we get a birth rate of 1.76% on an annualized basis. In total, for the last three quarters of 1942 and for 1943 and 1944. the difference between the birth rate and the pre-war mortality rate in Siberia turned out to be 1.428 times greater than the pre-war mortality rate. If we assume that the total difference between the actual birth rate and the pre-war mortality rate for the country as a whole was approximately in the same proportion, then in order to determine the conditional natural decline in the population for the period from the beginning of April 1942 to the end of 1944, an adjusted mortality rate of 1940 is needed in 1.75%, multiply by 1.428 and relate it to the average population of the USSR during the war, obtained as the average population of the country at the end of June 1941 (209.3 million people).

people) and in May 1945 (165.6 million people), and from the obtained value - 187.4 million, it is necessary to first subtract the average number of armed forces - 11.4 million people. As a result, according to our estimates, the conditional natural decline in the population will be about 4.4 million people, that is, 0.2 million people more than the total conditional natural increase during the war years. However, there is another factor that contributed to the increase in population compared to pre-war levels. The fact is that in the rear areas in 1943-1944. the death rate also fell well below pre-war levels. For example, in Siberia in 1943 it was 1.84, and in 1944 it was only 1.29%.<sup>{57}</sup> reaches 45.8% of the pre-war level. The paradoxical drop in the death rate in the rear areas during the war years is explained by a sharp decrease in child mortality due to a decrease in the birth rate and the start of the widespread use of antibiotics, which reduced both child and general mortality rates. Let us assume that such an effect took place not only in Siberia, but also in all non-occupied territories, where half of the country's population lived. After deducting the population of the occupied territories and the military personnel, the value of this increase can be obtained by multiplying the adjusted 1940 mortality rate of 1.75% by 0.458 and referring the resulting coefficient to the average population for the years of the war without military personnel, which gives 176 million people, after which the result should be halved. It turns out the value of a conditional natural increase in the rear areas due to a decrease in mortality by 0.7 million people. As a result, the figure of 166.5 million people must be reduced by 0.5 million people - to 166 million due to the total excess of the conditional natural increase over the conditional natural decline in the population.

In the occupied territories and in the frontline, a particularly strong decline in the birth rate was observed in large cities. So, in besieged Leningrad in 1943, the birth rate fell to zero. In Moscow from 1941 to 1943. the birth rate decreased by 2.6 times. In occupied Dnepropetrovsk in 1942, the level

the birth rate reached only 34% of the pre-war level.<sup>{58}</sup> At the same time, in the occupied countryside, where a significant part of the townspeople moved in search of food, the fall in the birth rate was probably not so significant. The effect of reducing mortality from natural causes could also be observed here, due to a decrease in the birth rate and a fall in the infant mortality rate for this reason. In addition, many residents of the occupied territories and the frontline died from causes related to the war - during hostilities or as a result of repression by the occupying authorities, which reduced their likelihood of dying of natural causes. The total value of the military losses of the population of the USSR can be obtained by subtracting 166

million people from 209.3 million people, which gives 43.3 million dead. Subtracting from this last number the irretrievable losses of the army - 26.4 million people, we get the irretrievable losses of the civilian population - 16.9 million, which turn out to be comparable to the losses of the armed forces. We also note that in the losses of the civilian population of military age, a significant predominance of women is inevitable, since in connection with the conscription of the vast majority of men of the corresponding ages into the army, the probability of death of women among civilians of these ages has increased. Such a phenomenon was observed in Germany, where, according to the results of the Allied air raids, "in all age groups, losses among women exceed those among men by approximately 40%". is not possible, since the female preponderance is significantly reduced due to civilian losses. A significant number of women (between 490,000 and 530,000) were drafted into the army, and many of them died, <sup>{60}</sup> which also helped to reduce the post-war female preponderance. At present, it is not possible to divide the losses of the civilian population into various categories: those who died during the hostilities, became victims of German repressions, excess deaths from starvation and disease, victims of Soviet repressions (excessive deaths and executions in prisons and camps, those who died during the deportation of "punished peoples", as well as as a result

repressions against collaborators and members of their families), etc. According to some estimates, more than 2 million Jews became victims of the German genocide on the territory of the USSR, some of whom were not Soviet citizens, but were deported from Poland, Germany and other European countries for destruction in camps and ghettos in the occupied Soviet territory.<sup>{61}</sup> Hundreds of thousands of gypsies also died during the genocide. The excess death rate of prisoners in Soviet camps during the war years (in comparison with the pre-war level of 1940) amounted to at least 391,000 people.<sup>{62}</sup>

The potential losses of the population of the USSR were also great - for. account of those who could have been born in 1942-1945. in the event that there was no war, but was not born due to the fall in the birth rate caused by the war. We agree with the opinion of V. A. Isupov that when assessing potential losses, one should proceed not from the actual natural increase of 1.32%, but from the adjusted natural increase of 1.5% (when adjusting, the influence of the losses of the Soviet-Finnish war and the fall of due to the already begun diversion of men into the army in connection with partial mobilization and an accelerated increase in the number of Soviet Armed Forces).<sup>{63}</sup> With such a natural increase from June 22, 1941 to January 1, 1946, the population of the USSR would increase from 209.3 million to 223.6 million. In reality, within the former borders, taking into account the displaced persons who remained in the West, the population of the USSR as of January 1, 1946, totaled only 166.5 million people. If we reduce the resulting difference between the expected and actual population - 57.1 million people - by the military losses of 43.3 million people defined above, then we get 13.8 million people - potential losses due to the unborn. If we add the irretrievable losses of the army in 1939-1940. and in the war with Japan, then the total irretrievable losses of the USSR in World War II will amount to 43.448 million people.

#### 4. Losses of the Wehrmacht and the civilian population of

Germany The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht up to November 1944 are quite fully taken into account according to the data of personal (by name) registration of losses. In the period from September 1, 1939 to December 31, 1944, the ground forces lost 1750.3 thousand people killed on the battlefield, as well as those who died from wounds, illnesses, accidents and other reasons, and 1609 missing, 7 thousand people. Fleet for this

the same period lost 60 thousand people dead and 100.3 thousand people missing, and the air force - 155 thousand dead and 148.5 thousand missing. Losses for the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945 by the central loss accounting bodies were estimated for the ground forces at 250 thousand dead and 1 million missing, for the Navy - at 5 thousand dead and 5 thousand missing, and for the Air Force - 10,000 dead and 7,000 missing.{64} According to the nature of the calculations, all those missing in the ground forces in the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945 can be classified as prisoners. Also, most of the missing during this period in the Navy and Air Force can be considered prisoners. It is more difficult with those who went missing before the end of 1944. The number of dead among them can be estimated by subtracting from the total number of missing in the ground forces during this period the approximate number of prisoners captured by Germany's enemies. It is known that in May 1943 in Tunisia, the German ground forces lost about 90 thousand prisoners. From June to December, more than 210 thousand people were taken prisoner on the Western Front, and about 20 thousand people in Italy. {65} The number of missing people in the East until January 1945 amounted to 1 million people, while the number of prisoners can be estimated at 544 thousand people. This figure is obtained by subtracting from the total number of prisoners captured by the Red Army until the end of 1944 (997 thousand people), 202 thousand Romanians, 49 thousand Italians and 2 thousand Finns (all of them could only be captured before the end of 1944 .), as well as 200,000 of the 514,000 Hungarian soldiers taken prisoner.{66} In this case, about 456,000 missing in the East before the end of 1944 should be attributed to the dead. In other theaters of the war, out of 610,000 soldiers of the ground forces who went missing by the end of 1944, about 290,000 could be classified as killed. This gives the number of dead in the ground forces from the beginning of the war to the end of 1944 at 2,496,000. In the Navy, of the missing, we conditionally attribute nine-tenths to the dead sailors who sank along with their ships. In this case, the total number of deaths in the fleet up to the end of 1944 can be estimated at 150 thousand people. In the Air Force, we conditionally accept that half of the missing can be attributed to the dead, and the other half to prisoners, then the total number of deaths in German aviation until the end of 1944 can be estimated at 229

thousand people. In the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945, we conventionally classify all those missing in the Air Force and Navy as prisoners. We estimate the losses killed in May 1945 at 10 thousand people, mainly from the ground forces. Then the total number of deaths in the ground forces should be estimated at 2756 thousand, in the Navy - at 155 thousand and in the Air Force - at 239 thousand people, and for the Wehrmacht as a whole (together with the SS troops) - at 3.15 million people. Losses by prisoners until the end of April 1945 are estimated at 1854 thousand for the ground forces, 15 thousand for the Navy and 81 thousand for the Air Force. The calculation of losses by prisoners for the next days of the war loses its meaning in connection with the beginning of the mass surrender of the

entire German army. In the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945, out of 1 million prisoners from the ground forces, 615 thousand were taken on the Western Front (290 thousand in January-March and 325 thousand in April in the Ruhr pocket), { 67} the number of prisoners in Italy can be estimated at 10,000; the remaining 375,000 prisoners were taken on the Eastern Front. During this period, we also attribute half of the prisoners from the fleet and one third of the prisoners from the Air Force to the share of the Eastern Front - about 5 thousand people in total. Human.

In total, 2.73 million former servicemen of the German army (2.390 million Germans, 157 thousand Austrians, the rest - Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, French, Yugoslavs, etc.) were in Soviet captivity, of which 450.6 thousand died in captivity. Human. In addition, Soviet troops captured about 215,000 former Soviet citizens who served in collaborationist formations or as support personnel ("volunteers") in German units. It should be noted that after the German capitulation on May 9 and later, 1391 thousand people surrendered to the Red Army, and earlier, in the period from May 1 to May 8, according to some information, 635 thousand people. {68} The total number of German soldiers killed in captivity is estimated by experts German tracing service at 800,000 people. {69} Taking into account the data on the number of those killed in Soviet captivity, the number of prisoners of war who died in captivity in the West can be approximately estimated at 350,000 people. In total, according to our estimates, about 3950 thousand Wehrmacht servicemen died in the war, including Austrians, Czechs, Poles, Baltic states and other citizens of the USSR and other countries who served in the German armed forces. This

the estimate practically coincides with the estimate of B. Müller-Hillebrand - 4 million

dead. {70} The irretrievable losses of the German civilian population during the war years are estimated at approximately 2 million people. This includes those who died as a result of ground fighting in the last period of the war, as well as approximately 500,000 victims of strategic bombing by allied aircraft and 300,000 German citizens (anti-fascists, Jews and gypsies) who died in concentration camps or were executed by the Nazis.{71} Total irretrievable Germany's losses - 5.95 million people turned out to be 7.3 times less than Soviet irretrievable losses - 43.448 million people. In terms of irretrievable losses of the civilian population, the ratio is even less favorable for the USSR - 8.5:1. This was affected by the large losses of the Soviet population during the hostilities, which lasted much longer on the territory of the USSR than on German territory, the Nazi genocide against Jews and Gypsies and their cruel repressions against the civilian population, especially in areas covered by partisan struggle, as well as significant excess mortality. of the Soviet population from starvation and disease, primarily in the territories that were occupied (in Germany, which practically did not starve until the end of the war, there was no such excess mortality). It should be noted that the mortality among German prisoners of war both in the East and in the West, although it was significant, was far from reaching the level of mortality of Soviet prisoners of war, of whom almost two-thirds died. Here, first of all, the inhuman attitude of the German camp administration towards the captured Red Army soldiers who did not fall under the Geneva Convention, as well as the calculation of a lightning war, in which the use of prisoners for military purposes was not provided, affected. The argument about the large number of Soviet prisoners, especially in 1941-1942, as the reason for the increased mortality among them, is hardly fair, since in the last months of the war and immediately after the surrender of German prisoners in the hands of the Allies, it turned out to be no less, but the difficulties of their maintenance and supplies were generally overcome, although among individual groups of prisoners taken in extreme conditions and after a long



blockade, the mortality rate was very high: most of the prisoners taken in Stalingrad and Tunisia did not return home.

5. On the ratio of losses on the Soviet-German front Let us now try to determine the ratio of irretrievable losses on the Soviet-German front. To do this, it is necessary to assess the losses of the Wehrmacht in the fight against the USSR, as well as the losses of Germany's allies. By the beginning of December 1944, the German land army had lost 1,420,000 dead in the East. Approximately 456 thousand more people from among the missing in the East before the end of 1944, according to our estimates, should be attributed to the dead. Of the 250 thousand servicemen of the ground forces who died between January 1 and April 30, 1945, about 180 thousand deaths can be attributed to the share of the Eastern Front, taking into account the share of German divisions deployed against the USSR during this period. In addition, almost all of the 10,000 servicemen of the ground forces who died in May 1945 should be attributed to the losses of the Eastern Front, since hostilities in the West had practically ceased at that time. In total, in the struggle against the USSR, thus, 2066 thousand servicemen of the ground forces died. The losses of the Navy in the East until the end of January 1945, including losses in the Polish campaign of 1939, amounted to 5.8 thousand dead and 3.8 thousand missing, which amounted to less than one fifteenth of all irretrievable losses of the fleet during this period. The Air Force at the same time lost 52.9 thousand dead and 49.2 thousand missing in the East, which accounted for 34% of all irretrievable losses of the Air Force. If we take the losses of the Air Force, differentiated by theaters of operations, then the share of the East (albeit together with losses in the war against Poland) rises to 38%, which approximately corresponds to the contribution of the Soviet Air Force to the war in the air.<sup>{72}</sup> Taking into account the ratio adopted above between those killed and captured among the missing in the Navy and Air Force, the number of those killed in the Air Force in the East until the end of January 1945, we estimate at 77.5 thousand people, and in the Navy - at 9.2 thousand people. Accordingly, we define losses in the Navy in the East from February 1 to April 30, 1945 at 1 thousand people, and in the Air Force - at 3 thousand people, referring all those missing to prisoners. Thus, we estimate the total losses of the German Air Force in the East at 80.5 thousand, and the Navy - at 10.2 thousand people, which

on the German front of the German military in 2157 thousand German prisoners until April 30, 1945, the Red Army captured about 950 thousand people, including up to 30 thousand pilots and sailors. Taking into account the losses of the allies, the overall ratio of the irretrievable losses of the parties on the Soviet-German front by the dead and prisoners taken before the end of April 1945 turns out to be 6.5:1, not in favor of the Red Army. If we take the ratio of only the dead, then it will turn out to be even less favorable for the Soviet side - 8.5: 1.<sup>{73}</sup> In some ways, this ratio, perhaps even more objectively reflects the level of military skill of the parties, since most of the prisoners were captured by the Red Army. Army in the last months of the war, when its outcome was no longer in doubt.

It is interesting to trace at least an approximate ratio of the losses of the parties over the years of the war. Using the ratio established above between the number of dead and injured in the battles of Soviet military personnel and based on the data given in the book of E. I. Smirnov, the number of dead Soviet military personnel by years can be distributed as follows:

1941 - 2.2 million, 1942 - 8 million, 1943 - 6.4 million, 1944 - 6.4 million, 1945 - 2.5 million. take into account that approximately 0.9 million Red Army soldiers who were listed as irretrievable losses, but later found out in the liberated territory and called up again, fall mainly in 1941-1942. Due to this, we reduce the losses by those who died in 1941 by 0.6 million, and in 1942 by 0.3 million people (in proportion to the number of prisoners) and with the addition of prisoners we get the total irretrievable losses of the Red Army by years: 1941 - 5.5 million, 1942 - 7.153 million, 1943 - 6.965 million, 1944 - 6.547 million, 1945 - 2.534 million. based on the data of B. Müller-Gillebrand. At the same time, we subtracted from the final figures the losses suffered outside the Eastern Front, tentatively spreading them over the years. The result was the following picture for the Eastern Front (in parentheses is the figure of the total irretrievable losses of ground forces for the year): 1941 (since June) - 301 thousand (307 thousand), 1942 - 519 thousand (538 thousand), 1943 - 668 thousand (793 thousand), 1944 (for this year, losses in December are taken equal to January) - 1129 thousand (1629 thousand), 1945 (before May 1) - 550 thousand ( 1250 thousand).<sup>{74}</sup> The ratio in all cases is obtained in

in favor of the Wehrmacht: 1941 - 18.1: 1, 1942 - 13.7: 1, 1943 - 10.4: 1, 1944 - 5.8: 1, 1945 - 4.6 :1. These ratios should be close to the true ratios of the irretrievable losses of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front, since the losses of the ground army amounted to the lion's share of all Soviet military losses, and much larger than that of the Wehrmacht, and the German aviation and navy were the main irretrievable losses in during the war suffered outside the Eastern Front. As for the losses of the German allies in the East, the underestimation of which somewhat worsens the performance of the Red Army, it should be taken into account that in the fight against them the Red Army suffered relatively much fewer losses than in the fight against the Wehrmacht, that the German allies did not act actively in all periods war and suffered the greatest loss of prisoners as part of the general capitulations (Romania and Hungary). In addition, the losses of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian units operating together with the Red Army were not taken into account on the Soviet side. So, in general, the ratios we have identified should be fairly objective. They show that the improvement in the ratio of irretrievable losses for the Red Army occurs only from 1944, when the Allies landed in the West and lend-lease assistance already gave the maximum effect in terms of both direct deliveries of weapons and equipment, and the deployment of Soviet military production. The Wehrmacht was forced to abandon its reserves to the West and was no longer able, as in 1943, to unleash active operations in the East. In addition, there were heavy losses of experienced soldiers and officers. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the ratio of losses remained unfavorable for the Red Army due to its inherent vices (temporality, contempt for human life, inept use of weapons and equipment, lack of continuity of experience due to huge losses and inept use of marching replacements, etc. ).

At the same time, in the war against the Western Allies in 1943-1945. according to our estimates, Germany was losing more than the enemy. Even in terms of the dead, the ratio as a whole turns out to be 1.6:1 in favor of the allies, not to mention their superiority in the number of prisoners by dozens of times. Only in Italy was the ratio of losses equal, which can be explained by the conditions of the theater, favorable for defense, and

by the art of war of the German commander at this theater, Field Marshal A. Kesselring.{75}  
We also note that in the German army until the

end of 1944, for 2496 thousand dead (according to our estimate) from the ground forces, there were 5026 thousand wounded who were evacuated, {76} which gives an equal to dead ratio of 2.0:1. In the Red Army, according to our estimates, the ratio of the number of those who were stricken in battle, evacuated, and the number of dead was almost equal - 1.1:1. The significantly higher number of deaths in relation to the wounded on the Soviet side can be explained by the ruthless attitude of the Soviet command towards its soldiers, when regiments and battalions were completely killed in senseless frontal attacks on the unsuppressed German defense system, which disproportionately increased the share of irretrievable losses in the overall structure of losses. In the German armed forces, the number of patients who were evacuated - treated in hospitals, was 2.1 times greater than the number of wounded and frostbite, and if we add the victims of accidents to the sick, then 2.3 times, {77} while in the USSR, the number of those evacuated, those injured in battles, exceeded the number of evacuated patients by 3.3 times. The fact is that the combat losses of the Red Army many times exceeded the combat losses of the Wehrmacht, more than half of those mobilized into the Soviet Armed Forces died or were captured. The number of patients depended on the total number of the active army, which was close to each other on both sides. At the same time, a Red Army soldier was much more likely to be killed, wounded or captured than sick, while in the Wehrmacht, on the contrary, a soldier was more likely to get sick than get injured. We also note that the irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany are of different order values. Therefore, if our estimates of German losses can deviate from the true value in one direction or another within 200-300 thousand people, then in the case of the Red Army, such a discrepancy can be calculated

millions of people.

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The ratio of irretrievable losses of the parties on the Soviet German front indicates a large numerical superiority

Red Army over the Wehrmacht. If we take into account that about three-quarters of all irretrievable losses Germany suffered on the Eastern Front, then the number of military personnel (including the personnel of the central and rear bodies in Germany) who fought against the Red Army can be estimated at three-quarters of the net conscription, which amounted to 15.9 million people, which makes 12 million people, and this figure must be reduced by a significant part of the 1.63 million demobilized from the Wehrmacht for age or other reasons. The contribution of Germany's allies was less significant, and they did not participate in active hostilities for the entire duration of the Soviet-German war. Taking into account these circumstances, the total number of mobilized, actually put up by Germany and its allies against the Soviet 42.9 million mobilized, can be determined at no more than 14 million people. It should be noted that from 1 to 1.5 million Soviet servicemen during the war were outside the Soviet-German front - in the Far East, Iran and Transcaucasia, but this was an insignificant part of all those mobilized. In terms of the total number of mobilized, the USSR retained more than a threefold superiority, which increased even more in combat units. The demographic structure of the Soviet population also contributed to this superiority. According to American military historians T. N. Dupuy and P. Martell, by the beginning of 1941, 4/5 of the male population of the USSR was under 40 years old, while in Germany this proportion did not exceed 3/5. {78} At the same time, a comparison of the number of active armies of the USSR and Germany (together with the allies) on certain dates does not give an objective picture, since the conditions of the front did not allow more than 6 million people from each side to be held against each other at the same time. Otherwise, troop control and deployment would be difficult. However, the numerical superiority of the Red Army was manifested in the fact that the complete change of troops at the front took place much faster on the Soviet side than on the German side, due to significantly greater losses. Therefore, in our opinion, it would be objective to compare the number of troops at the front for some significant period of time, on the order of 2-3 months, taking into account all marching replenishments and reserves, which can more clearly highlight the overwhelming Soviet superiority in manpower.

Explaining the enormous Soviet casualties, German generals usually point to the neglect of the lives of soldiers by the high command, the poor tactical training of the middle and lower command personnel, the stereotyped methods used during the offensive, the inability of both commanders and soldiers to make independent decisions. {79} Similar statements can be it would be considered a simple attempt to belittle the dignity of the enemy, who nevertheless won the war, if not for numerous similar testimonies from the Soviet side. So, Zhores Medvedev recalls the battles near Novorossiysk in 1943: "The Germans near Novorossiysk had two lines of defense, perfectly fortified to a depth of about 3 km. It was believed that artillery preparation was very effective, but it seems to me that the Germans quickly adapted to it. Noticing that the equipment was concentrating and powerful shooting began, they went to the second line, leaving only a few machine gunners on the front line. They left and, with the same interest as we, observed all this noise and smoke. Then we were ordered to go forward. We walked were blown up by mines and occupied the trenches almost empty, only two or three corpses were lying there. Then the order was given to attack the second line. It was then that up to 80 percent of the attackers died - the Germans, after all, were sitting in well-fortified structures and shot all of us almost at close range " .{80} The American diplomat A. Harriman conveys Stalin's words that "in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to advance" and comments on it this way: "This phrase of Stalin shows well that he was aware of the state of affairs in the army . We were shocked, but we understood that this forced the Red Army to fight ... Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive thing in the Russian offensive was its mass character. The Russians came wave after wave. The Germans literally mowed them down, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through."{81} And here is the testimony of the battles in December 1943 in Belarus of the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: "A chain of people in civilian clothes with huge "siders" behind their backs. "Slavs, who are you, where are you from?" I asked. "We are from the Oryol region, replenishment. "What kind of replenishment, when in civilian clothes and without rifles?" "Yes, they said that you would get in battle ..."

The artillery strike on the enemy lasted five minutes. 36 guns of the artillery regiment "hollowed" the front line of the Germans. From the discharges of shells, visibility became

even worse ... And now the attack. The chain rose, writhing like a black, curved snake. Behind her is the second. And those black snakes writhing and moving were so absurd, so unnatural on the gray-white earth! Black on snow is a perfect target. And the German "watered" these chains with dense lead. Many firing points came to life. Large-caliber machine guns fired from the second line of the trench. The chains are stuck. The battalion commander yelled: "Forward, ... fuck you! Forward! ... Into battle! Forward! I'll shoot!" But it was impossible to get up. Try to tear yourself off the ground under

artillery, machine-gun and automatic fire... The commanders still managed to raise the "black" village infantry several times. But all in vain. The enemy fire was so dense that, after running a couple of steps, people fell as if they had been cut down. We, the gunners, also could not reliably help - there was no visibility, the Germans camouflaged the firing points, and, most likely, the main machine-gun fire was fired from bunkers, and therefore the firing of our guns did not give

the desired results. "The same memoirist very colorfully describes the much-praised many memoirists from among the marshals and generals reconnaissance in battle, carried out by a battalion of penalists: "Two divisions of our regiment participated in a ten-minute fire raid - and that's it. There was silence for a few seconds after the fire. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: "Guys! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Follow me! Hooray!" The penitentiaries slowly crawled out of the trench and, as if waiting for the last, throwing their rifles at the ready, ran. A groan or a cry with a drawn-out "a-a-a" poured from left to right and again to the left, now fading, now intensifying. We also jumped out of the trench and ran forward. The Germans threw a series of red rockets towards the attackers and immediately opened a powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, we also lay down - a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. I couldn't raise my head. How to detect and to whom to detect enemy targets in this hell? His artillery hit from covered positions and far from the flanks. They also beat heavy guns. Several tanks fired at direct fire, their blank shells whining overhead...

Penal boxes lay in front of the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German "threshed" this field, plowing the earth, and bushes, and the bodies of people ... Only seven of us with a battalion of penal boxes left, and there were all together - 306 { 82} (there was no attack in

this area) ". We have a story about such senseless and bloody attacks both in the memoirs and in the letters of German soldiers and junior officers. One anonymous witness describes the attack of units of the 37th Soviet Army A. A. Vlasov to the height near Kiev occupied by the Germans in August 1941, and his description in detail coincides with the story of the Soviet officer given above. trying to raise his people and dying from a German bullet. Such attacks on a not very important height continued for three days in a row. German soldiers were most amazed that when the whole wave died, single soldiers still continued to run forward (the Germans were incapable of such senseless actions) . These failed attacks nevertheless exhausted the Germans physically. And, as the German soldier recalls, he and his comrades were most shocked and depressed by the methodicalness and scale of these attacks: "If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate such insignificant results of our advance, then how often and how many will they attack people if the object is really very important?" {83} (the German author could not imagine that the Red Army simply could not and could not attack otherwise). And in the letter of a German soldier home during the retreat from Kursk in the second half of 1943, as in the quoted letter of V. Dyatlov, an attack by almost unarmed and non-equipped reinforcements from the newly liberated territories (the same Oryol region) is described, in which the overwhelming majority of most of the

participants (according to an eyewitness - even women were among those called). The prisoners said that the authorities suspected the inhabitants of collaborating with the occupying authorities, and mobilization served as a form of punishment for them. And in the same letter the attack is described



Soviet penalists through a German minefield to blow up mines at the cost of their own lives (the story of Marshal G.K. Zhukov about this practice of the Soviet troops is cited in his memoirs by D. Eisenhower). And again, the German soldier was most struck by the obedience of the mobilized and the penalized. Prisoners of the penal, "with rare exceptions, never complained about such treatment", said that life is difficult and that "mistakes must be paid for." {84} capable of giving such inhuman orders, but also soldiers capable of following such orders unquestioningly. The inability of the Red Army to fight otherwise than at the cost of very large bloodshed is also evidenced by high-ranking Soviet military leaders.

Thus, Marshal A.I. Eremenko characterizes the features of the "art of war" of the famous (deservedly?) "Marshal of Victory" G.K. , otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight not in quantity and builds his career on blood ". {84a} By the way, in another case, the same A. I. Eremenko conveyed his impression of acquaintance with the memoirs of German generals: " The question naturally arises, why did the Nazi "heroes", who "defeated" our squad together, and five together a whole platoon, failed to complete the tasks in the first period of the war, when undeniable numerical and technical superiority was on their side? , the irony here is ostentatious, because A. I. Eremenko actually knew well that the German military leaders did not exaggerate the balance of forces in favor of the Red Army. After all, G.K. Zhukov led the main operations in the main directions and had an overwhelming superiority of forces and means. Another thing is that other Soviet generals and marshals were hardly able to fight differently than G.K. Zhukov, and A.I. Eremenko himself was no exception here.

It is interesting that, just like G.K. Zhukov, generals fought who had a reputation for caring about the lives of their subordinates, in particular, K.K. Rokossovsky. In November 1941, near Moscow, he sent the 58th Panzer Division into battle, which had just arrived from the Far East and did not have time to

preparing an attack. As a result, the division lost 3/4 of its tanks and almost a third of its personnel, inflicting almost no damage to the enemy. At the same time, Rokossovsky organized a crazy attack in the cavalry formation of two cavalry divisions, the 17th and 44th, which lost almost all of their personnel as a result. A vivid description of this attack from the German side has been preserved, extremely reminiscent of Lermontov's "Borodino": "... I could not believe that the enemy intended to attack us on this wide field, intended only for parades ... But then three lines of horsemen moved towards us. Riders with shining blades rushed to the attack across the space lit by the winter sun, bending down to the necks of their horses... The first shells exploded in the midst of the attackers... Soon a solid black cloud hung over them. to make out where the horsemen are, where the horses are... Crazy horses rushed about in this hell. The few surviving horsemen were finished off by artillery and machine gun fire... the performance will be repeated again... However, the area has already been shot, and the death of the second wave of cavalry occurred even faster than the first. {84c} Comments on this terrible document, as they say, are superfluous. We only note that dashing cavalry attacks during the civil war in the Great Patriotic War were repeated not by S. M. Budyonny, who is traditionally credited with a passion for cavalry and a misunderstanding of the essence of modern warfare, but by K. K. Rokossovsky, who is considered one of the greatest commanders of the Second World War. Semyon Mikhailovich just understood that it was impossible to throw cavalry on the enemy's defenses prepared in advance, having understood this well back in 1920 on the Polish front. And for Budyonny similar attacks in 1941-1942. not listed. We also note that the huge irretrievable losses of the Red Army did not allow, to the same extent as in the Wehrmacht, and even more so in the armies of the Western allies, to retain experienced soldiers and junior commanders, which reduced the soldering and stamina of the units and did not allow replenishment fighters to learn combat experience from veterans , which further increased the losses. Such an unfavorable ratio of irretrievable losses for the USSR was the result of a fundamental defect of the communist totalitarian system, which deprived people

the ability to independently make decisions and act, which taught everyone, including the military, to act according to a template, to avoid even a reasonable risk and, more than the enemy, to be afraid of responsibility to their higher authorities.

As former intelligence officer E. I. Malashenko, who rose to the rank of lieutenant general after the war, recalls, even at the very end of the war, Soviet troops often acted very inefficiently: "A few hours before the onset of our division on March 10, a reconnaissance group ... captured a prisoner. showed that the main forces of his regiment were withdrawn 8-10 km in depth ... By telephone, I reported this information to the division commander, who - to the commander. The division commander gave us his car to deliver the prisoner to the army headquarters. Approaching the command post, we heard the rumble of the artillery preparation that had begun. Unfortunately, it was carried out on unoccupied positions. Thousands of shells delivered with great difficulty through the Carpathians (it happened on the 4th Ukrainian Front. - B. S.) turned out to be spent in vain. The surviving enemy stopped the advance with stubborn resistance our troops." The same author gives a comparative assessment of the combat qualities of German and Soviet soldiers and officers - not in favor of the Red Army: "German soldiers and officers fought well. The rank and file was well trained, skillfully acted in the offensive and in defense. a prominent role in combat than our sergeants, many of whom were almost indistinguishable from the rank and file. The enemy infantry constantly fired intensely, acted persistently and swiftly in the offensive, stubbornly defended and launched quick counterattacks, usually supported by artillery fire, and sometimes by strikes aircraft. Tankers also aggressively attacked, fired on the move and from short stops, skillfully maneuvered and conducted reconnaissance. In case of failure, they quickly concentrated efforts in another direction, often struck at the junctions and flanks of our units. Artillery quickly opened fire and sometimes led it very German officers skillfully organized the battle and controlled the actions of their subunits and units, skillfully used the terrain, and timely maneuvered in a favorable direction. With the threat of encirclement or defeat, German units and

units made an organized retreat in depth, usually to occupy a new line. Soldiers and officers of the enemy were frightened by rumors of reprisals against prisoners, they rarely surrendered without a fight ... Our infantry was trained weaker than the German one. However,

she fought bravely. Of course, there were cases of panic and premature withdrawal, especially at the beginning of the war. The infantry was greatly assisted by artillery, the most effective was the Katyusha fire when repelling enemy counterattacks and delivering strikes on areas of accumulation and concentration of troops. However, artillery in the initial period of the war had few shells. It must be admitted that the tank units in the attacks did not always act skillfully. At the same time, in the operational depth during the development of the offensive, they showed themselves brilliantly. "{84g} Even then, some Soviet generals recognized the prohibitively large losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War,

although this was by no means safe. For example, Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin, who previously commanded the army, and then was engaged in the preparation of reserves, had the imprudence to write in his diary that the Supreme High Command "does not care about maintaining human reserves and allows heavy losses in individual operations." This, along with others, "anti-Soviet" statement cost the general a sentence of 25 years in the camps. {84d} And another military leader, Major General of Aviation A. A. Turzhansky, in 1942 received only 12 years in the camps for a completely fair opinion about the reports of the Sovinformburo, which "are intended only to calm the masses and do not correspond reality, because they underestimate our losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy. "{84e}

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And here is how the Soviet and German sides assessed each other's losses during the war. For example, Hitler at a meeting on December 6, 1941 with the leadership of the ground forces estimated Russian losses at 8-10 million people. {85} According to our own estimate, by the beginning of December 1941, the Red Army had lost 3.9 million prisoners, 1775 thousand dead, about 1970 thousand people - evacuated, injured in battles and about 590 thousand - evacuated sick, and in total - 8235 thousand, which

coincides with the assessment given by Hitler. Stalin, in his famous speech on November 6, 1941, claimed that during the four months of the war, Soviet troops lost 350 thousand dead, 378 thousand missing and 1020 thousand wounded, which was 7-8 times less than actual losses. The losses of the German troops over the same period, he defined in more than 4.5 million killed, wounded and captured. In fact, the entire German land army in June, July, August, September and October 1941 lost 225.1 thousand people killed and missing, and the number of wounded according to the ratio of the wounded and dead, and the missing missing officers in 2.47 can be estimated at 456 thousand people, which in total gives losses almost 6.9 times less than those named by Stalin.<sup>{86}</sup> And it seems that Stalin and the Soviet military really believed such figures, because that the analysis of intelligence reports paints the same picture. At the end of the war, the German military attaché in

Bern reported to Berlin on March 19, 1945, the British estimate of Soviet deadweight losses of 30 million men,<sup>87</sup> which was probably a factor of 1.4 understating their true size. Soviet military intelligence estimated the losses of German troops in the war against the USSR from June 22, 1941 to March 1, 1942 at 6.5 million people, including 5.8 million from the ground forces. According to ten-day reports of losses during this period, the German ground forces in the East lost (without patients) 1005.6 thousand people. <sup>{88}</sup> striving to make them no less than their own. For example, the headquarters of the Western Front estimated the losses of the opposing enemy troops in April 1942 at 30.6 thousand dead and at least 89,400 wounded who were evacuated. The headquarters determined the losses of its troops at 45 thousand dead and missing and 74 thousand wounded. <sup>{89}</sup> In reality, in April 1942, the entire German land army in the East lost only 60 thousand people, including irretrievably (killed and prisoners) - 15.2 thousand people. <sup>{90}</sup> The Soviet leadership, not having accurate information about their losses, had an extremely exaggerated idea of the losses of the enemy, which led to major miscalculations in strategic planning. German command

led by Hitler, as a whole, had a close to reality idea of Soviet losses, but underestimated the ability of the Soviet system to mobilize the human potential of the country.

6. Why the USSR suffered the greatest losses in World War II The fact

that the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces were ten times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht requires explanation. After all, the Soviet-German war was essentially a grandiose battle between two totalitarian states, which ended for them with very different, even paradoxical results. Obviously, for all the similarity of the two totalitarian regimes, there were significant differences between them that influenced both the magnitude of military losses and the outcome of the war. Hitler and his party received in 1933 a much more industrialized, more capitalist and more civilized country than Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had in 1917. Germany had one of the world's oldest and most developed military traditions, which Hitler, who was preparing to war, did not destroy, but sought to preserve and increase. Nazi totalitarianism lasted only six years before the Second World War, including only from the middle of 1934 - under the conditions of its monopoly domination. During the war years, it was basically impossible to destroy the war machine and the military tradition. German totalitarianism was also in many respects softer than Soviet, retaining not only private property, but, despite all its ugly racial and misanthropic manifestations, a certain idea of the inherent value of human individuality among the majority of its subjects. As W. Shtrik-Shtrikfeldt correctly noted: "And the Nazi regime strove for totalitarian, all-encompassing power, but it had not yet reached the diabolical perfection of Stalinism. In the Third Reich, some foundations of the old state and social structure were still preserved; private initiative and private property; it was still possible to work and live independently of the state. The Germans could still express their opinion, if it did not agree with the official dogma, they could even, to a certain extent, act as they considered best. pressure and increased

tangibly ... but this form of lack of freedom in Germany was evaluated by the overwhelming majority of former Soviet citizens by the standards of the Stalinist regime of violence and therefore was perceived as freedom. And that was the big difference between us." {91}

Soviet totalitarianism was born much earlier than German - in November 1917, and from the middle of 1918 it already had a one-party monopoly on power. This power had to be defended in a bloody civil war. In the course of the socialist revolution and civil war, the communists were forced to basically destroy the former Russian military tradition, which, moreover, as the experience of the First World War showed, had previously been in a state of decline. A significant part of the professional military died in the civil war or from the Red Terror, many emigrated. Those who remained in the country were gradually forced out of the army and subjected to repression during the purges of the 1920s and 1930s. By 1939, the pre-revolutionary military intelligentsia had almost disappeared. Only a few of the officers - participants in the First World War occupied prominent positions in the Red Army (the most famous of them is the former tsarist colonel B. M. Shaposhnikov, who became a marshal and chief of the General Staff). A new significant military tradition was never created. Soviet totalitarianism was much more comprehensive than Nazi. He abolished not only private property, but virtually every possibility of individual initiative not sanctioned from above. Man has become a disenfranchised cog in the state machine, which maintained its stability with the help of terror. The life of the subjects, from the point of view of the ruling nomenklatura, was worth nothing. M. S. Voslensky, noting the similarity of the Soviet system with Eastern despotisms based on "universal slavery", mentions "giant armies of Eastern despots", which consisted of mobilized "pseudo-free" community members. {92} The Red Army was such a gigantic army of the "Eastern-despotic type", the bulk of the soldiers in which were disenfranchised, forcibly driven into collective farm communities, peasants and equally disenfranchised, workers attached to factories and factories as serfs (it is even difficult to call them "pseudo-free"). In such a system, only the military tradition based on

template, on copying the outdated tactical principles of the First World War (in particular, the offensive in "waves" of dense infantry chains) and oriented in advance to the possibility of unlimitedly sacrificing the lives of their own soldiers. Added to this was the lower educational level of the Soviet population and the general industrial backwardness of the USSR compared to Germany and the Western allies. The Soviet leadership was also aware of this backwardness. Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Stalin's deputy during the war years, said after the war that "we must not forget that we entered the war while still continuing to be an industrially backward country in comparison with Germany" and that Germany had a much higher "military potential , the level of industry, the level of industrial culture, the level of general preparedness for war." {93} Hitler, contrary to popular belief, sought to minimize the

human losses of the Wehrmacht, recognizing the limited human resources of Germany compared to its opponents, and also fearing public dissatisfaction with large losses (after all, he promised a "blitzkrieg" with little bloodshed). In "table talks" in his Headquarters, for example, he pointed out the need to recall skilled workers from the army in order to increase the production of weapons and equipment and thereby reduce the losses of the army, since "a skilled worker can work 360 days a year on creating the most perfect for of their time, and thereby save the lives of hundreds of soldiers." {94} Stalin also sometimes urged his subordinates to spare soldiers' lives, as, for example, in a telegram to the leadership of the southwestern direction of May 27, 1942: "Isn't it time for you to learn fight with little bloodshed, as the Germans do? You must fight not with numbers, but with skill ... Consider all this if you ever

want to learn how to defeat the enemy, and not give him an easy victory. Otherwise, the weapons you receive from the Headquarters, will fall into the hands of the enemy, as is happening now." However, much more often in Stalin's orders one hears the insistent "do not reckon with the victims." {95} The ratio of German and Soviet losses, which remained throughout the war, was extremely unfavorable for the Soviet



On the other hand, it proves that for the Red Army, in practice, only Stalin's calls to win, regardless of any losses, made sense. In the Wehrmacht, losses in the last years of the war increased, but this was the result of objective reasons: the growing superiority of the Allies in weapons and military equipment, the decrease in the proportion of experienced military personnel in the ranks of the German army, and Hitler's forced desire to hold territories even in an unfavorable operational environment in order to prolong resistance. In the Red Army, throughout the war, military equipment acted primarily not as a means of minimizing human losses, but as a kind of independent value, for the sake of preserving which it was not a pity to sacrifice human lives. One can recall at least the story of the same G. Zhukov to D. Eisenhower about how Soviet troops overcame minefields. First, infantrymen were let in, who, at the cost of their own lives, blew up anti-personnel mines, then sappers went into the formed passage, removing anti-tank mines, so that the tanks could overcome the minefield without loss. {96}

The relative military weakness of the USSR compared to Germany, paradoxically, helped Stalin win the war. In the choice between two totalitarian regimes, Western democracies inevitably had to take the side of the weakest, as representing the least threat to them, and thereby ensure his victory. The Western allies not only diverted to themselves a significant part of the German ground forces (in the last year of the war - up to 40%), almost the entire fleet and more than 2/3 of the German aviation, {97} but also ensured the ability of the Soviet Union to wage war with Lend-Lease supplies. Western deliveries provided the bulk of high-octane gasoline for Soviet aviation, more than half of all aluminum and copper consumed in the USSR during the war, almost completely covered the needs of Soviet railway transport. {98} substances. The role of Lend-Lease after the war in frank personal conversations recorded by the KGB was also recognized by Marshal G. Zhukov: "... The Americans drove us so many materials, without which we could not form our reserves and could not continue the war ... We received 350 thousand cars, but what

cars!.. We didn't have explosives, gunpowder. There was nothing to equip rifle cartridges. The Americans really helped us out with gunpowder and explosives. And how much they drove us sheet steel! How could we quickly start producing tanks if it weren't for American help with steel? And now the situation is presented in such a way that we had all this in abundance.”{99} For industrial backwardness, the inability to properly use the military equipment of the Red Army, one also had to pay with blood.

\* \* \*

The Soviet Union and Germany suffered the greatest losses in the Second World War, suffered them mainly in the struggle against each other. Now, half a century later, this can no longer, must not poison the relations between the German and Russian peoples. At one time, the Finnish Marshal K. G. Mannerheim, in an order for the army on March 13, 1940, on the day the Soviet-Finnish war ended, wrote: “More than 15 thousand of you who went to the battlefield will never see your hearths again, and how many of you have forever lost the ability to work! But you also dealt heavy blows to the enemies, and if 200 thousand of them lie in snowdrifts and look with unseeing eyes at our gloomy sky, it is not your fault. {100} These words the commander can be attributed to both Soviet and German soldiers of the Second World War, only thousands, unfortunately, have to be replaced by millions. Millions of soldiers on both sides are not responsible either for Hitler's desire for world domination and the implementation of his program of extermination of "racially inferior" peoples, nor for Stalin's expansionist policy and for the fact that the peoples of the USSR and Eastern Europe, liberated from German totalitarianism, immediately fell into the hands of Soviet totalitarianism. Table 2 Human losses of the USSR and Germany in the Second World War\* (thousand people). USSR Germany Loss ratio Total number of dead and dead 43448 5950 7.3:1 including civilians 16900 2000

8.5:1

including from the armed forces 26548 3950 6.7:1  
of

them

in the Soviet-German war 26400 2608 10.1:1

Potential losses (unborn) 13800 Number of  
prisoners\*\* 6306 1950 3.2:1

including in the Soviet-German war 6300 950 6.6:1

Died

in captivity 4000 800

5.0:1

including as a result of the Soviet-German war 4000 451

\*  
8.9:1 ., for Germany - and the borders on September 1, 1939, with the  
inclusion of Austria and the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

\*\*  
For Germany - in the period up to April 30, 1945.

Former German general 3. Westphal in the mid-50s. declared: "Now  
we must fight only to win the love and respect of our former enemies. If all  
civilized nations together win the world, then - and this is our consolation - 6  
million Germans who fell on the battlefields or found death under bombs that  
fell on our cities, not in vain did they sacrifice their lives to their  
homeland."{101} Today, in the mid-1990s, there is hope that the former  
hatred and wariness between the German and Russian peoples have finally  
been replaced by respect and Love. Notes: {1} Kalinow K. Sowjetmarschaalle  
haben das Wort. Hamburg, 1950; Frumkin G. Population Changes in Europe  
since 1939. NY, 1951. P. 161;

Results of the Second World War. Per. with him. M., 1957. S. 600.

{2} Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and Tragedy: A Political Portrait

I. V. Stalin // October. M., 1989. No 7. S. 106.

{3} Mertsalov A. N. One to five // Motherland. M., 1991. No 6-7. WITH. 137.

{4} Alekseev VV, Isupov VA Population of Siberia during the Great Patriotic War. Novosibirsk, 1986. S. 198-201. For a detailed criticism of this, see: Sokolov B.V. The price of victory // Great Patriotic War: the unknown about the known. M., 1991. S. 14-15.

{5} Sokolov B. V. The price of victory. For an earlier version of the methodology, see our article: Sokolov B.V. On the ratio of losses in people and military equipment on the Soviet-German front during the Great Patriotic War // Questions of History. 1988. .No 9. {6} The classification was

removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat actions and military conflicts. Ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. M., 1993. {7} Müller-Gillebrand B. Land Army

of Germany 1933-1945. Per. with him. T. 3. M., 1976. S. 323-344. See also: Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism: in 2 vols. T. 2. M., 1973. S. 637-638. Note that B. Müller-Gillebrand emphasizes the shortcomings of daily loss reports: "In these reports, of course, we could not talk about exact numbers of losses. In critical combat situations, it was often not possible to accurately calculate them. Accurate data were replaced by estimated, approximate ones. The reliability of information about losses was influenced by rumors, overwork and other physical and moral stresses in the conditions of the front. Often these data were additionally specified. " Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 335. {8} Classified as classified. P. 87. {9} Aptekar PA Are the victims justified? // Military historical journal. 1992. No 3. S. 44-45. {10} See: Sokolov B. V. Pyrrhic victory. New about the war with Finland // Historians answer questions. Issue. 2. M., 1990. S. 294-297.

{11} Counting according to: Müller-

Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 343. {12} The classification has been removed. pp. 129, 132.

{13} Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). M "1993. S. 61.

{14} Questions of history. 1990. No 6. S. 185-187; Military history magazine. 1990. No 6. S. 185-187; Military history magazine. 1990. No 4. S. 4-5; 1992. No 9. S. 28-31.

{15} The classification has been removed. S. 146; Dallin A. German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945. L.-NY, 1957. P. 427.

{16} The classification has been removed.

pp. 188-189. {17} See, for example: Ivanov S. Defensive Operation of the Voronezh Front // Military History Journal. 1973. No 8. S. 22.

{18} The classification has been removed. pp.

159-160, note. {19}

Ibid. P. 143. {20} Volkogonov D. A. We won despite the inhuman system // Izvestia. 1993. May 8. P. 5.

{21} Smirnov E. I. War and military medicine, 2nd ed. M., 1979. S. 188. {22}

Classified as classified. P. 130. {23}

Halder F. Military diary. Per. with him. T. 3. Book. 2. M., 1971. S. 250.

{24} World War 1939-1945. Per. with him. M., 1957. S. 189. German data on the number of prisoners near Kharkov was confirmed in his memoirs by N. S. Khrushchev, who at that time was a member of the military council of the South-Western Front and direction (Spark. 1989. No 31. P. 22 ).

{25} The classification has been removed. S. 129.

{26} Dallin A. Op. cit. P. 427.

{27} Questions of history. 1989. No 3. S. 37; Nuremberg trials: in 7 vols. T. 3. M., 1960. S. 29-30.

{28} Reitlinger G. The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945. L., 1960. P. 21. In total, about 1 million Soviet citizens, mostly from among prisoners of war, served as auxiliary personnel ("volunteer assistants") or as part of collaborationist formations in the German army at various times. Until May 1, 1944, 818 thousand prisoners of war were released from the camps, most of which were used in the German armed forces. By the end of the war, the number of "voluntary

assistants" in the Wehrmacht from among Soviet citizens was estimated at 665-675 thousand people (Ibid. P. 446; Dallin A. Op. cit. P. 427, 658).

{29} Gareev M. A. On myths old and new // Military Historical Journal. 1991. No 4. S. 47.

{30} Dallin A. Op. cit. P. 427; Reillinger G. Op. cit. P. 446. {zoa} Izvestia, 1994, May 7. P. 1. {31}

Classified as classified. pp. 134-136. {32}

Konasov V. B., Tereshchuk A. B. A new approach to accounting for irretrievable losses during the Great Patriotic War // Questions of History. 1990. No 6. P. 187. {33} Kapilevich Ya.

B. Organization of treatment of lightly wounded // Military Medical Journal. 1970. No 5. S. 64.

{34} Smirnov E. I. Some lessons from the experience of medical support for combat operations of troops // Military Medical Journal. 70. No 5. P. 12.

35 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. In 12 vols. T. 9. M., 1978. S. 515.

{36} Kuzmin MK Soviet medicine during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1979. S. 82; Kuvshinsky D. D. Actual problems of staged treatment of modern combat trauma // Military Medical Journal. 1974. No 5. P. 9. {37} Smirnov E.I. War and military medicine. P. 172.

{38} Classified as classified. pp. 136, 140. {39} Ibid. pp. 139, 141. {40} Izvestia, 1990, May 27. {41}

Kozhurin V.S. On the population of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War // Military History Journal. 1991.

No 2. S. 23-26.

{42} Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 323, 328. {43} Ibid. P. 327. {44} The

Great Patriotic War: A Brief Popular Science Essay. M., 1970. S. 368; The seal of secrecy has been removed. P. 328. {45} Müller-Gillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 328; Results of the Second World War. pp. 288-290. {46}

TsAMO, f. 15A, op. 1849, d. 1, l. 105-107. {47}

TsAMO, f. 8, on. 11627, d. 1509, l. 46. {47a} TsAMO, f. 353, on. 5879, d. 74, l. 320.

- {48} The hidden truth of war: 1941. M., 1992. S. 342; The seal of secrecy has been removed. pp. 316-317. {49} The hidden truth of war: 1941. P. 222. {50} Müller-Gillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 338-341. {51} Ibid. P. 331. {52} Polyakov L. E. The price of war. M., 1985. S. 87; Brook S.I. Population of the world: Ethno-demographic reference book: M., 1981. S. 198. {53} See: Stalin IV Questions of Leninism, 11th ed. M., 1939. S. 511.
- {54} Why did we return to our homeland. M., 1983. S. 96.
- {55} Zemskov VN Repatriation and the second wave of emigration // Motherland. 1991. No 6-7. P. 111. {56} Historical demography: problems, judgments, tasks. M., 1989. S. 100; Country of Soviets for 50 years: Collection of statistical materials. Moscow, 1967. P. 257. {57} Alekseev V. V., Isupov V. A. Decree. op. P. 194. {58} Historical geography of the USSR. M., 1973. S. 280; Questions of protection of motherhood and childhood: The period of war and blockade. M., 1946. S. 26; Medical and sanitary consequences of the war and measures to eliminate them. M., 1948. T. 1. S. 51. {59} Results of the Second World War. P. 229. {60} Classified as classified. S. 329; military effectiveness. Vol. 3. Boston, 1988. P. 263.
- {61} The German War against the Soviet Union 1941-1945: Documentary Exposition of the City of Berlin on the 50th Anniversary of the German Attack on the Soviet Union. Berlin, 1992. S. 117.
- {62} Zemskov VN GULAG (Historical and sociological aspect) // Sociological research. 1991. No6. P. 14. {63} Isupov V. A. Urban population of Siberia: From catastrophe to revival (late 30s - late 50s), Novosibirsk, 1991. P. 21. {64} Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 338. {65} Eisenhower D. Crusade to Europe. Per. from English. M., 1980. S. 352-379; Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 343; Liddell Hart B. World War II. Per. from English. M., 1976. S. 505.
- {66} Galitsky V. P. Enemy prisoners of war in the USSR (1941-1945) // Military History Journal. 1990. No 9. S. 39-46; The seal of secrecy has been removed. S. 391.

{67} Erman J. Grand Strategy: October 1944-August 1945.

Per. from English. M., 1958. S. 119, 121.

{68} Galitsky V.P. Decree. op. S. 46; The seal of secrecy has been removed. S. 391; The Great Patriotic War; Brief popular science essay. P. 447. 69 Results of the Second World

War. P. 597. {70} Müller-Gillebrand B. Decree.

op. T. 3. S. 340. {71} Ulanis B. Ts. Decree. op. S. 205; The results of the second world war. S. 598.

{72} Dashichev V. I. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 637-638. {73}

Safronov EG Italian troops on the Soviet-German front. 1941-1943. M., 1990. S. 194; Galitsky V.P. Decree. op. S. 46.; Ulanis B. Ts. Decree. op. pp. 220-222; The seal of secrecy has been removed. pp. 391-392; The Great Patriotic War: A Brief Popular Science Essay. S. 396.

{74} Score according to: Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 338-344; Erman J. Decree. op. pp. 119, 121. {76} Estimated

by: Ulanis B. Ts. Decree. op. pp. 221-235; Müller Gillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 338-344; Dashichev V. I. Decree. op. T, 2. S. 637-638; McDonald C.B. The Ordeal: American Forces in the European Theater during World War II. Per. from English. M., 1979. S. 346. {76} Müller-Gillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 338. {77} Ulanis B. Ts. Decree. op. S. 309.

{78} Dupuy T. N., Martell P. Great Battles on the Eastern Front; the Soviet-German War, 1941-1945. NY, 1982. P. 2-3.

{79} See: World War 1939-1945. pp. 153-154; Mellenthin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. Per. from English. M., 1957. S. 148, 244-246, 252.

8° Star. 1990. No 3. S. 140-141. {81}

Motherland. 1991. No 6-7. P. 49. {82}

Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1993, June 24. S. Z.

{83} Lucas J. War on the Eastern Front; the German Soldier in Russia. L., 1991. P. 31-33.

{84} Ibid. P. 35-36; Cf.: Eisenhower D. Crusade in Europe. NY, 1977. P. 465-468. {84a} Moscow

region. 1994. No 25. S. 5.



{846} Eremenko A. I. Against the falsification of history of the second world war. M., 1958. S. 93. {84c}

Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1995, December 27. P. 3.

{84g} Malashenko E.I. I have been in intelligence since the forty-first ... // Military Historical Journal. 1995. No

3. S. 77-78. {84d} Muranov A. I., Zvyagintsev V. E. File on the marshal: From history of closed trials. M., 1996. S. 200.

{84e} Ibid. pp. 177-179.

{85} Halder F. Decree. op. T. 3. Book. 2. P. 98. An estimate of irretrievable losses in 1941, close to ours, is 5.3 million people. See: Great Patriotic War: Events, people, documents. M., 1990. S. 76.

{86} IV Stalin. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 5th ed. M., 1949. S. 20; Müller-Hillebrand B. Decree. op. T. 3. S. 342-343. {87} Materials

of the documentary exposition of the city of Berlin: "War of Germany against the Soviet Union 1941-1945". To the 50th anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union.

{88} Military history magazine. 1992. No 2. S. 25; Halder F. Decree. op. T. 3. Book. 2. S. 207.

{89} TsAMO, f. 208, on. 2504, d. 82, l. 337.

{90} Halder F. Decree. op. T. 3. Book. 2. S. 225,

240. {91} Shtrik-Shtrikfeldt V. Against Stalin and Hitler. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. Per. from German, 3rd ed. M., 1993. S. 158.

{92} Vselensky M. S. Nomenclature. ruling class Soviet Union. M., 1991. S. 577.

{93} Simonov KM Through the eyes of a man of my generation. M., 1989. S.

353-354. {94} Picker G. Hitler's Table Talk. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993. P. 480. Entry dated July 28, 1942, noon. {95}

Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and tragedy // October. 1989. No 8. P. 62. {96}

See: Eisenhower D. Op. cit. P. 465-468. {97}

So, for example, in July and August 1943, during the days of the Battle of Kursk, when a significant part of the German aviation was sent to the Soviet-German front, it accounted for only 1030 of the 3213 combat aircraft lost in battle, or 32% ( Murray W. Luftwaffe.

Baltimore, 1985. P. 154). Approximately this was probably the share of the Eastern Front in the combat losses of German aviation for the war as a whole.

{98} Score by: Jones RH The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union. Norman, 1969. P.220-224, 280-289; National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Statistical Collection. M., 1990. S. 55-56; See also: Vannikov B. L. Notes of the People's Commissar // Znamya. 1988. No 2. S. 155.

{99} Military archives of Russia. Issue. 1. M., 1993. S. 234.

{100} Cited. by: Coates WP and Z. Soviet-Finnish Campaign 1939-1940. L., 1941. P. 91. {101}

Fatal decisions. Per. from English. M., 1958. S. 306-307. Human losses of Russia and the USSR in wars, armed conflicts and other demographic catastrophes of the 20th century.

(Published: Grani. 1997. .No 183. Published with additions) As a result of wars, political repressions and mass famine in the 20th century, which was also largely due to political reasons, the population of the Russian Empire, the USSR and independent Russia, which became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suffered the greatest in absolute losses in comparison with other states, with the possible exception of China, whose losses from wars, famines and repressions are still impossible to determine even approximately. The only generalizing work on the losses of the population of the USSR is the work of S. Maksudov.{1} We also note the generalizing work of B.Ts. Due to censorship conditions and the lack of materials, Soviet losses in the Second World War are not even approximately calculated by Uralnis.

In our study, we will first try to estimate the losses of the country in military conflicts. This is easier to do, since a significant part of the dead was recorded in one way or another by the accounting authorities, at least among military personnel. An attempt will then be made to determine the losses from starvation and repression. Losses of this kind can only be estimated very roughly, since practically no accurate accounting has been kept of them, and estimates can be

made only on the basis of population dynamics.

Determining the military losses of the armed forces and the population as a whole of a particular state is an important task, but difficult to accomplish even for our century. On the one hand, the military situation is usually unfavorable for accurate and complete recording of human losses, especially when they reach thousands and thousands of deaths every day, and the armed conflict lasts for several years. On the other hand, the magnitude of human losses in wars, and especially the comparative magnitude of the losses of the armies of the opposing sides, very often becomes the object of national mythology, extolling the military prowess and skill of a particular people and its armed forces. In the case of Russia and the USSR, the incompleteness of accounting for combat losses was influenced both by the traditionally low price of human life, especially in relation to the lower classes of the population, and the lack of full-fledged parliamentary democracy and powerful public opinion that could demand a full report from the government and the identification of all military losses by name .

Russia's casualties in the First World War can only be determined very roughly, because due to the revolutionary events of 1917 and the subsequent civil war, the final data on losses after the war were never received, and the current record of losses in the military department was very incomplete. The irretrievable losses of the army (including those killed, who died from wounds, diseases, accidents, those who died in captivity and for other reasons) are estimated at 1.8-2 million people. An estimate of 1.8 million people was given by B. Ts. Ulanis, who proceeded from the assumption that on the Russian front the Russian army lost as many more enemy killed as on the Western Front the Allied armies lost more than the German, i.e. in 1.5 times, and the number of deaths from wounds was determined using a very low mortality rate of 6%. In our opinion, this ratio is somewhat underestimated. Most importantly, most likely, the Russian losses in the dead exceeded the losses of the armies of the Central Powers opposing Russia on the Eastern Front in a greater proportion than the losses of the Allies in the dead were greater than the German losses on the Western Front. The Russian army was technically worse equipped than the allied armies, had fewer guns and machine guns, and also had a significant numerical superiority over the enemy (1.5-2 times in different periods

war), which indirectly indicated that the successes of the Russian troops were usually bought with more blood than the successes of the allied, and especially the German troops. /In the XX century. the only war where Russian casualties were less than those of the enemy was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, where the Russian army lost about 32 thousand killed against 49 thousand killed in the Japanese army. Another 1,600 Russians died in captivity. 6.1 thousand Russians and 11.4 thousand Japanese died from wounds, 13.0 thousand Russians and 27.2 thousand Japanese died from diseases. The overall ratio of the dead is 1.7:1 in favor of the Russian army. 59 thousand Russians were taken prisoner, mainly during the capitulation of Port Arthur. The number of Japanese prisoners was insignificant, and in terms of the total number of dead and captured, the ratio was in favor of Japan. The smaller losses in killed and wounded in the Russian army were explained by the "strategy of attrition" used by the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief General Kuropatkin, who took into account that Japanese manpower resources are much less than Russian ones, and therefore avoided decisive large-scale clashes with potentially large losses of Russian troops. However, the internal instability in Russia, which resulted in a revolution, did not allow this rational strategy of Kuropatkin to triumph.

Therefore, we are inclined to estimate the losses of the Russian army in the First World War at 2 million dead. The losses of civilians in the war were small and hardly exceeded several tens of thousands who died in the front line during the hostilities, mainly in Poland. Then air raids on cities were only episodes and were almost not accompanied by losses among the civilian population. We estimate the number of captured Russian military personnel at 3.75 million people, of which about 150 thousand died. For comparison: 1.99 million people were in Russian captivity. We determine the number of wounded in the Russian army at about 4 million people, the number of those who died from wounds - at 265 thousand, those who died from diseases - at 135 thousand and the number of those killed - at 1450 thousand people. Indirect losses due to the fall in the birth rate in 1915-1917. are estimated at 6 million people within the borders of

1913. Before the start of the war, the Russian army numbered 1,423 thousand people, after it began, another 15,125 thousand people were mobilized, so that the total conscription, together with the peacetime army, amounted to 16.55 million people , or 9.8% of the population in the middle of 1914 at 16

million people (excluding Finland, whose inhabitants were not drafted into the Russian army). In relation to the total draft, the total number of deaths reaches 12.1%, which is by no means the highest figure among the participants in the war. In Germany, for example, it was 15.4%, and in France - 16.8% (however, these countries fought almost a year longer than Russia). Although, as already mentioned, Russian successes, like the Brusilov breakthrough, were bought with a lot of blood, and often large masses of soldiers in tight chains rushed to the attack after far from sufficient artillery preparation, especially in the first years of the war; the depletion of human resources due to heavy losses in killed and prisoners already from the end of 1916 forced the Russian command to more economically approach the expenditure of personnel. At the beginning of 1917, 28 members of the State Duma and the State Council submitted a note to Emperor Nicholas II, which, in particular, stated that "the view has firmly taken root in the army that, with the weakness of our technical forces, we must fight our way to victory mainly at the cost of human blood "and it was proposed to the military leaders to take care of reducing combat losses, since "the easy expenditure of human life ... is unacceptable, because our human reserve is far from inexhaustible." However, in the answer compiled by General Gurko and approved by the tsar on February 4, 1917 (O.S.), it was stated that "any pressure on the chiefs in this extremely delicate issue would undoubtedly lead to the extinction of their enterprise and offensive impulse "and the desire to return skilled workers to industry was also rejected (such demobilization was not carried out during the war). Human losses in the civil war 1918-1920. can only be determined by very rough

demographic estimates of the total population on different dates and within the same boundaries and the losses of the Red Army, about which there is only incomplete and scattered information. The population of the Russian Empire (without Finland) before the revolution of February 1917 is estimated at 176.3 million people, and with the deduction of irretrievable losses by the dead and prisoners suffered by the Russian army by that time - at 171.9 million people. In addition, the population of the vassal Emirate of Bukhara can be estimated at about 3 million people, and the vassal Khiva

khanates - 0.75 million people. The population of the territories of Poland that seceded from the Russian Empire after the revolution (including here Western Belarus, the Vilna region and the border Ukrainian territories), the Baltic States, Bessarabia, as well as the border territories that ceded to Turkey, is estimated by us at the beginning of 1917 at 25 million people, and the loss of the dead before the end of the First World War - another 0.5 million people. The total natural increase in the population of the USSR within the borders at the beginning of 1926 (after the return of northern Sakhalin by Japan) in the period 1917-1925, inclusive, we estimate it at 3.33% or 5 million people. In addition, approximately 2 million people emigrated from European Russia and at least 0.5 million people from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Taking this into account, the population of the USSR, excluding those who died and excess mortality from hunger and disease during the years of the civil war, by the beginning of 1926 should have been about 152.65 million people, in practice, the 1926 census determined the population at 146, 9 million people. The difference of 5.75 million people is an approximate value of irretrievable losses in the civil war, including here the excess mortality of the population, not directly related to

hostilities. Let's try to roughly estimate the irretrievable losses of the armed forces during the civil war. In 1923, a survey of the rural population was conducted in Ukraine, during which an approximate ratio of the number of dead and missing during the First World and Civil Wars was established (including those who died from wounds and diseases in the armed forces). In 8 provinces of Ukraine, the respondents named 3508 dead and missing during the First World War and 2022 - during the civil war. Considering that the survey covered both the provinces that actively participated in the civil war and those where there were practically no active hostilities, and also taking into account that Ukraine's somewhat more active role in the civil war compared to the country as a whole is compensated by the fact that only the rural population was surveyed, and in the Civil War the role of the urban population in the armed forces, and consequently in losses, was higher than in the First World War (in the Red Army, the share of urban residents at the expense of workers exceeded 31.4% compared to 17.8% in

imperial army, in the white armies, at the expense of officers and volunteers, the proportion of townspeople was also higher than in the First World War), the ratio between the victims of the two wars can be considered close to the national average and take this average ratio equal to 1.67: 1, which gives 2 million dead in the First World War, approximately 1,150 thousand civilian deaths in the armies and rebel formations of all sides. The number of dead and dead in the Red Army can be roughly estimated on the basis of the available incomplete statistical data. We have at our disposal relatively accurate data on Polish losses during the Soviet-Polish war of 1918-1920. - 113.5 thousand wounded, 30.3 thousand dead, 17.3 thousand killed, 51.4 thousand missing and 38.8 thousand - without indicating the type of losses, but only 251.3 thousand, of which 201.6 thousand people accounted for 1920 - the time of the most intense hostilities. considering that there were about 30 thousand Polish prisoners of war in Soviet captivity and another 2.5 thousand prisoners ended up in East Prussia along with interned Soviet troops, and also proportionally distributing the losses shown without indicating the type of losses into different categories of losses, we estimate the number of those killed in the Polish army of 38 thousand people, which coincides with the estimate of B. Ts. Uralnis. In 1920, of this number of dead, there were about 30 thousand. In addition, on the side of Poland in 1920, the Ukrainian troops of the government of S. Petlyura, the brigade of the Don Cossacks and the detachments of S. Bulak-Bulakhovich, who were all inferior to the Polish at the height of the campaign, were fighting troops in number by about 10 times, so that their losses in killed can be estimated at about 3 thousand people. We estimate the total number of wounded in the Polish troops for the war as a whole at 136 thousand people, which gives a ratio of wounded and killed of 3.6:1. We assume that the losses of the Red Army killed in the war against the Polish army were greater than the losses of the Poles, given the better organization, weapons and combat effectiveness of the Polish troops. To obtain an approximate value of the losses of the Red Army killed, we take the coefficient of 1.6 used to determine the losses of the Russian army killed, based on the losses of the armies of the Central Powers on the Russian front. Then the losses of the Red Army in the war with Poland will amount to about 62 thousand killed, including in 1920 - about 48 thousand.

In addition, the losses of the Soviet troops in the battles on the Polish front with the Polish allies can be taken approximately equal to the losses of the enemy, since the troops of Petlyura and Bulak-Bulakhovich were inferior to the Polish troops in terms of combat capability. Thus, the total losses of the Red Army in the 1920 campaign on the Polish front amounted to about 51 thousand people. Suppose that in 1920, taking into account the duration and intensity of hostilities, in the war with Poland, the Red Army lost three-quarters of the total number of those killed that year, which can then be estimated at 68 thousand. The number of those killed in 1919 can be taken approximately equal to the number of those killed in the Red Army in 1920, based, again, on the intensity and duration of the fighting. In 1918, the losses of the Red Army in killed can be estimated at about one quarter of the level of 1919, i.e., at 17 thousand, taking into account that the Red Army was created only in June and that the intensity of the fighting in the second half of 1918 was lower than in 1919. The total losses of the Red Army killed in 1918-1920. we estimate it at 153 thousand. This figure is confirmed by the data on the number of wounded servicemen of the Regional Army - from October 1918 to November 1, 1920, there were about 502 thousand of them. Adding here the losses during the occupation of the Crimea - at least 10 thousand killed and wounded (including, probably, about 8 thousand wounded) and taking the monthly losses of the wounded in the first four months of the existence of the Red Army (from June to October 1918) twice less than the average monthly for the war as a whole, the total number of wounded in the Red Army in 1918-1920. we estimate it at 550,000, which gives us, if we apply the ratio of wounded and killed of 3.6:1 established for the Polish army, the number of killed at 153,000 people. Of this number, about 89 thousand died in the fight against the White armies and rebel detachments. In general, the White armies were significantly inferior to the Red Army in numbers (1-1.5 million people in the short period of the maximum total strength in 1919, while the Regional Army already on July 1, 1919, there were more than 2.3 million people, and by November 1, 1920 - more than 5.4 million people), but, due to the presence in their composition of a relatively larger proportion of officers and regular military personnel, they surpassed it in overall capacity. Suppose, therefore, that the ratio of the number of killed between the Red and White Armies w



as on the Russian front of the First World War, and on the Soviet-Polish front, i.e. 1.6:1, and that out of 89 thousand killed Red Army soldiers, approximately 80 thousand, or 90%, died in the fight against the White armies, and the remaining 9 thousand - in the fight against the troops of the Ukrainian government and various kinds of rebels. Then the losses of the white

armies can be estimated at 50 thousand killed. Now let's try to establish the number of servicemen who died from wounds and diseases. Assuming the mortality rate for the wounded at 10% (due to the deterioration of sanitary conditions, it was probably higher than in the First World War), the number of Red Army soldiers who died from wounds can be estimated at 55 thousand. Assuming the same ratio of the number of killed for the White armies and the wounded as for the Red Army, and the same percentage of mortality, we estimate the total number of wounded among the whites at 180 thousand, and those who died from wounds at 18 thousand (we are talking here only about losses in the fight against the regular Red Army). Only from infectious diseases in the Red Army in 1918-1920. 283.1 thousand people died. Mortality for infectious patients was 12.6%. Assuming for the rest of the patients the mortality rate is half as much ~ 6.3%, the number of deaths from non-communicable diseases can be estimated at 97 thousand people, which gives the total number of deaths from diseases in the Red Army - 380 thousand people. In the White Army, infectious and other diseases were as common as in the Soviet troops. However, taking into account the smaller number of troops of the White Guard, we estimate the number of deaths from diseases in it at one third of the number of deaths from diseases in the Red Army, or 127 thousand people. Thus, the total losses of the Red Army killed and died from

wounds and diseases amounted to 588 thousand people, and the White armies - 195 thousand people. It makes sense to calculate the losses of prisoners and those who died in captivity in the civil war only for the Soviet-Polish war, since in the battles of the civil war itself, the prisoners were partly destroyed (especially officers, commissars and communists), and partly put in the ranks of their army. In total, about 78 thousand Red Army soldiers were returned from Polish captivity to the USSR, more than a thousand Red Army soldiers of Polish origin remained in Poland, and from 25 to 40 thousand former prisoners joined the formations of Petly

White Guard Corps of General Bredov. According to Polish data, 18 thousand prisoners died from diseases and wounds, and in total there were about 130 thousand prisoners, which gives a mortality rate in captivity of about 13.8%. In addition, approximately 41,000 interned Red Army soldiers were returned from East Prussia. If we assume that the mortality among the internees was the same as among the prisoners in Poland, then about 6.6 thousand Red Army soldiers died in East Prussia, and the total number of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died in captivity is about 25 thousand people.

Thus, the total losses of the Red Army killed and died from wounds, diseases and in captivity reach 633 thousand people, and the losses of the White armies in the fight against regular Soviet troops - 195 thousand. Of the total losses of the armed forces of all the warring parties killed and died in 1150 thousand people remain about 320 thousand people - the loss of the Red Guard and local and partisan red detachments, the loss of anti-Soviet and "green" rebel formations and troops of the Ukrainian government, as well as the loss of white armies in the fight against red partisans, red guards, local formations, as well as against detachments of the "green" (like the army of Makhno and the "red-green" army of the Crimea and the North Caucasus). We estimate the losses of the Whites in this struggle at the rate of half of their losses in the struggle against the Red Army, or at 34 thousand killed and died from wounds, and the losses of the formations opposing them are determined to be 1.6 times greater - at 54 thousand dead. Here one can note fierce battles in Siberia, in the Far East, in Semirechye, in the North. Caucasus and Crimea. In particular, the famous "ice campaign" of Kornilov's army in the winter-spring of 1918 was marked by heavy losses, especially from the local Red detachments opposing the volunteers. The remaining approximately 230 thousand dead are the losses of anti-Soviet and "green" formations in the fight against the Red Army, as well as non-combat irretrievable losses - those who died as a result of accidents, suicides and were shot by the tribunals of the Soviet and White troops. In addition, this includes the losses of the Soviet internal troops and special forces in the fight against the insurgents. It is currently not possible to separate these categories of losses.

In total, out of 1,150,000 servicemen who perished or died during the civil war, about 663,000 are in the regular Red Army, and about 229,000 are in the regular troops of the White Guard. The above figure of 5.75

million irretrievable losses of Russia-USSR in the civil war also includes the losses of the Soviet troops and formations opposing them, suffered in 1921-1922, when hostilities continued in the Far East, in Transbaikalia, Mongolia, in Central Asia, as well as on the territory of Belarus, Ukraine and in a number of Russian provinces (the Antonov uprising in the Tambov region and a number of other peasant uprisings). In these battles, the losses of the Red Army in the dead amounted, according to incomplete data, to 23.9 thousand and 1.7 thousand who died as a result of accidents, suicides and were shot by the verdicts of the tribunals, if the same ratio between combat and non-combat irretrievable losses in the Red Army and the troops of the White Guard existed in 1918-1920, then the non-combat irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the civil war can be estimated at 11 thousand people, and in the White armies at 5 thousand people. The losses of the internal troops and the CHON, which played an increasingly prominent role in the hostilities during this period, we estimate at half the losses of the Red Army, i.e., at 12.3 thousand dead. In addition, 10.7 thousand Red Army soldiers were wounded, which, with a 10% mortality rate, gives about 1 thousand deaths from wounds. 113.2 thousand people fell ill, which, with a 6% mortality rate, gives about 6.8 thousand deaths from wounds. The excess of the number of those killed over the number of the wounded is probably caused by the extermination of a significant part of the captured Red Army soldiers, and possibly also by the fact that many of the missing actually deserted or went over to the side of the enemy (there were 14.5 thousand missing in action). Human). We estimate the number of those who died from wounds and diseases in the internal troops and ChON

at 3.9 thousand people. In 1921-1922. the troops of the Far Eastern Republic also fought, losing about 0.8 thousand people killed, 1.4 thousand wounded and 2.2 thousand people killed as a result of accidents, suicides and other non-combat reasons. There were 3.5 thousand patients. The total irretrievable losses of the army of the Far Eastern Republic, including those who died from wounds and

diseases, we estimate at 3.7 thousand, and with the addition of losses during a number of unrecorded operations, in particular, the Primorsky operation in October 1922, at 5 thousand people.

Thus, the total losses of the Soviet troops in 1921-1922. dead and dead can be estimated at 54.5 thousand. Taking the same losses of the formations opposing them, we get the total irretrievable losses of all the warring parties in that period at about 110 thousand people. Thus, the loss of the civilian population of Russia of the USSR during the hostilities in 1918-1920. can be estimated by subtracting from 5.75 million total irretrievable losses of 1150 thousand and 110 thousand losses of the armed forces of all parties to 4.5 million people. It is very difficult to say exactly which part of them fell victim to the red, white or "green" terror, and who fell victim to famine and epidemics. At one time, the commission created by A. Denikin to investigate the acts of the Bolsheviks estimated the number of victims of the Red Terror in 1918-1919. 1.7 million people. This figure seems to us to be significantly exaggerated, even if we include in it the victims of 1920, part of the servicemen of the White armies and other anti-Soviet formations destroyed after surrendering (for example, thousands of servicemen of the Wrangel army who remained in the Crimea were destroyed). There is no doubt that the victims of the Red Terror were much greater than the number of civilians killed by military personnel and punitive bodies of other authorities on the territory of the former Russian Empire during the civil war. Only the Soviet government proclaimed terror as a means of state policy, while in the governments of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel, Petlyura and others, terror was the result of excesses of subordinate commanders, to which the higher command turned a blind eye or even encouraged, and not the result of a targeted policy. They did not practice on a large scale and hostage-taking, which was so common under Soviet rule. Finally, the size of the territories and the size of the armed forces and punitive organs of these governments were incomparable with the size of the Soviet troops and the power of the Cheka. And yet we believe that the victims of terror were about half as many as the victims of famine and epidemics, and here we are talking only about excess mortality from these causes compared to the pre-war 1913, and not about all

died from starvation and disease. After all, even before the war, the mortality rate in Russia was very high, reaching 3% of the population per year, so that even in peacetime, many residents of Russia died from epidemics and malnutrition. We estimate the excess deaths from starvation and diseases, mainly infectious ones like typhus, at 3 million people, and the number of terror victims at 1.5 million people, of which about 1 million are due to the Red Terror, and about 0.5 million - for the terror of all other forces: whites, "greens", Petliurists, etc. The total number mobilized

into the Red Army, taking into account its maximum strength and various types of losses, can be estimated during the years of the civil war at 6.4 million people (without accounting for deserters), of which the dead amounted to 10.3%. It is not possible to establish the number of those mobilized into white and other anti-Soviet formations. A characteristic feature of the civil war of 1918-1920. was that the losses of the civilian population were almost four times higher than the losses of the armed forces. Indirect losses due to the fall in the birth rate in 1918-1920. are estimated by us at 6 million people within the boundaries of 1926.

After the Civil War and before the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army participated in a number of military conflicts, about the losses in which there are official Soviet (and most likely underestimated) data, which we will give below. In the fight against the Basmachi

movement in Central Asia from October 1922 to June 1931, the Soviet troops, according to incomplete data, lost 516 killed, 14 missing and 44 prisoners, as well as 867 wounded and sick, which, taking into account those who died from wounds and diseases gives about 580 dead. There is no reliable data on the losses of the Basmachi available.

During the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1929, losses amounted to 147 killed and missing and 665 wounded. Including those who died from their wounds, the death toll may have exceeded 200. The losses of the Chinese troops many times exceeded the Soviet ones. The Chinese army, compared to the Soviet troops, was the army of a colonial power, opposed by an army with a European organization and level of weaponry. In 1929, about 1,000 Soviet troops intervened in Afghanistan to help Ammanula.

Khan, against whom the uprising began. According to the testimony of the Chekist defector G. S. Agabekov, the losses of the Red Army amounted to about 120 killed and wounded, while the losses of the Afghans (both soldiers and civilians) exceeded 8 thousand people.

In 1936-1939. about 3 thousand Soviet volunteers fought on the side of the government of the Spanish Republic, of which 158 people died.

In 1937-1939. about 3.7 thousand Soviet military advisers and specialists fought on the side of China against Japan, of which 195 people died. During the Soviet-Japanese

military conflict in the region of Lake Khasan in 1938, Soviet troops lost 792 people killed and missing, 2,752 people wounded and 527 sick. Taking into account those who died from wounds and diseases, the number of dead Red Army soldiers (with a 6% mortality rate) probably reached 1,000 people. Japanese losses were less - about 900 wounded and about 500 killed and died from wounds and diseases, which was more than two times less than Soviet losses. More than 23 thousand Red Army soldiers took part in the battles. During the Soviet-Japanese conflict near the Khalkhin-Gol River in Mongolia in 1939,

Soviet troops lost 6831 killed and 1143 missing. There were 15,251 wounded and 701 sick. Taking into account those who died from wounds and diseases, the total number of deaths can be estimated at 9 thousand. Japanese losses were significantly higher than about 61 thousand killed, wounded and captured, including about 25 thousand killed and dead : from wounds, which is almost three times more than Soviet losses. The average monthly number of Soviet troops during the conflict was about 70 thousand people. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 was the largest conflict in which the Red Army participated in the period between

the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. The losses in it of the Soviet troops, acting as the aggressor, according to the books compiled in the post-war years of the names of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army, in the Soviet-Finnish war amounted to 131.5 thousand dead.{3} This did not include those who died from wounds and diseases in rear hospitals . In addition, a number of those who died during the war were never taken into account by name, and the documents of a number of units and formations on losses

were lost. Finnish sources estimate the losses of the Red Army at about 200 thousand dead. Close to this assessment is the assessment of German intelligence in 1942, based on a Soviet intelligence source. According to this estimate, the losses of the Red Army in the war with Finland were estimated at 430,000 dead and disabled (the dead here account for probably slightly less than half). We estimate the total number of dead Red Army soldiers in the "winter war" as the average between the data of the Soviet name registration (most likely incomplete) and the Finnish estimate (most likely overestimated), i.e. 166 thousand dead. About 6,000 fighters and commanders of the Red Army were taken prisoner, of which approximately 5,770 returned to their homeland, and about 200 people chose to stay in Finland. There is no exact data on the number of wounded and sick soldiers. According to incomplete data from the Russian military archives, the total number of wounded and sick exceeded 248 thousand people, but in the light of even a minimal estimate of the total number of dead, this number of wounded and sick looks clearly underestimated. The Finnish army lost 23.5 thousand killed and died from wounds, 1 thousand prisoners and 43.5 thousand wounded, of which about 10 thousand remained disabled. Soviet bombings killed 646 civilians. According to our estimate, the Soviet losses in the dead exceeded the Finnish ones by 7 times, and by the prisoners - 6 times. This ratio of losses was a consequence of the low combat effectiveness of the Red Army and poor preparation (although it took 5 months) of the war against Finland. The low tactical training of fighters, both tactical and operational commanders, the inability of military personnel to handle modern weapons and equipment, a low level of independence, and fear of risk affected. All these shortcomings were never overcome, although by the end of the war the number of Soviet troops exceeded 1 million people, 2.3 times the number of the Finnish army opposing them, with an overwhelming superiority in tanks and aircraft. In total, more than 1.3 million Soviet military personnel and about 600 thousand Finns took part in the war. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army took a direct part in World War II for the first time, invading Poland by prior agreement with Germany. The Polish command gave the order not to fight with the Soviet troops, however, a number of units, to which this order did not reach, had the Red

Army fragmented resistance. As a result, Soviet losses amounted to 996 killed and missing, 2002 wounded and 381 sick. At the same time, 452 thousand Polish soldiers were captured. Of the 18.8 thousand captured officers, 14.7 were shot in Katyn and other places in April-May 1940.

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the German aggression against the USSR. In this war, the losses of the Red Army and the population of the Soviet Union as a whole turned out to be the largest in their entire history and exceeded the total casualties of all other participants in the Second World War. The exact determination of Soviet losses is hampered both by the lack of any reliable official statistical publications of the post-war period, and by the extremely poor record of the losses of the Red Army and especially the civilian population. So, in 1942, according to the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense E. A. Shchadenko, "no more than one third of the actual registration of those killed" was on a personal record of the dead, and this situation remained

until the end of the war. Official data on the losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, as well as in other armed conflicts, are published in the collection "Secrecy Removed".{4} However, in relation to 1941-1945. these losses, defined as 8,688,400 dead in the armed forces, are clearly and most likely deliberately underestimated many times over. In two cases, when it is possible to check the data on irretrievable and sanitary losses by the dynamics of the number of personnel, the true losses exceed those indicated in the book "Secret Classification Removed" by 3 or more times. The first example refers to the Battle of Kursk. Here, the Central Front of K.K. Rokossovsky before the start of the battle on July 5, 1943, numbered 738,000 people. During the defensive battle, the front allegedly lost 15,336 people dead and missing, and 18,561 people wounded and sick. By the beginning of the Oryol offensive operation, which immediately followed the Kursk defensive operation, the composition of the Central Front remained almost unchanged - two rifle brigades left it, and one tank brigade arrived in return, which in total could reduce the size of the crippled front by about 5 thousand people. . Consequently, by the beginning of the Oryol offensive operation as part of the Central Front



there should have been, according to all the laws of arithmetic, about 700 thousand military personnel, in reality it turned out, according to the book "Secrecy stamp removed", only 645,300. Even without taking into account the marching reinforcements received during the defense of Kursk and before the attack on Orel, it turns out that at least 55 thousand soldiers and officers of the Central Front were somehow able to desert from the battlefield. The real reason for this paradox is, no doubt, that they were actually killed, wounded or taken prisoner, but were not counted as killed, wounded or missing, and the vast majority of unrecorded losses, apparently on the dead and prisoners, who were taken into account much less accurately than the wounded and sick. The second example dates back to 1945. During the Vistula-Oder operation in January-February, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, numbering 90,900 people by the beginning of the operation, according to the book "Secrecy Removed", lost 225 people killed and sold missing and 841 people - wounded and sick. By the beginning of the next operation - East Pomeranian - the composition of the army had not changed (5 infantry divisions and one tank and cavalry brigade each), but the number had decreased not by a thousand and a few people, as might be expected, but by more than 15,000 - up to 75 600 troops. Such statistical miracles can only be explained by the catastrophic underestimation of losses, especially irretrievable losses, in the Soviet Armed Forces. Therefore, the data of the book "Secrecy Removed" cannot be taken as the basis for calculating the actual losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. We carried out our own calculations of the Soviet irretrievable losses of the USSR in 1941-1945, the results of which we offer to readers. {5}

In our opinion, the key to a relatively reliable estimate of the actual number of Soviet military personnel is provided by D. A. Volkogonov's published figure of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942, taken from the archives of the Ministry of Defense. These losses amounted to 5888 thousand people. Irretrievable losses include killed and died from wounds, diseases and accidents, as well as captured. D. Volkogonov also provides a monthly breakdown of deadweight losses. Comparing them with

German data on the number of Red Army soldiers who were captured in 1942, and with information on the monthly dynamics of the wounded throughout the war, cited by the former head of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Red Army E. I. Smirnov, proves that D. Volkogonov's data are also significant underestimated. For example, he claims that the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops in May 1942 amounted to 422 thousand and even decreased compared to April, although in May the German troops only in large boilers near Kharkov and on the Kerch Peninsula captured about 390 thousand Soviet troops, while the number of wounded in April and May was almost the same. Soviet losses were especially poorly taken into account when surrounded and retreated, as well as when advancing rapidly. At the same time, it is believed that in the course of each war there is a certain relationship between the number of killed and wounded, close to directly proportional, and their ratio to each other throughout a given war is usually taken as a constant value. It is possible to name the number of killed Red Army soldiers during the entire war close to reality, if we determine that Month of 1942, when the losses of the Red Army by the dead were taken into account most fully and when it had almost no losses as prisoners. For a number of reasons, we chose November 1942 as such a month and extended the ratio of the number of dead and wounded obtained for it to the entire period of the war. As a result, we came to the figure of 22.4 million Soviet servicemen killed in action and died from wounds, illnesses, accidents, and shot by tribunals. The Red Army also suffered heavy losses in prisoners. In 1941 alone, 3.9 million fighters and commanders fell into German

captivity. According to German data, the total number of prisoners can be estimated at 6.3 million people, of which about 4 million people died in captivity. Germany did not apply the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War to Soviet prisoners of war. The USSR did not sign this convention, but after the start of the war, it declared that it would comply with its main provisions, with the exception of granting the right to receive parcels and exchange nominal lists of prisoners of war through the International Red Cross. Hitler expected to defeat the Soviet Union during the blitzkrieg and hatched plans for a wide

colonization of the eastern lands. Therefore, he and his associates in the National Socialist Party were interested in reducing the Soviet population, especially those of Slavic origin. Jews and Gypsies were subject to total extermination. The prisoners captured in the East were poorly fed and little fed, kept in the open without warm clothes, and shot at the slightest pretext. They treated the indigenous population of the Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus better. Those who expressed a desire to serve in the German army as "voluntary assistants" in the rear units (there were more than 800 thousand of them during the war), as well as in collaborationist military formations and civil administration, were released. Since the spring of 1942, having finally realized the protracted nature of the war in the East, the German leadership somewhat improved the situation of prisoners of war, who were needed as a labor force and to replenish the ranks of collaborators. The total losses of the Red Army in the dead, taking into account those who died in captivity, we determine at 26.4 million

people. This figure does not contradict the data collected in the Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaya Hill. Here, by May 1994, the computer data bank contained personal data on 19 million servicemen who died or went missing during the war and have not yet been found. Not all the dead were included here, as evidenced by the failures of dozens of citizens who applied in the first days of the museum's existence with inquiries about the fate of their family and friends who had been sold without a trace. It is practically impossible to establish by name all those who died in the war, half a century after it ended. Of the approximately 5,000 dead Soviet servicemen whose remains were recently found by Russian search engines and whose identity was established, about 30% were not listed in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and therefore did not fall into the computer data bank. Assuming that the 19 million people who got into this bank account for approximately 70% of all dead and missing, their total number should reach 27.1 million people. From this number it is necessary to subtract about 2 million surviving prisoners and about 900 thousand who returned to their encirclement. Then the total number of dead soldiers and officers can be calculated at 24.2 million. However, this

the calculation was made on the basis of the 5,000 dead who could be identified from the documents they had left. Consequently, these servicemen are more likely to be on the lists of the Ministry of Defense than the average killed, therefore, most likely, 19 million actually cover not 70%, but a smaller percentage of all the dead. Because of this circumstance, we consider the figure of 26.4 million dead in the ranks of the Soviet armed forces, obtained as a result of our previous calculations, to be closer to the truth. Note that due to the lack of a reliable primary calculation of the losses of the armed forces and the inaccuracy of data on the population of the USSR before the start and after the end of the Great Patriotic War, the accuracy of our estimates of both the losses of the Red Army and the total losses of the population is small and fluctuates within plus or minus 5 million

Human.

We estimate the number of wounded Soviet servicemen who were evacuated at 25.8 million, and the number of evacuated patients at 7.7 million. Of the wounded and sick, at least 2.6 million became disabled. In total, in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, together with the peacetime army, according to our estimates, about 46.5 million people were called up, of which about 3.6 million people were returned to the national economy during the war. Net conscription amounted to 42.9 million people. The total irretrievable losses of the Soviet population,

both civilians and military personnel, can be determined by comparing the population of the country on June 22, 1941 and June 1, 1945, taking into account the dynamics of the birth and death rates of the civilian population and changes in the population due to the increase in the territory of the USSR after war. According to our estimate, based on the estimate of the Central Statistical Bureau of 1941, adjusted for the underestimation of an average of 4.6% by June 22, 1941, revealed by recalculation, about 209.3 million people lived on the territory of the USSR.<sup>{6}</sup> borders on June 1, 1945, we estimate 165.5 million people. Taking into account the natural increase in the war years, "eaten" by military losses, and also taking into account that about 620 thousand former Soviet prisoners of war and civilians remained in the West after the war, constituting the so-called "second wave" of emigration, the general

we estimate the irretrievable losses of the population of the USSR by dead and premature deaths due to the deterioration of living conditions caused by the war at 43.3 million people, of which 16.9 million people are civilians. In addition, indirect losses due to the fall in the birth rate in 1942-1945. amounted to approximately 13.8 million unborn children. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet

civilian population include the victims of the Nazi genocide - about 2 million Jews and more than 150 thousand Gypsies, as well as those who died during the bombing and other hostilities and were destroyed by the German troops hostages and underground workers (the dead partisans are mainly former military personnel, and they are included in troop losses). It is also necessary to take into account the victims of the Gulag - excess mortality in prisons and camps compared to peacetime, as well as during the inhuman deportations of "punished peoples" - Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, etc. We estimate the total number of victims of the Gulag and deportations not less than 1 million people.

It is interesting to compare Soviet losses with German ones.<sup>{7}</sup> According to an estimate based on the most reliable personal records in German conditions, the Wehrmacht lost about 3.95 million people in World War II, of which about 800 thousand died in captivity ( 0.45 million - in the East out of a total of 2.73 million in Soviet captivity and 0.35 million - in the West). The irretrievable losses of the civilian population of Germany by German researchers are estimated at about 2 million people, of which about 0.5 million are victims of strategic bombing by allied aviation, 300 thousand Jews, gypsies and opponents of Hitler who died in concentration camps or were executed by the Nazis. The rest of the dead must be attributed to the victims of hostilities in Germany and the excesses committed by Soviet military personnel against the civilian population of the eastern regions of Germany. This can also include those who died prematurely due to the deterioration of living conditions in wartime, but the number of such victims was small. The population of Germany began to experience hunger and other hardships to a large extent only from the end of 1944 as a result of allied bombing, the cessation of the supply of food from the occupied countries and the invasion of Soviet and Anglo-American troops into the territory

Reich. The total irretrievable losses of the population of Germany are 7.3 times less than the Soviet ones, and the losses of the Wehrmacht by the dead are 6.7 times less than the losses of the Red Army. If we take only those who died on the Eastern Front, where the Wehrmacht lost 2.16 million killed and died from wounds and diseases and 0.45 million who died in captivity, then the losses of the Red Army will be 10.1 times greater. Until the end of April 1945, the Wehrmacht lost about 1950 thousand people as prisoners, of which 950 thousand were in the East, which is 6.6 times less than the number of Soviet soldiers in Soviet captivity. The losses of the wounded who were evacuated in the German armed forces amounted to at least 6 million people, and the evacuated patients - up to 12 million people, which is 4.3 and 1.3 times less, respectively, than in the Red Army. In the Wehrmacht, taking into account the peacetime army, about 17.9 million people were mobilized, of which about 2 million people were returned to the national economy during the war. In addition, 1.63 million military personnel were demobilized due to age and other reasons. The net conscription to the Wehrmacht was about 3 times less than the net conscription to the Regional Army, which indicates the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviet troops. We also note that on the Western Front in the last year of the war, from June 1944 to May 1945, German losses in killed were 1.6 times greater than the losses of the allies, and in terms of the number of prisoners the difference was dozens of times. The total number of those mobilized (without being recalled to the national economy) was about 18.7% of the more than 80 million population of the Reich within the borders on September 1, 1939. In the USSR, the total number of mobilized (without being recalled to the national economy) was about 20.5% of the population of the USSR on June 22, 1941. As can be seen, in both countries the percentage of those mobilized was almost the same: in the USSR by a third, and in Germany by half, it exceeded the percentage of the

The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armed forces, which is extremely unfavorable for the USSR, is explained by the fundamental vices of the Soviet totalitarian regime, which did not value the lives of its subjects. Adherence to the template in all spheres of activity, including in military affairs, stemmed from the suppression of initiative and independence in both superiors and subordinates. The German military recalled with amazement the insane Soviet frontal attacks on the unsuppressed defense system, which led to

colossal sacrifices. The low combat training of privates and the low level of operational training of command personnel at all levels also affected. By and large, military art was alien to the highest military leaders. We can agree with the harsh but fair characterization by Marshal A.I. Eremenko, in hot pursuit at the end of February 1943, of another marshal - G.K. to say that Zhukovsky operational art is 5-6 times superior in strength, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight not in quantity and builds his career on blood. But not only Zhukov, but Eremenko himself, and other military leaders, children of the communist system, could not fight otherwise. In the most dangerous attacks, reconnaissance in force and on minefields, first of all, penalized men were sent, and those who were called up from the previously occupied territories were "under the Germans" and already "guilty" before the Soviet government. But even ordinary soldiers had little more chance of surviving than the penalty box.

Fear of reprisals, along with the indifference to their own lives instilled in the regime, drove forward the fighters and commanders of the Red Army. The American diplomat A. Harriman conveys Stalin's words that "in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to advance," and adds: "Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive in the Russian offensive was its massive character. The Russians came wave after wave. The Germans literally salted them, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through. " The front-line writer Viktor Astafiev is right when he says: "We simply did not know how to fight, we simply covered the fascists with our blood, covered them with our corpses." It should be noted that

the Soviet military leaders during the war not only did not have a clear idea of their own losses, but also repeatedly exaggerated the losses of the enemy. For example, in the political report of the head of the political department of the 16th Army, K.L. and German losses were estimated at 240 killed and 9 captured. Soviet

military intelligence estimated the losses of German troops in the war against the USSR in the period from June 22, 1941 to March 1, 1942 at 6.5 million people, including 5.8 million from the ground forces (this was almost twice as much the regular strength of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front). According to German data, the ground forces on the Soviet-German front during this period lost 1,006 thousand people killed, wounded and missing, that is, six times less. Such miscalculations can be explained by the fact that in the reports of the troops and intelligence officers the losses of the enemy were exaggerated in every possible way, since they sought to make them comparable with the actual loss of personnel in their troops. As a result, the military command was wrong in assessing the degree of depletion of German manpower and the prospects for the nature and timing of the end of the war. The German command, on the other hand, fairly correctly assessed the losses of the Red Army. So, Hitler himself in early December 1941 estimated the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces at 8-10 million people, and according to our estimate, by this time the Red Army had lost more than 8.2 million soldiers and commanders killed, wounded and captured. However, Hitler and other military and political leaders of Germany were fatally mistaken in assessing the ability of the Soviet system to mobilize the country's gigantic human potential for the needs of the war and withstand the most critical situations of 1941-1942. German intelligence believed that during the war the USSR would be able to mobilize and arm no more than 12 million people, while in reality almost 43 million were mobilized together with the peacetime army.

Human.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army launched a short-term military campaign in August and early September 1945 against Japan, which was on the eve of the collapse. The losses of the Soviet Armed Forces during this campaign, according to official figures, amounted to 12,031 dead and missing and 24,425 wounded and sick. Mongolian troops allied with the USSR lost 72 killed and missing and 125 wounded and sick. There are no reliable data on the losses of the Japanese and allied Manchu troops in this campaign in killed and wounded. As a result of the surrender of the Japanese army, 640.1 thousand Japanese were captured



military personnel and soldiers of the Manchurian troops allied with Japan. Of this number, about 62 thousand died in

Soviet captivity. After the end of World War II, Soviet servicemen participated in the Korean War of 1950-1953, mainly as military advisers and pilots. During this war, according to official figures, 299 soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army were killed. In Algeria in 1954-1962. and later, 25 Soviet servicemen died for various reasons, in Egypt in the period 1962-1974. - 21, in Syria in 1967-1973. - 35, in Angola in 1975-1979. - 7, in Mozambique in 1967-1979. - 6 and in Ethiopia in 1977-1990. - 34. This does not include military personnel who died of disease and died as a result of incidents not directly related to the conduct of hostilities. In 1956, Soviet troops launched an invasion of Hungary to put

down an anti-communist uprising. During the fighting, 720 Soviet servicemen were killed or went missing and 1,540 were wounded. There is no reliable data on the losses of the Hungarian rebels.

In 1968, Soviet troops, together with the armies of the allies under the Warsaw Pact, entered Czechoslovakia to overthrow the liberal communist regime headed by A. Dubcek. During clashes with citizens of Czechoslovakia, 11 Soviet servicemen were killed and 87 more were injured. In addition, 85 more people died as a result of accidents, suicides and diseases. In 1969, during the border clashes on the

Soviet-Chinese border near Damansky Island and near Lake Zhalanashkol, 60 Soviet servicemen were killed and 99 were wounded. There is no reliable data on the losses of the Chinese side.

From December 1979 to February 1989, Soviet troops fought in Afghanistan against the rebels, supporting the puppet, pro-Soviet communist regime in Kabul. According to official Soviet figures, 14,433 Soviet servicemen and 20 Soviet civilians died in Afghanistan. Of this number, 2386 people died from wounds and 574 people from diseases. There were 53,753 wounded Soviet servicemen, and 415,932 sick people, 298 people are missing. Estimates of the total number of Soviet troops who passed through Afghanistan vary from the official 620 thousand to the maximum

estimates by some researchers at 3 million people. There are also higher independent estimates of the magnitude of Soviet irretrievable losses in Afghanistan - from 35 to 50 thousand dead. According to our estimate, based on fragmentary data on the number of dead and wounded among certain categories of military personnel, the number of disabled people and irretrievable losses in individual clashes, on the average size of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan (according to official data, it ranged from 80 to 104 thousand, it was also called a higher figure of 120 thousand people) and the total number of military personnel who came to Afghanistan (soldiers usually served here up to 1-1.5, officers - up to 1.5-2 years), in total, up to 1.5 million participated in the Afghan campaign Soviet military personnel, of which 135-140 thousand people died and up to 350 thousand people were injured. According to some reports, about half of the servicemen who returned from Afghanistan and served in combat units (and we estimate that there were 700-800 thousand of them) were wounded. There is no reliable data on the losses of Afghans (both military personnel and civilians). The last

major conflict in which Russian troops are still involved is the war in Chechnya, initiated by the entry of Russian troops into the republic on December 11, 1994, in an attempt to overthrow the independence-seeking Chechen government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Prior to this, during the unsuccessful assault on the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny - by the Chechen opposition troops, with the support of the Russian military, at least several dozen Russian servicemen were killed and dozens were captured. In the first two months of fighting after December 11, 1994, the losses of Russian troops, according to official figures, exceeded 1.5 thousand dead and missing, while the Chechen losses of the Russian military at various times were estimated from 6670 to 15 thousand dead. According to other sources, Russian losses in Chechnya are much higher. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights under the President of Russia S. A. Kovalev, who was in the conflict zone, in the first two months of fighting, the Russian army lost about 10 thousand people in Chechnya, and irretrievable losses only among civilians in Grozny from Russian aviation and artillery amounted to about 24.5 thousand people. According to S. A. Kovalev, the losses of the Chechen army were several

times lower than Russian ones. General A. Maskhadov, chief of staff of the Chechen army, also cited similar figures of losses. According to him, about 12,000 Russian and about 600 Chechen servicemen were killed in two months of fighting. The Russian army inherited and multiplied all the vices of the old Soviet Army, showing a significantly lower combat capability and level of control than the professionally trained Chechen formations, despite their overwhelming numerical and technical (in aviation, artillery and tanks) superiority. In a certain period, the number of Russian troops in Chechnya reached 60 thousand people, while the number of the Chechen army, even according to the maximum estimates, did not exceed 15-20 thousand people. Taking all this into account, we estimate the loss of Russian troops in the first two months of the war at about 10,000 dead, and Chechen troops at about 1,000 dead. In addition, up to 30,000 civilians died during the first two months of the war, primarily in Grozny. We also note that the unfavorable course of the Chechen war for the Russian army and the high level of casualties testify in favor of the highest estimates of Soviet irretrievable losses in Afghanistan. Close to the figure of S. A. Kovalev and the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers,

whose representatives stated that they had information about the death of 6 thousand military personnel by the beginning of February 1995. According to military doctors, published in the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper on June 10, 1995, by the beginning of June, refrigerators in Rostov with a capacity of 2,500 people were filled to overflowing with the corpses of soldiers. It can be assumed that the dead were kept there for about a month of fighting. If we take the level of losses in May 1995 close to the average for the war, then by mid-June 1995, when there was a long pause in hostilities due to the hostage-taking in Budenovsk by Sh. Basayev's detachment, the Russian army and internal troops should have lost about 15, 5 thousand people died, and with those who died from wounds and diseases - at least 16 thousand. In the winter of 1995/1996. active hostilities resumed, reaching a particular intensity in the spring of 1996, on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia. Only during the fighting in the Bamut area, according to the Chechen side, from 500 to 1 thousand Russian servicemen died (the Russian command recognized

loss of 125 people). During the capture of Grozny by Chechen troops in August 1996, the federal

side reported the death of 506 servicemen during the 10-day battles, stating that | that the data is not final, since many were buried by Chechens in mass graves or remained in unsorted rubble. So the data of the Chechen side about the death of a thousand or more Russian soldiers and officers during the capture of Grozny seem close to reality. In total, in the last months of the fighting in Chechnya, the losses of the Russian side in the dead can be estimated at 4 thousand people, and the total losses of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs killed and died from wounds during the entire war - at least 20 thousand people.

It is even more difficult to assess the losses of the Chechen side. According to Duma deputy S. Yushenkov, by December 28, 1994, the Chechen army had lost 310 people killed. If we take this level of losses as the average for the period until mid-June 1995, then during this time the troops of the Republic of Ichkeria should have lost about 3.1 thousand killed, and with those who died from wounds and diseases - up to 3.5 thousand. losses on the Chechen side decreased as the Russian army attacked the hard-to-reach and well-fortified mountainous regions of Chechnya. During the capture of Grozny by the Chechens in August 1996, the federal troops showed extremely low combat effectiveness and even resorted to the shameful practice of taking hostages among civilians. In addition, the Chechen offensive turned out to be sudden for the Russian side. Taking into account all these factors, we estimate the Chechen losses in the last months of the war at approximately 500 killed and died from wounds, and the total losses of the Chechen army in the dead - at 4

thousand

Data on civilian casualties in Chechnya are rather scarce. There is information that in the first two and a half months of the war, about 30 thousand civilians died, of which five-sixths died in Grozny, during the bombing and storming of the city. Later, the level of losses should have decreased, since there were no more such large-scale hostilities in large settlements, although the civilian population suffered significant losses during Russian bombing, shelling and "cleansing operations". In August 1996, intense fighting resumed in Grozny, where

several thousand citizens. There is an estimate of 70,000 dead civilians (before the latest fighting in Grozny). Taking into account these recent battles in the capital and in the south of Chechnya, the total number of civilian casualties can be estimated at 75 thousand people, and the total number of deaths during the conflict at 99 thousand. This figure is close to the estimate of the former Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed, who declared about 80 thousand dead in Chechnya. In early September 1996, Russian Defense Minister I. Rodionov stated that 2,837 servicemen of the Ministry of Defense had died in Chechnya, and 337 people were missing, and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had approximately the same losses. In total, this gives about 6 thousand dead, but this estimate seems to be underestimated by at least three times. The number of wounded in the army was estimated by Rodionov as 13,270, which also seems to be an underestimation in approximately the same proportion as the number of those killed. For example, according to military doctors, only on one day in mid-May 1995, 56 wounded servicemen were admitted to the Grozny hospital, although only 15 were officially reported wounded.

From March 27 to the end of May 1995, the 532nd Special Purpose Medical Detachment alone received more than 3,000 wounded servicemen. If we assume that the number of wounded, as well as the number of those killed, is underestimated by 3-3.5 times and the losses of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the wounded are approximately equal to the losses of the army, then the total number of wounded Russian servicemen "will be 80-90 thousand people. This figure corresponds to the published data that during the entire time of the Chechen conflict, only helicopters of the Russian ground forces transported 28,000 wounded. not only helicopters, but also airplanes, and motor vehicles. The number of wounded on the Chechen side, assuming the same ratio between those killed and wounded as on the Russian side, can be estimated at 15-20 thousand people. We also note that the underestimation of Russian losses could partially occur due to soldiers contract soldiers, many of whom are recruited from among the unemployed or homeless. There have been repeated reports in the media that casualties among contract soldiers are not included in official reports, but check the veracity

these messages are not currently available. It should also be noted that 83% of the servicemen who fought in Chechnya previously lived in rural areas. Those killed among them, as well as children from orphanages who have no relatives, may well not have been included in the official lists of casualties, since the likelihood "that information about them as missing in Chechnya will reach the general public and the media", was close to zero. It is possible that the action of the same factor at one time allowed the authorities to underestimate the figures of losses in Afghanistan. We point out that representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers expressed doubts about the reliability of the figures of losses made public by I. Rodionov, stating that, according to their data, the loss of the Russian army killed amounted to about 10 thousand people.

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In second place after wars and military conflicts as factors of demographic catastrophes in the USSR was famine. For the first time he struck in 1921 the Volga region. In addition to crop failure, the famine was facilitated by the general physical weakening of the population due to the disasters of the civil war, the disruption of transport caused by it, and the policy of war communism, which thoroughly destroyed the country's agriculture through the surplus appraisal. The victims of the famine undoubtedly numbered in the many hundreds of thousands, but there are no statistical data to accurately determine them. Therefore, in our study, those who died of starvation in the Volga region are included in the total number of victims of the civil war - along with those who died in battle, from terror and epidemics. Since the total losses in the civil war were determined above by us at 5.75 million dead and dead, the sometimes found estimate of 6 million victims of famine in the Volga region seems to be very far from the truth.

The second time famine struck the population of the USSR in 1932-1933. and was associated with the forcible mass collectivization of the peasantry. There are general estimates of the number of victims of collectivization for 1930-1933, including those who died due to dispossession, spontaneous anti-Soviet uprisings, as well as hunger and disease, at 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 7.5; 8; 10; 13 and 16 million people.<sup>{8}</sup> However, it must be borne in mind that the highest estimates include not only the actual deaths, but also the demographic losses caused by

a decrease in the birth rate in these years, i.e., unborn. The most reliable estimates of the number of deaths during the years of collectivization for some of the most affected regions. The number of dead and dead in Kazakhstan in 1930-1933 Kazakhstani demographers Zh. Abylkhozhin and M. Tatimov define it as 1.7 million people (in addition, 600 thousand Kazakhs migrated to Xinjiang). International Commission of Inquiry into the Famine of 1932-1933. in Ukraine, working in 1988-1990, estimated the death toll in this country at no less than 4.5 million people, and in other regions, excluding Kazakhstan, at 2 million people (of which the main mortality occurred in the Northern Caucasus). Thus, the total losses during collectivization can be estimated at about 8 million people (the accuracy of this estimate, taking into account the imperfection of data on the size and natural movement of the population of the USSR in the 30s, is plus or minus two million people). The catastrophe was caused by a crop failure and a drop in grain collection due to collectivization.

The last time hunger struck the population of the USSR was in 1946-1947, after the end of World War II. During the war years, the decline in agricultural production was partially offset by Lend-Lease food supplies, which ceased in the post-war years (instead, the herd assistance was provided, but on a smaller scale, by the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration (UNRRA), which supplied seeds and food to the victims of the occupation of Ukraine and Belarus). The abolition of the rationing system, which began in 1946, exacerbated the food shortage and provoked mass starvation. It covered mainly Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. According to V.F. Zima, based on data on mortality and migrations of the population in 1946-1947, about 1 million people died from starvation and related diseases. {9} Thus, during the years of Soviet power, from the consequences collectivization and famine died about 9

million people.

Political repressions became the third most important factor in demographic catastrophes in the Soviet era.{10} of which 642,980 people were

sentenced to death. Despite a possible underestimation, this figure is probably close to the truth and can be taken as an approximate number of those executed for political reasons, given that not all death sentences were carried out. In addition, in the camps of the Gulag from January 1, 1934 to January 1, 1948, about 964 thousand prisoners, both criminal and political, died. The proportion of the latter among those held in the camps during this period ranged from 12.6 to 59.2%. If we assume that the proportion of political among the dead was approximately the same, then the total number of deaths in the camps convicted under political articles can be estimated at about 300 thousand people, of which about 180 thousand fell during the Great Patriotic War (these victims of political repression are included in the irretrievable losses of the civilian population during the war years). In addition to the camps, prisoners also died in corrective labor colonies, but there both the death rate and the proportion of political prisoners were much lower than in the camps. Since the period 1934-1947. differed both in the maximum proportion of those convicted for counter-revolutionary activities (a total of 2369 thousand political prisoners were sentenced to imprisonment in 1921-1953), and in the highest mortality, the number of political prisoners who died in the penal colony and camps, as well as in prisons, hardly exceeded 100 thousand Human. Then the total number of deaths as a result of political repression in 1921-1953. can be estimated at about 1050 thousand people, of which probably at least 250 thousand, including those sentenced to death, died during the Great Patriotic War.

We summarize the results of our study in the following table:

Population losses in Russia and the USSR as a result of demographic catastrophes in 1904-1996. (killed and dead) (thousand people)	
Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 Total killed in the armed forces of Russia.....	53.0
World War I 1914-1918. Total number of deaths in the armed forces of Russia.....	2000.0
including those who died in captivity .....	150.0
Civil war 1917-1922 General population losses .....	5750.0
including those in the Red Army and allied formations with her, including losses in the Soviet-Polish war	



.....742.0  
 including as part of the White armies and formations allied with  
 them .....  
 284.0 including "green", local, national and other formations who  
 fought both against reds and against  
  
 whites .....224.0 Total  
 casualties in the armed formations .... 1260.0 Victims  
 of terror ..... 1500.0 including the  
 Red Terror ..... 1000.0 Victims of  
 famine and epidemics ..... 2990.0 Armed conflicts near Lake Kha  
 1938-1939  
 Losses of the Red Army .....  
 10.0 Other, armed conflicts 1920 -1930s, including the fight against  
 the Basmachi in Central Asia and the invasion of Poland in September  
 1939. Losses  
 of the Red Army .....  
 2.0 Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Losses  
 of the Red Army ..... 166.0  
 Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 gg. General  
 losses of the population of the USSR .....  
 43,300.0 including losses of the Soviet Armed Forces .....  
 26,400.0  
 including those who died in captivity ..... ..  
 4000.0 Losses of the civilian population of the  
 USSR ..... 16 900.0 Soviet-  
 Japanese war of 1945. Losses of the Soviet Armed  
 Forces ..... 12.0 Armed conflicts of the 1950s-1970s, including the war  
 Korea, the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the Middle East wars  
 Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces .....  
 1.2 War in Afghanistan 1979-1988.  
 Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces ..... 135.0  
 War in Chechnya 1994-1996  
 General losses of the population .....  
 100.0 including losses of armed formations. .. 24.0

including losses of the Russian Armed Forces (Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, border guards) ..... 20.0  
including losses of the Chechen armed forces .. ... 4.0 including  
losses of the civilian population of Chechnya .... 76.0 Losses of the  
population of Russia and the USSR in wars and military conflicts  
1904-1996..... 51529.2  
including the loss of the population of the USSR, 1917-1991 49 376.2  
Losses of the population of the USSR from hunger and collectivization,  
1930-1933 .....  
8000.0 The loss of the population of the USSR from starvation,  
1946-1947. .... 1000.0 Losses of the population of the USSR from political  
repressions, 1921-1953 ..... 1050.0 /This number  
includes 250,000 dead during the Great Patriotic War and included in the column of  
military losses./  
Total losses of the population of the USSR from hunger and political 10,050.0  
repressions .....  
Total losses of the population of Russia and the USSR as a result of  
demographic catastrophes 1904-1996 ..... 61 329.2 including  
the loss of the population of the USSR 1917-1991. 59,176.2  
\* \* \*

The total demographic loss of the population of the USSR and Russia in the 20th century, as can be seen, exceeded 61 million people and was one of the highest in the world (in absolute terms, only the loss of the population of China can be compared with them, but there, probably, a more significant factor there was a famine, not a war). Potential demographic losses due to those who were not born during the First World War, the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War reached, according to our estimates, 25.8 million people.

The bulk of the dead and those who died during the years of Soviet power - more than two thirds - fell on the period of the Great Patriotic War. Our figure of 1,050,000 victims of political repression can be at least doubled by the number of victims of the Red Terror during the Civil War. The victims of the famine - about 9 million people - to some extent can also be equated with the victims of political repression, since the most severe famine of the 30s was largely caused by a political event - collectivization, and those who died of starvation were primarily those who

one way or another, he was in opposition to Soviet power - kulaks and other peasants and nomads (in Kazakhstan) who did not want to join collective farms. Also during the years of the Great Patriotic War, conscripts from the occupied territories who fell under suspicion and militia divisions formed from not quite trustworthy urban intelligentsia were most used as cannon fodder. The communist regime did not value the lives of its subjects, and could not create a truly combat-ready army comparable to the armies of Germany, England and the United States due to the low level of self-awareness, education and combat training of the bulk of soldiers and commanders. In addition, both privates and generals were taught by the totalitarian system to be afraid to make decisions on their own, which could not but have a detrimental effect on the course of hostilities and the level of losses. As a result, victory in a war with such a serious enemy as the German Wehrmacht could only be achieved at the cost of very large bloodshed, which is why Soviet losses exceeded by many times the losses of the enemy. A similar indifference of the authorities to the population largely contributed to the many millions of victims during periods of famine. As for the physical suppression of dissidents, the fact that the number of victims of political repression in just three decades has reached a demographically significant value - more than 1 million people - speaks for itself. In fact, some of the Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush and a number of other peoples who died during the years of collectivization, as well as during the deportation during the Great Patriotic War during the years of the Great Patriotic War (in our study, they are taken into account in the section of military losses) can also be attributed to the victims of political repressions. General demographic losses of the population of the USSR in 1917-1953. exceeded 59 million people, which amounted to 30% of the country's population at the beginning of 1955 - 194.4 million people. Since the mid-1950s,

the scale of Soviet population losses has been sharply reduced. This was facilitated by the absence of large-scale wars, the cessation of political repressions in their former form and scale, as well as the cessation of deaths from starvation. The country had largely overcome its former isolation from the outside world, and now the increase in food shortages, threatening mass starvation, was prevented by purchases in the West. The only one

a more or less significant military conflict in which the Soviet Army was involved after the end of the Second World War is the war in Afghanistan. Here the same vices were manifested that were characteristic of her in 1939-1945, so the losses were great, especially taking into account the relative military weakness of the enemy. The just ended Chechen war demonstrated to the whole world that the Russian army had so far inherited only the worst qualities of the Soviet army, which resulted in heavy losses suffered in Chechnya. A significant number of victims among the civilian population of the republic is primarily due to the fact that Russian (in the past - Soviet) generals and officers are not accustomed to reckon with victims not only among their own soldiers, but also among the civilian population. Notes: {1} Maksudov S. Population losses in the USSR. Benson (Vermont),

1989. {2}

Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. M., 1960. {3} On the

losses of the USSR in this war, see: Aptekar PA Are the victims justified? // Military history magazine. 1992. No 3. {4} Classified as classified. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat operations and military conflicts. Ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. M., 1993. {5} The calculation mechanism is described in detail: Sokolov V. V.

The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939-1945. - Journal of Slavic Military Studies, March 1996. For an abbreviated version, see: Sokolov B.V. The cost of losses is the price of the system // Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1993, June 22; Sokolov B.V. The price of war // Delo. 1995. No 8. {6} See:

Kozhurin V.S. On the population of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War // Military History Journal. 1991.

No 2. Here are the data of a preliminary estimate of the population of the USSR on January 1, 1941, made by the Central Statistical Bureau in June 1941. It was estimated at 198.7 million people. Only Moldova and the Khabarovsk Territory managed to recalculate, and in these regions there were more inhabitants than according to the preliminary calculation, by 4.7% and 4.5%, respectively (4.6% on average).

Assuming that approximately the same underestimation was made in the primary calculation for other regions (and that such an underestimation

was, no doubt; for example, in Estonia on January 1, 1940 and 1941, the same population was given), then by January 1, 1941, the actual population of the USSR should be 207.8 million people, and by June 22, from taking into account the natural movement of the population, - 209.3 million. We emphasize that the above estimate of the CSO is the only estimate of the population of the USSR Within the new borders, made before the start of the Great Patriotic War on the basis of primary statistical materials that are not currently available. In the light of these data, the official figure of the total losses of the population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 26.6 million dead and dead seems to be clearly underestimated. {7} For a review of various estimates of German losses, see: Overmans R. Human casualties of World War II

in Germany // World War II. Ed. V. Michalki. Per. with him. M., 1996.

{8} On the victims of collectivization, see: Famine of 1932-1933. Ed. Yu. N. Afanasiev, N. A. Ivnitsky. M., 1995; Danilov V., Ilyin A., Teptsov N. Collectivization: how it was // History gives a lesson. M., 1989. {9} About the famine of 1946-1947. see:

Winter V.F. Famine in Russia 1946-1947 // Patriotic history. 1993. No 1.

{10} On the number of victims of political repression, see: Zemskov VN GULAG (historical and sociological aspect) // Sociological research. 1991. NoNo 6, 7.

Russian collaborators (Published: Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 29.10.1991. Published with corrections.) Traitors and patriots It cannot be said that the phenomenon of Soviet collaborationism was unique in World War II. But if not by the share of the population, then by the absolute number of collaborators who served in the German army. The Soviet Union occupies a sad first place.

Since the beginning of the war, millions of Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner. By December 1, 1941, there were already 3806 thousand of them. In 1942, another 1653 thousand were added, in 1943 - 565 thousand, in 1944 - 147 thousand. Even in four months of victorious 1945, 34 thousand Soviet military personnel managed to get captured . Of the approximately 6.2 million Soviet prisoners, about 100, and maybe 200 thousand, were able to escape, about 4.2 million died in

captivity, and approximately 1.8 million were liberated by Soviet troops (of which only half at the time of liberation retained the status of long-term prisoners, while the rest had been liberated by the Germans themselves and served in collaborationist formations). The numbers are terrible.

The reason for the tragedy lies in the misanthropic policy of Hitler, for whom the territories in the East were primarily "living space" for German colonization. The German leadership counted on a blitzkrieg and did not care about the prisoners - more than 2.5 million of them did not survive the winter of 1941/1942. The Soviet government provided unwitting support, although it declared with the outbreak of war that it was ready to comply with the basic conditions of the Geneva Convention on Conversion with prisoners of war, but in fact rejected two of its most important points: on providing the International Red Cross with lists of captured enemy soldiers and on allowing parcels from their homeland for military personnel. As a result, the German command left the prisoners without food and in unequipped camps to their fate.

There were many defectors. For the first year of the war, however, when their number was especially large, there is no data, but it is known that later, in the second half of 1942, 61 thousand Red Army soldiers defected to the side of the Germans. In 1943, the number of defectors decreased to 24 thousand, and in the first three months of 1944 there were only 2.2 thousand of them. In the last year of the war, there were even fewer of them (there are no exact data), but even in March 1945 on the Oder, when no one doubted Hitler's defeat, 18 Soviet soldiers nevertheless ran across the

German lines. Collaboration with Germany was initially not rejected by many captured representatives of the Soviet generals. So, according to German data, in December 1941, such generals as M. I. Potapov and P. G. Ponedelin expressed their readiness, under certain conditions, together with the German army to fight against Stalin and the Bolsheviks ... On December 12, the hero of Vyazma, Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin, under whose leadership the encircled Soviet troops detained the infantry units of the Center group for almost two weeks and thereby, perhaps, saved Moscow, transmitted on behalf of a group of generals imprisoned with him a proposal to the German side to create a Russian

a counter-government that would prove to the people and the army that it is possible to fight "against the hated Bolshevik system" without opposing the interests of one's homeland. At the same time, Lukin told the German officers who interrogated him: "The people will face an unusual situation: the Russians sided with the so-called enemy, which means that going over to them is not treason to the Motherland, but only a departure from the system ... Even prominent Soviet figures will probably think about this, perhaps, even those who can still do something. After all, not all leaders are sworn adherents of communism. Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin died in 1970 as a recognized war hero. Only 14 years later, in Joachim

Hoffman's book "History of the Vlasov Army", excerpts from the protocols of his interrogations were published. If these protocols fell into the hands of Stalin's investigators, the general would not escape execution. After all, General Ponedelin was shot after the war, and only on the basis of very confused denunciations about his alleged readiness to cooperate with the enemy. And even later, during the time of Khrushchev or Brezhnev, the announcement of the protocols would certainly deprive Lukin of the rank of general, and his name would be deleted from the history of the Great Patriotic War ...

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The first stage of collaborationism encouraged by the Germans in Russia came from the first weeks of the war. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, in order to escape from the camp, and civilians, in order not to die of hunger, entered the German army as "Hee-wee" - "voluntary assistants (Hilfswillige). They were used in rear services and formally did not have the right to wear weapons, although they were considered soldiers of the German army. Soon, many "Hee-wee" began to be used for sentry and security functions and armed with light small arms. By the end of 1941, "Hee-wee" was already about 200 thousand people: Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Latvians, Tatars ... It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of "Hee-Vi" in different periods. According to some estimates, in the spring of 1943 there were more than 1 million. According to a number of German generals and officers, without the assistance of "voluntary assistants" it would have been impossible for German troops in Russia to solve the difficult problems of transport and supply.

From the moment the war in the East took on a protracted character, the German command began to seek the possibility of forming combat units from collaborators, initially more for propaganda than for actual military purposes. In the formation of Russian units, an important role was played by the captured commander of the 2nd shock army and deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. Born in 1901 into a peasant family, Vlasov made a brilliant career. At the beginning of the war, he commanded the 4th mechanized corps on the Southwestern Front, then - the 37th army in the battle of Kiev. In the Battle of Moscow, Vlasov successfully led the 20th Army. Later, he led the 2nd shock, which was surrounded through no fault of his own. He tried to get to the front line with a group of fighters, but on July 11, 1942 he was captured by a German patrol. In his appeals to the Red Army soldiers later, Vlasov repeatedly claimed that he deliberately took up the fight against the Bolsheviks for the "new Russia". However, by his own admission, he decided the question of the unacceptability of the Soviet system for himself only when he was surrounded in the Volkhov swamps. By the autumn of 1942, Vlasov was the largest and most popular Soviet commander in the army, who agreed to cooperate unconditionally with Germany. Lukin, not having obtained the consent of the German leaders to the

creation of an independent Russian army and government, and convinced of the death of millions of prisoners in the camps due to the inhumanity of the Germans, lost interest in such cooperation. In addition, he asked the Germans for the time being not to announce his proposals for Russian-German cooperation, because he was afraid for the family that remained in the unoccupied territory. Therefore, the choice fell on Vlasov, whose name promised the greatest propaganda effect.

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In Smolensk, on December 27, 1942, the appeal of the Russian Committee to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army was published, signed by its chairman, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov and secretary, Major General V. F. Malyshev, the former chief of staff of the 19th Army. In this appeal, Bolshevism was declared "the enemy of the Russian people" and the main culprit of the war. It was also stated here: "The history of our country does not know such



defeats, which were the lot of the Red Army in this war. Despite the selflessness of the fighters and commanders, despite the courage and sacrifice of the Russian people, battle after battle was lost. The reason for this is the rottenness of the entire Bolshevik system, the mediocrity of Stalin and his main headquarters. "Stalin's allies" - the British and American "capitalists" who allegedly betrayed the Russian people" also got it, while "Germany is not waging war against the Russian people and its Motherland, but only against Bolshevism." The Russian Committee called on the Russian people to fight for a "new Russia" - "without Bolsheviks and capitalists." In this "new Russia" forced labor was to be abolished and the "real" right to work, as well as real freedoms of conscience, speech, and assembly were to be ensured for workers ... Vlasov and Malyshev called for the destruction of the "regime of terror and violence." A special paragraph of the appeal also provided for ensuring social justice and protecting workers from any exploitation. "The collective farms were supposed to be liquidated and the land transferred to the private ownership of the peasants. In addition, they promised to release all political prisoners. The program is attractive at first glance. But in the same appeal, the Russian Committee declared enemies of the

people not only "Stalin and his clique", but also "everyone who volunteers to serve in the punitive organs of Bolshevism - special departments, the NKVD, detachments", and even "those who destroy the values belonging to the Russian people". people should be mercilessly destroyed. It is easy to see that millions and millions of people are included in this category, including even ordinary Red Army soldiers, who destroyed bridges, roads and buildings on the orders of the command. Come Vlasov and his supporters to power as a result of the German victory, they would arrange a terror that could eclipse the Red Terror in Russia in 1917-1920, when, according to some reports, about 2 million people died. And upon closer examination, the program for building a "new Russia" turns out to be copied from the program documents of the German Nazis with their slogans of the struggle against Russian Bolshevism and Western plutocracy. By the way, the Russian Committee also spoke very sparingly about the national question, promising only a "guarantee of national freedom" and emphasizing the special role

ranking people. Well, the members of the Russian Russian, high-committee, Soviet military in the past, who grew up in a totalitarian system, accepted without much difficulty another totalitarian ideology - Nazi, which often coincided almost literally with the Bolshevik. It is interesting that Major M.F. Zykov worked at Vlasov's headquarters, who was a supporter of N.I. Bukharin, worked with him in Izvestia, was in a camp, was released before the war, and, having been captured, tried to implement the "Bukharin alternative" within the framework of the Vlasov movement. He disappeared without a trace in the summer of 1944. At Vlasov's headquarters and in the leadership of the Wehrmacht, there was no doubt that he was kidnapped and killed by Gestapo agents who saw in Zuev a "Jew" (perhaps unfounded) and a "communist" (which is undoubtedly). The Gestapo, in turn, claimed that Zuev was killed by Soviet agents.

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In 1942-1943. separate security or combat infantry battalions, formed by the Wehrmacht from prisoners of Russian nationality, were formally included in the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) headed by Vlasov. Sometimes during the fighting they were united in regiments. One of these regiments, for example, during the landing of the allies in Normandy, was commanded by the former colonel of the Red Army S.K. Bunyachenko, later - the commander of the 1st division of the ROA (he was awarded by the Germans for the battles in Normandy). At the end of 1942, on the orders of Hitler, many military formations from Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, representatives of Muslim nationalities and other immigrants from the USSR were transferred from East to West, and later to Italy (Russian Hee Vee were even in Rommel's army in Northern Africa). This, along with the refusal to form any Russian political bodies and the Russian army, as well as other national bodies, caused a decline in morale and an increase in desertion to the partisans. Vlasov, in practice, did not control the use of parts of the ROA formally headed by him. In those cases when individual Russian battalions found themselves at the front, they fought stubbornly. Here, however, we encounter the courage of the doomed rather than the heroism of the conscious fighters against Stalin's tyranny. In the event of a retreat, the Vlasovites were threatened with severe German repressions,

Soviet captivity threatened them with a quick and often painful death. I recall the story of my distant Belarusian relative, who in July 1944 liberated Brest as a sergeant. Shortly after the German retreat, the Brest Fortress was visited by two Soviet colonels who were inspecting its fortifications. In the dungeons of the fortress, a Vlasov platoon was hiding, which destroyed both. They began to look for the disappeared colonels, the soldiers discovered the Vlasovites and, with the help of smoke bombs, forced them to surrender. The commander of the unit told the prisoners: "I can transfer your case to the tribunal, and everyone will be shot. But I appeal to my soldiers. As they decide, so it will be with you." And the soldiers immediately raised the Vlasovites on bayonets, not heeding the call of one of them to listen to why they began to serve the Germans.

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Since 1942, the highest officers of the German army were aware that the creation of the ROA and some kind of Russian government alternative to Stalin, as well as a number of other national armies and governments, could become the only means of achieving victory in the East. However, until the beginning of 1944, their proposals in this regard were rejected by Hitler and Himmler, who considered the "eastern territories" only as German colonies. But with new defeats in the East and West, even the Nazi leaders made concessions here. Back in 1943, troops were created, collaborationist formations. On April 16 of the same year, the chief of staff of Army Group North, General Kinzel, criticizing the charters intended for these formations, wrote to the commander of the Eastern Forces, General Helmikh, that they bypass the main question: "what will happen to them, the fighters of the Eastern troops, homeland after the war command Eastern "because bringing together All it is completely wrong to think that they are "fighting on the side of Germany out of gratitude for the liberation from Bolshevism." "For the fighters of the Eastern troops, in fact, the question is this: will we move from Bolshevik slavery to German slavery, or are we fighting for the freedom and independence of our Motherland?" In order for this kind of assumption to receive at least formal approval, it took the defeat of German troops in France and Belarus in the summer of 1944. On September 14, Vlasov was received

Himmler. The commander of the ROA was promised the preservation of Russia within the borders on September 1, 1939, subject to broad autonomy for non-Russian peoples and Cossack regions. Hitler and Himmler agreed to the formation of the 1st division of the ROA (600th Infantry). In January 1945, the 2nd division of the ROA (650th infantry) began to form. Then, in the autumn of 1944, Germany was preparing for a counter-offensive in the Ardennes, hoping to inflict a decisive defeat on the Western allies and force them to a separate peace. After that, they expected to throw all their forces to the East and defeat the Red Army. It was here that the ROA divisions were

supposed to play their role. On November 14, 1944, the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) was formed in Prague, headed by Vlasov. He united the Russian Committee and other national committees and military formations created under the auspices of Germany (except for the Baltic ones). KONR adopted a manifesto, basically repeating the appeal of the Russian Committee of December 27, 1942. It is significant that the manifesto did not say anything about the struggle against the "British and American capitalists", and Germany's help was already welcomed "on conditions that do not affect the honor and independence of our country." At the same time, it was emphasized that at the moment Germany's assistance is the only opportunity to wage an armed struggle against the "Stalinist clique". The manifesto also indicated the desire of the KONR to maintain friendly relations with all countries after the war. KONR also declared that now, with the Red Army's entry into Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans, the war had taken on a distinctly predatory character on the part of the USSR. One gets the impression that the KONR manifesto was addressed not so much to the Red Army and the population of the USSR, but to the Western allies, whose protection the committee members were trying to achieve, in view of the near defeat of Germany, which had become undeniable.

People-collaborators are "children of the Soviet peoples" (Published: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 20, 1992. Published with

corrections.) The huge number of Soviet prisoners in the first two years of the war was a consequence of German superiority on the battlefield. But not only. Many peoples of the USSR, especially the inhabitants of the re

The Baltic States, Bessarabia, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, at first saw the German troops as their liberators.

Many immigrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Volga region did not show much desire to fight for Stalin and for Soviet power ... Included in the Red Army, the armies of the former Baltic states, for the most part, with weapons in their hands, went over to the side of the Germans. Since

the beginning of the war, the militants of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists attacked Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and members of anti-Soviet organizations in the Baltic states even managed to occupy some cities, in particular Kaunas, even before the approach of the German units. Yes, and many fighters and commanders from among Russians, eastern Ukrainians and eastern Belarusians were demoralized by many years of Stalinist terror and the Soviet system itself and did not show proper stamina

in battle, easily surrendering. I have already written about the hostility of the German leadership to the very idea of the Russian liberation movement, and this was also reflected in the

status of the units that later became part of the ROA, headed by A. Vlasov. The situation was somewhat different in the Estonian, Latvian and to some extent Lithuanian units, since the Germans still allowed limited local self-government in the Baltic countries. True, here the

attitude towards the Lithuanians was somewhat worse: unlike the Estonians and Latvians, they were not considered an Aryan people.

Therefore, in particular, the Lithuanian SS division was formed later than the Estonian

By the autumn of 1944, national formations played a significant role in the German army. The Baltic divisions had been fighting at the front for a long time: the SS 15th (Lithuanian-Latvian, but with a predominance of Latvians), the 19th (Latvian) and the 20th (Estonian). The 14th SS division was formed from the Ukrainians, which in the summer of 1944 fell into the cauldron near Brody, escaped from the encirclement and, after reorganization, was again brought into battle on the southern sector of the Eastern Front at the very end of the war. In Italy, since 1943, the 162nd Infantry Division, formed from the Turkic population of the Caucasus and Central Asia, fought. In Yugoslavia, as part of the 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions, formed from the Cossacks of the Don, Kub.

Terek and the peoples of the North Caucasus, the 15th Cavalry Corps, led by the German General von Panwitz, operated. At

the same time, the 29th SS division of the RONA (Russian Liberation People's Army) was formed, headed by Bronislav Kaminsky. Kaminsky, a former prisoner (unknown - criminal or political), lived in the city of Lokot, Bryansk region, where he worked as an engineer at a chemical plant. With the arrival of the Germans, from 1942 he headed the administration of the "self-governing district of Lokot" and the militia, intended to fight the partisans. Then the SS brigade was formed from the militia, after the Germans left Lokot, it was deployed against the partisans of Belarus, and in 1944 against the Warsaw insurgents.

During the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, Kaminsky's fighters shamelessly robbed the population. The Germans decided to arrest Kaminsky. He fled to the Carpathians, in the region of Tarnopol, trying to join the detachments of the anti-communist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), but in November he was killed by agents of the German security service (SD). After these events, the emerging 29th SS division was included in the 1st division of the ROA. The 30th SS division, formed from the SS brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Sieglig, which included parts of the Belarusian self-defense (mainly former prisoners of Russian nationality), was later merged into the 1st and 2nd divisions of the ROA. At the very end of the war in Germany, the 30th SS division was formed for the second time as a national Belarusian division from Belarusian collaborators who left with the Germans. In April 1945, this division was sent to the Italian front, but did not take part in the battles. For most of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR,

cooperation with Germany was an attempt to resist the Soviet policy of destroying national cultures and Russification. The tragic dilemma of the national movements in the Second World War was well expressed by the President of the Belarusian People's Rada Zakharka: "We have no choice" either or ". If the Germans win, they will destroy us all, if the Soviets win, they will destroy the intelligentsia and assimilate the people ... Third no exit". In this regard, the history of relations between the Germans and

the national movement in Ukraine is interesting. At the start of the war, the faction

An organization of Ukrainian nationalists led by Stepan Bandera organized their own government in Lvov, which, however, was arrested by German troops a few days later, and Bandera himself was sent to the so-called "political bunker" of Sachsenhausen, where politicians with whom Germany was counting were imprisoned. reach an agreement. Another faction of the

OUN, headed by Andriy Melnyk, who unconditionally took the side of the Germans, was not popular among Ukrainians. The Bandera people, on the other hand, created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which acted both against the Germans and against the Soviet partisans, but preferred to conserve strength until the moment when failures would force the Germans to a political agreement with the OUN or when the possibility of an attack on Ukraine by the forces of the Western allies arose.

In October 1944, when Ukraine had already been lost to the Germans, Bandera was released, and although an agreement could not be reached, Germany began to arm the UPA units and send their leaders to the Soviet rear to fight against the Red

Army. Now the slogan of self-determination of Ukraine was not so terrible for Hitler, and at the same time the Ukrainian Liberation Committee was formed, at the head of which the Germans put a politically neutral figure - General Pavel Shandruk, the last chief of staff of Petliura's army, and then - an officer of the Polish army. He arranged for both the Melnikovites and the Banderaites, who, however, were not included in the committee, and even a group of socialists - followers of Petlyura, headed by the former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian People's Republic Konstantin Levitsky. Shandruk was made commander-in-chief of the Liberation Army of Ukraine and nominally subordinated to him the 14th SS division "Galicia", which also became the 1st Ukrainian. The Germans and the leaders of the committee considered the possibility of creating a 2nd Ukrainian division, in contrast to the first - from immigrants from Eastern Ukraine, but it was never formed. Vlasov offered Shandruk to unite with the ROA, but the latter rejected this project, as well as the idea of forming a special East Ukrainian division as part of the Russian Liberation Army. On March

28, 1945, at the last meeting of the KONR, it was decided to concentrate the Vlasov army, which agreed to enter into its

composition of the 15th Cossack corps and the Cossack militia - the "Cossack camp" of ataman T.I. Domanov, a former major of the Red Army, stationed in Northern Italy, as well as other national formations in the region of the Austrian and Italian Alps, in order to either agree on surrender Western allies with the possible use of them as a separate army in the fight against the USSR or Japan, or go to the mountains, unite with the Serbian Chetniks of Mihailovic and wage partisan struggle in anticipation of an early, as the members of the KONR hoped, an armed conflict between the USSR and the Western powers.

But on April 13, the German command threw the 1st division of the ROA under the leadership of S.K. Bunyachenko into an attack on the Soviet Erlenhof bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder, near Frankfurt. At first, the Vlasovites advanced 500 meters, capturing several Soviet fortifications, but then, under flank fire, they were forced to stop. The massive air attack of the German aviation and the Air Force of the ROA, led by General V.I. Maltsev, a former colonel of the Red Army, did not help either. Seeing that the attack failed, Bunyachenko withdrew the division from the front, which the Germans had to put up with: in the last days of the Third Reich, the Wehrmacht did not want to increase the number of its opponents.

By that time, Vlasov and his headquarters decided that it was dangerous to go to Austria, to the area of \u200b\u200bthe notorious "Alpine fortress", since there could be many SS units loyal to Hitler. Therefore, Bunyachenko was ordered to go to Bohemia. The 2nd division of the ROA under the command of the former colonel of the Red Army G. A. Zverev, which was part of the Austrian army group, as well as the 599th brigade from Denmark, was also sent there (this Vlasov unit did not manage to enter Czechoslovakia). In late April-early May, the Vlasovites entered into an agreement with the Czech military organization Bartosh and the Alekes group, close to the Czechoslovak exile government and preparing an anti-German uprising in Prague. In exchange for military assistance to the rebels, Vlasov and his army counted on political asylum in Czechoslovakia, not knowing that, according to an agreement between the Soviet and American commands, Prague should be occupied by the Red Army. Bunyachenko's division on May 6 and 7 attacked the German garrison in Prague, occupied the airfield



facilities, providing significant assistance to the rebels. However, on May 7, communication groups of the Red Army appeared in Prague.

It became clear that Soviet troops would enter the city. The German liaison officer at Vlasov, Major Schwenninger, reports a typical conversation between Bunyachenko and Soviet Major Kostenko. The officer of the Red Army conveyed to the commander of the 1st division of the ROA Stalin's wish that he "with his entire division return to the arms of the Motherland." Bunyachenko "delivered to Stalin a response wish that could not be translated into German." On May 8, the 1st division left Prague and now again, together with the German units, moved to the Pilsen area towards the Americans. She, together with Vlasov, managed to enter the American occupation zone in the Czech Republic, but here Vlasov, Bunyachenko and a number of other senior officers of the ROA were extradited by the Americans to the Red Army.

Later, most of the soldiers and officers of the division were also repatriated, the 2nd division of the ROA was captured by Soviet troops even before crossing the lines of the American army. The air force of the ROA, led by V. I. Maltsev, managed to surrender to the Americans. Maltsev himself and a number of officers of his headquarters were returned to the USSR in 1946, but most of the personnel escaped extradition, as did some of the soldiers and officers of the Bunyachenko division and Vlasov's headquarters. Three of the four

commanders of the regiments of this division (Sakharov, Arkhipov, Artemiev) also survived. In total, out of 50 thousand Vlasovites, at least 10 thousand people escaped extradition. According to the Yalta agreements, the Cossacks Panvitsa and Domanova and the soldiers of the 162nd division, who had surrendered to the Western allies, were also returned to the USSR.

The Baltic SS divisions surrendered to the Red Army in Courland as part of a general surrender. More fortunate was the 14th Ukrainian SS division under the command of Shandruk, who surrendered to the British in Austria. 10,000 of its soldiers were not recognized as Soviet citizens, because they lived in Poland before the start of the war, although, according to data cited by N. Tolstoy, from 20 to 50% of its soldiers were in fact residents of Eastern Ukraine and had indisputable Soviet citizenship.

The demand for the repatriation of Ukrainian SS men, specially announced by Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, did not help either. However, in the confusion of the first post-war months, the Allies

handed over to the USSR and a number of white emigrants, who were not formally subject to the requirement of repatriation. So, the officers of the Cossack corps, which consisted mainly of emigrants, were transferred. It also turned out to be a kind of "ideological inspirer" of the corps, the former white generals P. N. Krasnov and A. G. Shkuro, although they not only never were citizens of the USSR, but did not even occupy any command posts in the corps and could not to commit any war crimes because they did not participate in the battles. The West still hoped to continue cooperation with the powerful Soviet dictator ... Vlasov and all his generals, as well as

Shkuro, Krasnov, Domanov, as well as many of the captured ordinary collaborators, were executed. Thousands of others were waiting for the Stalinist camps... The Soviet

Economy: Truth and Myth

(Published: Literary Kirgizstan. Frunze. 1989. No 5.) in the recently published reference book "USSR in Figures in 1987", {1} that we have not thought about what is behind this for a long time. After all, the gap in the level and quality of life with the same United States is colossal, this will be confirmed by any citizen of our country who has been there, and dry statistical calculations will also confirm that we lag behind the United States by 3 (!) times only in terms of per capita meat consumption. { 2} I will not reveal any secret by saying that our economy still retains strict centralized planning, even if it is now called "state order". If you do not

fulfill the plan, then you will be left without a bonus, which has already become an indispensable and significant part of the salary, and now, with the introduction of state acceptance, sometimes without a salary at all, if the company's products are rejected. Planned indicators lowered from above very often do not take into account the real possibilities of enterprises and farms. But the control figures are the law. And in order to fulfill them, managers have to go for postscripts - a deliberate overestimation of information about the goods and services produced. The temptation to "fulfill" and even "overfulfill" the plan with one stroke of the pen is too great. There are other additions, so to speak, absolutely legal - the maximum

an increase in the cost of production, for which the most expensive raw materials, materials and equipment are used, and the number of intermediate operations performed each time at a separate enterprise increases dramatically. All this leads to a significant increase in the gross value of products due to double, triple, quadruple counting, but without any increase in the physical volume of manufactured products or improvement in their consumer properties.

But there are also "material annotations" that you can literally touch with your hand, but the trouble is that they do not affect the standard of living of the population or, say, the country's defense capability, since they do not have consumer properties and, therefore, they are not values in the political-economic sense of the word. These are tractors and harvesters rusting in the open air due to the lack of the necessary hanging equipment. These are machines that are obsolete before they are going to be installed, and doomed to be at best scrapped for the steel industry, and at worst, simply crumble with rust. This is steel, in terms of smelting and imports of which we have long and firmly held the first place in the world. These are shoes and clothes that are destined to rot in warehouses. These are construction projects that drag on for decades, only to be mothballed later. This, finally, services for the repair of household electrical appliances and electronics, which have become our daily concern due to the extremely low quality of domestic refrigerators and tape recorders, televisions and players. In terms of the volume of such services, we also clearly occupy a leading position in the world.

It is clear that all the above circumstances greatly distort the Soviet statistics of cost indicators - national income and gross national product (GNP). In the statistics of countries with a market economy, both developing and developed capitalist, there is no such distortion, since there are no phenomena that generate it - postscripts and products produced, but not sold on the market. The appearance of such products in a market economy is the beginning of a crisis of overproduction. One more phenomenon that affects our well-being

should be mentioned. We will talk about the so-called "shadow economy".

In the West, its role is extremely great. These are all goods and services hidden from the tax authorities and produced either in officially registered enterprises or in clandestine factories. It is known, for example, that when, in 1987, official statistics in Italy included goods and services of the shadow economy in the country's GNP, in per capita terms, Italy caught up with Japan in this indicator, which back in 1983 lagged behind 1.6 times.<sup>{3}</sup> Sometimes in the West the scale of the Soviet shadow economy is considered just as significant. Thus, the American scientist V. G. Trembl believes that in the USSR the production of this sector is about 30% of the official GNP. <sup>{4}</sup> Only one thing can be said about this - if this were actually the case, then it would not be bad. At least there would not be such a huge shortage of consumer goods and services. Indeed, in the West, the "shadow economy" produces mainly what is in high demand among the population. Yes, if we also take the official GNP, the State Statistics Committee! After all, our national income, according to the already mentioned statistical guide, reaches almost two-thirds of the American one. If we also had "left" products reaching almost a third of the official GNP, then our GNP would generally be equal to the US GNP. Everyone would be dressed and shod in the latest fashion and served in the highest class, no worse than in America. Only how far we are in reality from such a rosy picture! And the "shadow economy" is no help here. Because in the USSR it has

a pronounced parasitic character and adds almost nothing to the social pie. Its dealers profit from postscripts, bribes, deficit speculation, drug trafficking. They (with the exception of "guild workers") have practically no new values.

create.

I would also note a huge gap in the quality of the vast majority of goods produced in the USSR and in the West. It is known, for example, that Soviet Zhiguli in freely convertible currency are sold several times cheaper than Japanese Toyotas and Italian Fiats, and if anyone buys a Volga in the West, then at a price close to the cost of scrap metal. All these considerations made me doubt

the official data of the State Statistics Committee and try to independently

to compare the main economic indicators of the USSR and the USA. Comparison of these two countries is a long tradition in our economic science. After all, they are close in terms of population (the population of the USSR in 1983 was only 1.16 times the population of the United States), and their territories are vast, and the economy has an extremely diversified, diversified structure, and climatic conditions are similar.

In principle, the national income in the GNP of the USSR and the USA can be compared in two ways: either to calculate American indicators according to Soviet norms and prices in rubles, or Soviet ones - according to American ones in dollars. The first method has to be rejected, since there are no postscripts or imaginary values in the American economy, it would never occur to anyone to increase the cost of products with the help of postscripts (since this will only cause an increase in the amount of tax), and therefore it is simply impossible to adequately recalculate the US national income in rubles. The second way remains. Recalculation according to it automatically excludes all postscripts and shams from Soviet indicators. Only the "shadow economy" remains outside the calculations (in the United States, it is largely formed due to the phenomenon, the opposite of postscripts - the concealment of manufactured products from taxation). But as was shown above, the American "shadow economy" significantly exceeds the Soviet "shadow economy" in terms of output. Therefore, my calculation may somewhat overestimate the true ratio of indicators in favor of the USSR, but certainly not

in favor of the United States. A group of researchers from the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR compared the national incomes of the USA and the USSR. His results are published in the newspaper "Arguments and Facts" (1988, No. 47, p. 2), and I used them. In the 1980s, the share of wages in the US national income was stable, remaining at the level of 60%. Wages make up about 90% of the personal income of the US population, so the share of personal income in national income is approximately 66%. In the USSR in 1985, the share of wages in national income was 37% (in our country wages are practically equal to all personal incomes of citizens). The rest - 34% of the national income of the United States and 63% - of the USSR (what is left after subtracting the share of personal consumption).

production) necessary to meet a given level of personal consumption, and military spending by the state. There is no need to prove that defense spending is only an additional burden for the national economy, since neither the army nor the military industry creates any material wealth.

In the United States, according to scientists from the Stockholm Institute for International Peace Research (SIPRI), American military spending in the 1980s averaged about 7% of GNP, or, considering that in the United States, national income is approximately 89% of GNP, approximately 8% of the national income.<sup>{5}</sup> The remaining part of the American national income - approximately 26% - is precisely the accumulation (you can call it conditionally net, that is, cleared of military spending) that is necessary to maintain the current level of personal income in the United States consumption - about 66% of national income. Assuming that in the USSR the ratio between personal consumption and conditionally net accumulation is approximately the same as in the USA, I approximately determined the share of conditional net accumulation in the Soviet national income - about 15%. A considerable part of the national income falls on the military expenditures of the USSR. In the GNP, their share will be somewhat lower - 42%, if we accept for the USSR the ratio between national income and GNP that exists in the USA. Now we finally have the

opportunity to equate the Soviet and American indicators to each other. After all, military parity between the USSR and the USA as a whole is an indisputable thing, at least since the 70s, so the military spending of the two countries can be considered approximately equivalent. The entire Soviet GNP is only about 16% of the US (on a per capita basis, about 14%). With this in mind, you can see what place our country occupies in the world in terms of GNP (both in terms of total volume and in terms of per capita).

A group of American researchers compared most countries and territories of the world in terms of per capita GNP. Calculations were made in conditional dollars, taking into account the different purchasing power of various national currencies in relation to 1983.<sup>{6}</sup> The per capita GNP of the United States was determined at 14,120 dollars. This means that the per capita GNP of the USSR will be equal to approximately 1975 dollars.

This puts our country in 53rd place in a group of 135 countries and territories, behind South Korea (2010 dollars) and ahead of Brazil (1880 dollars). As is clear from the data published in the UN Statistical Yearbook for 1983/84, a similar situation is observed in other socio-economic indicators. Thus, in terms of average life expectancy, the USSR ranks from 47th to 56th among 156 countries, in terms of infant mortality - 90th out of 200, in terms of telephone penetration (the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants) - 66th out of 147, and in terms of the number of cars per capita - 74th among 139 countries and territories (according to this last indicator, we are 13 times behind the United States!). The number of passenger cars per capita reflects, strictly speaking, the standard of living of

the population, rather than general economic indicators. The standard of living in the USSR is relatively worse than it could be, based on the level of GNP per capita, since our country is forced to bear the exorbitant burden of military spending. If we subtract from our GNP "excessive" military spending in excess of the American and world norm in excess of the 7% level (in the vast majority of states they are below the level of 7% of GNP), then the size of such a "cleaned" GNP will be equal to 1285 dollars and to a greater extent reflect the position of our country in the world hierarchy in terms of the standard of living of the population. According to this indicator, the USSR falls into the same group of countries with the Congo (\$1,230), Turkey (\$1,240), Tunisia (\$1,290),

Jamaica (\$1,300) and the Dominican Republic (\$1,370). So, both in terms of per capita GNP and in terms of living standards, the Soviet Union has to be included in the group of developing countries. Therefore, all the claims of some leaders of these countries about the allegedly insufficient assistance of the USSR to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in comparison with the assistance provided by the developed capitalist countries can hardly be considered substantiated.

My calculations are fully confirmed by the data given by the famous Soviet economist G. Khanin. He tried to clean our economic indicators from the influence of inflation and determined that for 1928-1987. the national income of the USSR increased by 6.9 times (according to the calculations of the State Statistics Committee - by 89.5 times), while

over the same period, the national income of the United States increased by 6.1 times, Great Britain - by 3.8 times and France - by 4.6 times. Meanwhile, in 1893, the industrial production of the USA, Great Britain, France and Tsarist Russia was correlated as 5.0:2.2:1.5:1.0. By 1913 there was no significant change in the ratio of the main economic indicators of Russia and the leading industrial powers of the world. In 1928, the USSR, according to the main economic indicators, including the total national income, approximately reached the level of 1913. The ratio of the national incomes of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR in 1928. was approximately equal to 7:2, 2:1.4:1 (I repeat that ideally the ratio of two or more countries in terms of GNP, national income and industrial production will be the same). This means that in 1987 this ratio was 6.2:1 between the USA and the USSR, 0.9:1 between Great Britain and the USSR, and 1:1 between France and the USSR. According to my calculations, in 1983 the GNP of the USA and the USSR were related as 6.2:1, while those of

France, Great Britain and the USSR were almost equal. As you can see, the results are almost identical.

The USSR in terms of total GNP ranks fifth in the world, behind the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and (very slightly) France. In sixth place is the United Kingdom, which has almost caught up with us, and then Italy and Canada. The situation is almost the same as in tsarist Russia in 1913, only Japan has taken the place of Great Britain ahead of us.

My estimate is almost 4 times lower than the official one given in the reference book "USSR in Figures in 1987", which states that the national income of the USSR in 1987 was 64% of the national income of the United States. This means that the postscripts and the "imaginary" cost distort our statistical data by about the same number of times, overestimate them. With this in mind, we must also assess the relative size of our annual budget deficit. As shown by E. Gaidar and O. Latsis, our deficit is about 11% of GNP, and the official GNP, not cleared of distortions. But since the official GNP is overestimated, in my opinion, by about 4 times, in reality the deficit reaches 44-45% of GNP. Critical world economic science considers a budget deficit of 8-10% of GNP. Then galloping, uncontrollable inflation begins.



The enormous size of the Soviet budget deficit clearly indicates that if market pricing is introduced in the economy on any significant scale, we will face a real inflationary catastrophe (growth in prices by 1000 percent or more per year) with unpredictable social, economic and political consequences. Cooperative prices today, sometimes ten times higher than the state prices, showing what potential inflation can be in our country.

A realistic view of the true place of our country in the world economic hierarchy dictates urgent measures. An immediate rejection of centralized mandatory planning and a transition to a predominantly market-based regulation is impossible due to the above reason. The only way out today is a sharp and unilateral (!) reduction in military spending, the fastest conversion (transfer to peaceful purposes) of the main part of the military industry and scientific research. Military spending should provide us with the possibility of guaranteed destruction of the enemy in the event of a retaliatory nuclear strike. At the same time, transfer most of our enterprises to a joint-stock basis, which will make it possible to mobilize funds from the population, as well as investments from abroad, for development needs. Small private ownership in the service sector and in small industrial enterprises should be allowed, which will make it possible to streamline the current individual labor and cooperative sectors.

In agriculture, under certain conditions, it is worth allowing private ownership of land, and the initial allotment should be for a purely symbolic payment. This will make the peasant a true master of the land. Lease, even unlimited, will not give such a feeling and responsibility for the land. Recall that we already had an indefinite lease, but it lasted only 11 years - from 1918 to 1929. Such an experience will alarm anyone. So today's tenant will first of all strive to get the maximum possible income from the land in the shortest possible time, which will inevitably lead to soil depletion and deterioration of the already difficult environmental situation in the country. In addition, now the tenants are firmly tied to the collective farms, state farms and local Soviet

bodies that in practice are able to dictate their terms to them. One should not think that

the transfer of land into private hands will liquidate the collective farms. This process is slow, for decades (as well as shareholderization); viable collective farms will undoubtedly remain. In addition, few peasants today will agree to take the land into private ownership. Yes, and the peasants who have taken the land will inevitably unite in various kinds of cooperatives (this is also evidenced by the experience of Western countries). The fact that the processes will be extended over time guarantees us against violent inflation, and the conversion of the military industry will smooth out both the budget and trade deficits. Of course, changes in the economy will be positive and irreversible only if political life is fully and consistently democratized. Only then will we be able to reach the level of industrialized countries in a few decades (but not in 5-10 years, as some people think). Notes: {1}USSR in numbers in 1987. Moscow, 1988, p. 288. {2} Arguments and Facts. 1988. No 47. P. 2. {3} Abroad. 1988. No 29. P. 11. {4}

Sputnik. 1988.

No 10. P. 46. {5} SIPRI Yearbook 1987. Oxford, 1987, pp. 173-179. {6} World Bank World Development Report 1985.

Washington, 1988, pp. 174-175, 231.

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